Community pressure for green behavior |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Ottawa, 55 Laurier Avenue East, Ottawa, Canada K1N 6N5;2. Department of Economics, Birkbeck, University of London, Malet St, London WC1E 7HX, United Kingdom;1. Resources for the Future, Gothenburg University, FEEM, CESifo Research Network;2. Statistics Norway, CREE and CESifo Research Network;3. Norwegian University of Life Sciences, CREE and CESifo Research Network;1. Indiana University, School of Public and Environmental Affairs, 1315 E 10th St, Rm 231, Bloomington, IN 47405-1701, United States;2. Indiana University Kelley School of Business, 1309 E 10th St, Rm 456, Bloomington, IN 47405-1701, United States;1. Academy of Chinese Energy Strategy, China University of Petroleum (Beijing), China;2. Division of Economics and Business, Colorado School of Mines, USA;1. Department of Economics, University of Richmond, VA, USA;2. Department of Economics, Binghamton University, P.O. Box 6000, Binghamton, NY, 13902-6000, USA |
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| Abstract: | The desire to avoid rousing community hostility may encourage firms to behave in an environmentally responsible manner. Firms may engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) to maintain community support and/or to regain the support of a community where it has been lost. It has been conjectured that such ‘informal regulation’ could effectively replace formal intervention in some settings, and usefully complement it in others. We explore these conjectures with mixed results. Informal regulation is necessarily less efficient than a well-designed formal alternative and the pattern of green behavior induced by the threat of community hostility may increase or decrease welfare. The existence of community pressure may increase or decrease the optimal calibration of a formal intervention (in this case an environmental tax) and may complement or detract from the incentives generated by an optimally calibrated tax. |
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