考虑恐怖袭击下危险品运输安全监管的演化博弈与稳定性分析

为了提高恐怖袭击背景下的危险品运输安全水平和政府监管能力，首先构建政府监管部门、危险品运输企业和恐怖袭击者的三方演化博弈模型；其次引入政府动态惩罚机制和动态惩罚-补贴机制，进而采用系统动力学仿真分析动态惩罚和动态惩罚-补贴下的局中人的演化稳定策略。研究结果表明：给定情形下，引入动态惩罚机制能弥补原有模型没有稳定策略的不足；引入动态惩罚-补贴机制的模型可以演化出稳定的纯策略。

Evolutionary game and stability analysis of safety supervision on hazmat transportation considering terrorist attack

In order to improve the safety level on hazmat transportation and the supervision ability of government under the background of terrorist attacks,a tripartite evolutionary game model of governmental supervision department,hazmat transportation enterprises and terrorist attackers was constructed.The governmental dynamic penalty mechanism and dynamic penalty-subsidy mechanism were introduced,and the system dynamics was used to simulate and analyze the evolutionary stable strategies of players under the dynamic penalty and dynamic penalty-subsidy.The results showed that under the given conditions,introducing into the dynamic penalty mechanism could make up for the lack of stable strategy in the original model.Furthermore,the model introducing into the dynamic penalty-subsidy mechanism could evolve the stable pure strategy.