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动态激励视角下建筑工人不安全行为演化博弈分析
引用本文:陈艳,吕云翔,柴访,王晓峰.动态激励视角下建筑工人不安全行为演化博弈分析[J].安全与环境工程,2020(1):197-203.
作者姓名:陈艳  吕云翔  柴访  王晓峰
作者单位:青岛理工大学管理工程学院;烟建集团有限公司第四分公司
基金项目:山东省社会科学规划研究项目(16CGLJ07);青岛市哲学社会科学规划项目(QDSKL1701137)。
摘    要:现有的建筑行业单一激励机制不能实现建筑工人和工程项目管理者双方期望收益的最大化,而不同条件下的动态激励机制能更好地实现建筑工人不安全行为概率的最小化。从建筑工人和工程项目管理者双方的利益动机出发,构建了以建筑工人和工程项目管理者为主体的动态激励机制下建筑工人不安全行为演化博弈模型,探究双方关注的利益焦点、策略选择条件和行为演变过程,并采用系统动力学方法探究了以经济激励为主的正向激励机制与以经济惩罚为主的负向激励机制相结合的动态激励机制对建筑工人不安全行为的影响,仿真分析了该博弈模型的演化趋势。结果表明:当采用正向激励机制与负向激励机制相结合的混合动态策略时,仿真曲线呈现围绕中心振荡的波动性,说明不存在进化稳定策略;提高安全奖励的额度、加大对建筑工人不安全行为的惩罚力度、采用与不安全行为收益相关的动态惩罚策略均可降低建筑工人做出不安全行为的概率;通过改变建筑工人的收益结构,可引导其选择安全行为策略。

关 键 词:建筑工人  不安全行为  动态激励机制  演化博弈  SD仿真分析模型

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Unsafe Behavior of Construction Workers from the Perspective of Dynamic Incentives
CHEN Yan,LYU Yunxiang,CHAI Fang,WANG Xiaofeng.Evolutionary Game Analysis of Unsafe Behavior of Construction Workers from the Perspective of Dynamic Incentives[J].Safety and Environmental Engineering,2020(1):197-203.
Authors:CHEN Yan  LYU Yunxiang  CHAI Fang  WANG Xiaofeng
Institution:(School of Management Engineering,Qingdao University of Technology,Qingdao 266520,China;The Fourth Branch of Yantai Construction Group Co.,Ltd.,Yantai 264000,China)
Abstract:Single incentive mechanism cannot maximize the expected return of construction project managers and construction workers in the existing construction industry.And the dynamic incentive mechanism with different conditions can better minimize the probability of unsafe behavior of construction workers.Based on the interest motivation of both construction workers and engineering managers,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of unsafe behaviors of construction workers under the dynamic incentive mechanism with construction workers and project managers as the subjects, and explores the interest focus,strategy selection conditions and behavior evolution process concerned by both sides.To further explore the impact of the dynamic incentive mechanism combining the positive incentive mechanism and the negative incentive mechanism based on economic punishment,the paper uses the systematic dynamics method to simulate and analyze the evolution trend of the model.The results show that when using the hybrid dynamic strategy combining positive incentive mechanism and negative incentive mechanism,the simulation curve shows the volatility of development around the central oscillation,and there is no evolutionary stable strategy;increasing the amount of safety reward,increasing the penalty for unsafe behavior of construction workers,and adopting dynamic punishment strategies related to the illegal income can reduce the probability of unsafe behavior of construction workers;by changing the income structure of construction workers,they can be guided to choose safe behavior strategies.
Keywords:construction worker  unsafe behavior  dynamic incentives mechanism  evolutionary game  SD simulation analysis model
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