Endogenous vs. exogenous regulations in the commons |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group, Wageningen University, P.O. Box 8130, 6700 EW Wageningen, The Netherlands;2. Centre for Ecological and Evolutionary Synthesis (CEES), Department of Biosciences, University of Oslo, Postboks 1066 Blindern, 0316 Oslo, Norway;3. Integrative Ecology Group, Estación Biológica de Doñana, C/Américo Vespucio S/N, E-41092 Sevilla, Spain;1. Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University, 186 Rubenstein Hall, Box 90312, Durham, NC 27708, USA;2. Facultad de Administración, Universidad de Los Andes, Calle 21 # 1–20 Ed. SD, Bogotá, Colombia;3. School of Rural and Environmental Studies, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Transv 4 # 42 - 00. 8th floor, Bogotá, Colombia;4. Consultant Office of Evaluation and Oversight, Inter-American Development Bank, USA;1. Programa Magíster en Economía de Recursos Naturales y del Medio Ambiente, Universidad de Concepción, Victoria 471, Barrio Universitario, Concepción, Chile;2. Centro de Conservación Marina, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile;3. Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Concepción, Victoria 471, Barrio Universitario, Concepción, Chile;4. Interdisciplinary Center for Aquaculture Research (INCAR), Chile;5. Research Nucleus on Environmental and Natural Resource Economics (NENRE), Chile;1. The Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm, Sweden;2. Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden |
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| Abstract: | It is widely believed that there is strong experimental evidence to support the idea that exogenously imposed regulations crowd out the intrinsic motivations of common pool resource (CPR) users to refrain from over-harvesting. We introduce a novel experimental design that attempts to disentangle potential confounds in previous experiments. A key feature of our experimental design is to have the exact same regulations chosen endogenously as those that are imposed exogenously. When we compare the same regulations chosen endogenously to those externally imposed, we observe no differences in extraction levels among CPR users in a laboratory experiment. We also observe no differences between weak external regulations and no regulations, after controlling for a potential confound. However, when we add communication to our endogenous treatment, we observe significant behavioral differences between endogenous regulations with communication and exogenous regulations without communication. Our results suggest that externally imposed regulations do not crowd out intrinsic motivations in the lab and they confirm that communication facilitates cooperation to reduce extraction. |
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| Keywords: | Resource management Endogenous rule-making External regulations Crowding out |
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