首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     


Optimal charges on river effluent from lumped and distributed sources
Authors:Alain Haurie  Jacek B. Krawczyk
Affiliation:(1) HEC‐LOGILAB, Department of Management Studies, University of Geneva, 102 Carl Vogt, CH‐1211 Geneva 4, Switzerland;(2) Commerce and Administration Faculty, Victoria University of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand
Abstract:We propose a modelling framework for the design of a Pigouvian effluent tax, in an environmental management problem implicating several economic agents located in a river basin. The proposed charging system allows for the agents' geographical position relative to the river's sections, at which environmental standards are to be enforced, and takes into account the possible different market structures within which the agents are operating. In particular, we consider industrial agents competing on an oligopolistic market, and a set of farmers acting as price takers on a large market. A regional authority's goal is to induce agents to some sort of cooperation which would result in the satisfaction of the common environmental constraints. The economic process on one side, and the pollution transport and accumulation on the other, constitute two dynamic processes in two different time scales. As the economic process is much slower than the other process we can neglect the latter's transients and concentrate on the time invariant steady state solutions to the transportation equation. The model thus constructed has some noncooperative game and optimal control problem's features with space being the ‘running’ variable. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.
Keywords:dynamic games  optimal taxation  lumped and distributed emissions  coupled constraints  normalised equilibrium
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号