| 政府环境监管与企业污染的博弈分析及对策研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 张学刚,钟茂初. 政府环境监管与企业污染的博弈分析及对策研究[J]. 中国人口．资源与环境, 2011, 21(2). DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1002-2104.2011.02.006 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 张学刚 钟茂初 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 1. 天津商业大经济学院,天津,300134;南开大学经济研究所,天津,300071
2. 南开大学经济研究所,天津,300071 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学研究项目基金课题，天津市社科项目 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 企业不考虑环境成本追求利润造成了严重环境污染,利用市场机制很难解决此类外部性问题,政府规制介入成为必然. 政府环境管制政策的制定和执行实际上是相关主体之间的博弈过程,可以用博弈方法来研究政府环境管制政策的效果.现有博弈分析中存在忽视环境污染给政府和企业分别带来政治成本与声誉成本的重大缺陷,造成理论不能解释现实世界.本文在引入上述成本的基础上运用博弈分析方法对政府环境监管与企业污染治理的互动决策进行深入探讨,结果表明: 减少政府因企业污染带来的收益、降低政府监管成本、加大对企业污染的处罚等有助于环境质量的改善.而且,建立以增加企业污染的声誉成本以及提高地方政府纵容污染的政治成本等非物质成本的制度建设是改善环境质量的重要方向.
|
| 关 键 词： | 环境污染 环境监管 博弈分析 |
Research about Government Regulation and the Firm Environment Pollution under Perspective of Game Theory |
| |
| ZHANG Xue-gang,ZHONG Mao-chu. Research about Government Regulation and the Firm Environment Pollution under Perspective of Game Theory[J]. China Polulation.Resources and Environment, 2011, 21(2). DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1002-2104.2011.02.006 |
| |
| Authors: | ZHANG Xue-gang ZHONG Mao-chu |
| |
| Affiliation: | ZHANG Xue-gang1,2 ZHONG Mao-chu2(1.School of Economics,Tianjin Commerce University,Tianjin 300134,China,2.The Institute of Economics,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China) |
| |
| Abstract: | The firms seek profit without taking environmental cost into consideration,which cause serious pollution to the environment.Under such circumstances,the market can not handle the externalities,it is necessary for the government to intervene.Prevailing analysis of game theory fail to take political cost and reputation cost into account,which makes theories can not explain and applied to the real world.Based on defects mentioned above,the author try analyzing with game model,and reach such conclusions: with t... |
| |
| Keywords: | environment pollution environment regulation game theory analysis |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
