Two concepts of dignity for humans and non-human organisms in the context of genetic engineering

The 1992 incorporation of an article by referendum in the Swiss Constitution mandating that the federal government issue regulations on the use of genetic material that take into account the dignity of nonhuman organism raises philosophical questions about how we should understand what is meant by “the dignity of nonhuman animals,” and about what sort of moral demands arise from recognizing this dignity with respect to their genetic engineering. The first step in determining what is meant is to clarify the difference between dignity when applied to humans and when applied to nonhumans. Several conceptions of human dignity should be rejected in favor of a fourth conception: the right not to be degraded. This right implies that those who have it have the cognitive capacities that are prerequisite for self-respect. In the case of nonhuman organisms that lack this capacity, respecting their dignity requires the recognition that their inherent value, which is tied to their abilities to pursue their own good, be respected. This value is not absolute, as it is in the case of humans, so it does not prohibit breeding manipulations that make organisms more useful to humans. But it does restrict morally how sentient animals can be used. In regard to genetic engineering, this conception requires that animals be allowed the uninhibited development of species specific functions, a position shared by Holland and Attfield, as opposed to the Original Purpose conception proposed by Fox and the Integrity of the Genetic Make-up position proposed by Rolston. The inherent value conception of dignity, as here defended, is what is meant in the Swiss Constitution article. This paper is a slightly revised version of a paper that had been published in German in 1998 (“Menschenwürde vs. Würde der Kreatur,” Freiburg i.Br.).