首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

全球低碳减排的合作竞争及其博弈格局分析
引用本文:郭志达. 全球低碳减排的合作竞争及其博弈格局分析[J]. 环境保护科学, 2011, 37(4): 44-46
作者姓名:郭志达
作者单位:大连交通大学管理学院,大连,116028
基金项目:辽宁省社会科学规划基金
摘    要:在全球围绕"低碳"减排博弈的背景下,从合作竞争的角度,分析国际低碳减排过程中的多个缔约国家之间的合作竞争行为及其动态平衡过程。重点用博弈论的相关原理对国际低碳减排市场背后的多个利益群体做一个全局性的分析,对全球低碳减排过程中的一些利益争夺现象进行解释,试图揭露出全球低碳减排博弈背后各个利益群体的谋划与动机;最后提醒中国在下一轮的低碳减排博弈过程中要有所准备。

关 键 词:低碳减排  合作竞争  博弈理论

Analysis on the Cooperation and Competition and Game Pattern of Global Low-Carbon Emission Reduction
Guo Zhi-da. Analysis on the Cooperation and Competition and Game Pattern of Global Low-Carbon Emission Reduction[J]. Environmental Protection Science, 2011, 37(4): 44-46
Authors:Guo Zhi-da
Abstract:In the world around the low-carbon emission reduction game background,from the perspective of cooperation and competition,the dynamic equilibrium process and the competitive behavior are analyzed in this paper.Focusing on the relevant principles of game theory,it gives a global analysis on global carbon emission reduction market,and explains the phenomenon of interests scramble during the global carbon emission reduction process and exposes the planning and motivation of the various interest groups.Finally,the countermeasures to China are proposed to remind China to arrange everything in advance during the next round of low-carbon emission reduction game process.
Keywords:Low-Carbon Emission Reduction Cooperation and Competition Game Theory
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号