Remanufacturing |
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| Authors: | Sophie Bernard |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur, W. Bengal 721302, India;2. Department of Industrial & Systems Engineering, Wayne State University, 4815 Fourth Street, Detroit, MI 48202, USA;1. School of Economics & Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou, China;2. Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Hong Kong, China;3. Business School, University of Technology Sydney, Sydney, Australia;1. Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, 2053 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2;2. Food and Resource Economics, The Faculty of Land and Food Systems, University of British Columbia, 2357 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z4;1. Department of Technology and Innovation, Centre for Sustainable Supply Chain Engineering, Campusvej 55, DK-5230, Odense M, Denmark;2. Department of Management and Business Economics, Universidad de León, Campus de Vegazana s/n, 24071, León, Spain;3. Department of Business Management and Sociology, Universidad de Extremadura, Avenida de Elvas s/n, 06006 Badajoz, Spain;4. Department of Financial Economics II, University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015, Bilbao, Spain |
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| Abstract: | This paper presents a theoretical model of remanufacturing where a duopoly of original manufacturers produces a component of a final good. The specific component that needs to be replaced during the lifetime of the final good creates a secondary market where independent remanufacturers enter the competition. An environmental regulation imposing a minimum level of remanufacturability is also introduced. The main results establish that, while collusion of the firms on the level of remanufacturability increases both profit and consumer surplus, a social planner could use collusion as a substitute for an environmental regulation. However, if an environmental regulation is to be implemented, collusion should be repressed since competition supports the public intervention better. Under certain circumstances, the environmental regulation can increase both profit and consumer surplus. Part of this result supports the Porter Hypothesis, which stipulates that industries respecting environmental regulations can see their profits increase. |
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