Lease delay rights: Market valued permits and offshore leasing |
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| Institution: | 1. Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong;2. University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong;1. Office of Communications UK;2. Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche ed Aziendali “M. Fanno”, Università di Padova, Italy;3. School of Economics and Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, UK;1. Toulouse School of Economics: 1, Esplanade de l''Université, Toulouse, 31080, France;2. Università di Bergamo: 2, via dei Caniana, Bergamo, 24127, Italy;3. Luiss: 32, Viale Romania, Roma, 00197, Italy |
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| Abstract: | Sealed bid auctions for offshore federal mineral holdings are a source of substantial litigation brought by environmental groups and the states against the US government. A basic utility maximizing model and explanations based on externalities and wealth seeking behaviour are used to predict a willingness to pay by interest groups to delay a lease on specific tracts. A method is developed that incorporates bids for delay into the auction process. Estimates of the minimum payment to delay a lease, based on data from two lease sales, are compared to the budget of selected environmental groups, states and local governments. |
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