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农地整治项目投资分摊博弈机理研究——以政府和企业为例
引用本文:周厚智,汪文雄,杨钢桥.农地整治项目投资分摊博弈机理研究——以政府和企业为例[J].中国人口.资源与环境,2012,22(6):109-114.
作者姓名:周厚智  汪文雄  杨钢桥
作者单位:华中农业大学土地管理学院,湖北武汉,430070
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目,中国博士后基金项目
摘    要:投资主体、建设主体与受益主体不一致是导致我国农地整治项目效率偏低的根本原因,公私合作(PPP)模式是从制度层面提升我国农地整治项目效率的理想模式。本文首先界定了农地整治项目PPP模式,分析了PPP模式下农地整治项目的运行机制及其博弈关系,建立了农地整治项目投资的成本收益函数;然后以政府与农业产业化企业间的博弈为例,在探讨他们博弈要素的基础上构建了投资博弈模型,提出了二者理想的投资决策边界;最后用一个典型案例论证了本文的分析结果。研究结果表明,新增耕地面积和项目建设成本是影响农地整治项目效益发挥的主要因素。农地整治项目PPP模式顺利实施的条件是:当项目政府补贴较低时,企业投入高建设成本得到的支付不低于其保留支付。项目高效运行的条件是:当项目政府补贴较高时,企业投入低建设成本得到的支付不高于其保留支付;与投入低建设成本相比,企业选择高建设成本得到农地经营收益的增加值不小于其增加的成本值。

关 键 词:农地整治  PPP模式  博弈  分摊投资

Study on the Mechanism of Investment Allotment Game of Rural Land Consolidation Projects :A Case Study on Government and Enterprise
ZHOU Hou-zhi , WANG Wen-xiong , YANG Gang-qiao.Study on the Mechanism of Investment Allotment Game of Rural Land Consolidation Projects :A Case Study on Government and Enterprise[J].China Polulation.Resources and Environment,2012,22(6):109-114.
Authors:ZHOU Hou-zhi  WANG Wen-xiong  YANG Gang-qiao
Institution:(College of Land Management,Huazhong Agricultural University,Wuhan Hubei 430070,China)
Abstract:The primary reason for low efficiency of rural land consolidation projects(RLCP) is that the investment subject,constructor and the beneficial subject are not consistent in China.PPP mode is an ideal mode which can improve the efficiency of RLCP from the institutional level.Firstly,this paper defined PPP model of RLCP,and discussed the operation mechanism and game relations of RLCP in PPP model,then established the cost-benefit function of investment of RLCP.Taking the game between government and leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization as an example,the paper established the game model based on the analysis of their game ingredients,and found an ideal boundary of their investment.Finally,the paper used a typical case to prove the results of it.It is concluded that the area of increased arable land and the cost of project construction are the main influencing factors to the benefit of RLCP.The condition for the smooth implementation of projects in PPP mode is that the payoff of higher construction cost invested by enterprises is no less than retention payment when the subsidies of the project from the government are low.The condition for higher efficiency of the project is that the payoff of lower construction cost invested by enterprises is no more than retention payment when the subsidies of the project from the government are higher.Compared with lower construction cost invested,when an enterprises chooses higher construction cost,the added value of land management benefits is no less than the increased cost.
Keywords:rural land consolidation  PPP model  game theory  allocation investment
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