中国水资源管理博弈特征分析

随着中国水资源匮乏和水污染态势日益严峻．建立一个面向效率和公平的水资源管理机制的需求日益凸现。本文在比较传统行政模式和市场模式下水权管理不同特征的基础上,分别从静态和动态两个角度．从水量和水质两个维度分析了两种模式下的水用户博弈特征。结果表明：政府管制会出现“政府失灵”。无法实现政府和水用户之间的激励相容;在完全市场机制配置情况下,由于个人和集体理性的不一致,会导致水资源被过度污染、治污的公共产品提供不足等“市场失灵”,基于不同模式下各自的利与弊,无论哪一种单纯的管理模式都不能满足水资源的可持续发展要求。认为中国水资源管理需要把水量和水质、政府管制与市场机制两种配置方式的优势相结合,提出了一种准市场水权交易机制分析框架。

Study of Game Theories Characters of Water Resources Management in China

Along with the growing scarcity of water shortage and increasing water pollution in China,the need for an efficient and equitable management mechanism about water resources has increased.From the point of view of static game and dynamic game as well as two dimensions namely water flows and water quality,this paper compares the different game characters respectively under traditional government regulation and pure market mechanism.The results show "Government Failure" that cannot realize incentive compatibility between government and water users under the former model;Meanwhile,they also show "Government Failure" like over-polluted water and scarcity of public products about pollution controlling under the latter model due to rational variance between individual and collectivity.It goes against sustainable development of water resources under current water management pattern since each of them has its respective advantage and disadvantage.In the light of analyses,a framework about the quasi-market mechanism is put forward,which combines two models and two dimensions as mentioned above.