The Issue of No Moral Agency in Climate Change |
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Authors: | Theresa Scavenius |
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Institution: | 1.Department of Political Science,University of Copenhagen,Copenhagen,Denmark |
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Abstract: | The dominant methodological assumptions in climate ethical debates are rational-individualistic. The aim of this paper is to examine whether the rational-individualistic methodological framework is compatible with a theory of moral responsibility for climate change. I employ three fitness criteria of moral agency: (1) a normatively significant choice, (2) sufficient knowledge and (3) control. I demonstrate that the rational-individualistic methodology does not provide a framework in which rational agents meet the three criteria. I conclude that rational-individualistic agents are not fit to be held morally responsible for climate change. The paper demonstrates that the dominant climate-ethical view rests on a methodology that does not allow for a conceptualisation of a moral agent of climate change. |
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