动态群体安全投入博弈模拟*——以我国煤矿为例

为探究煤矿生产中的群体安全投入博弈特点，针对煤矿生产参与者面临的安全投入囚徒困境（SIPD）博弈，基于NetLogo模拟平台设计博弈模型，获取不同安全投入策略的工人群体变化、死亡情况和安全收益特征，探究不同安全环境对博弈结果的影响。研究结果表明:在低安全水平煤矿中，消极型工人（D-worker）可以利用积极型工人（C-worker）的安全投入，快速增加消极型群体规模，并攫取高达70%的安全收益，而在高安全水平煤矿中，在制裁型工人（T-worker）影响下，D-worker安全收益可被限制到20.4%。D-worker在恶劣安全环境中将成为主流，攫取最大安全收益，产生较高死亡率，并严重损害群体安全，扭转上述局面的短期方法为抑制群体消极心理，长期方法为逐步提高安全管理技术水平。研究结果可为我国煤矿安全水平提升提供安全投入策略参考。

Simulation of dynamic group safety input game: a case study of coal mine in China

In order to explore the characteristics of group safety input game in coal mine production,a game model was designed based on NetLogo simulation platform for the safety input prisoner’s dilemma (SIPD) game faced by the participants of coal mine production.The characteristics of group change,death and safety benefits of worders under different safety input strategies were obtained,and the influence of different game environment on the game results was explored.The results showed that in the coal mines with low safety level,the negative Defect-worker (D-worker) could use the safety input of positive Cooperate-worker (C-worker),rapidly increase the scale of negative groups,and seize up to 70% of safety benefits.In the coal mines with high safety level,under the influence of sanctioned Tit-for-Tat-worker (T-worker),the safety benefits of D-worker could be limited to 20.4%.The D-worker would become the mainstream in the harsh safety environment,seize the maximum safety benefits,produce the higher mortality rate,and seriously damage the group safety.The short-term way to reverse this situation was to suppress the group’s negative psychology,and the long-term way was to gradually improve the level of safety management and safety technology.The research results can provide safety input strategy reference for the improvement of coal mine safety level in China.