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新闻媒体环保监督视角下环境污染治理演化博弈
引用本文:刘德智,杨琨. 新闻媒体环保监督视角下环境污染治理演化博弈[J]. 中国环境管理, 2019, 11(5): 127-134
作者姓名:刘德智  杨琨
作者单位:长安大学经济与管理学院, 陕西西安 710064,长安大学经济与管理学院, 陕西西安 710064
基金项目:中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(2323180001)。
摘    要:为督促政府严格履行环境监管职责,应引入新闻媒体,与政府、企业共同参与污染治理。本文使用演化博弈理论通过构建博弈支付矩阵,研究不同情形下政府与企业间、新闻媒体与政府间的演化稳定策略(ESS),探究新闻媒体监督对环境污染治理的影响,并通过数值算例对演化结果进行验证。演化过程及数值仿真结果表明:①对企业、政府而言,当某种策略的期望利润始终更大时,其决策过程将不受另一方与新闻媒体策略的影响,且此时存在ESS;②新闻媒体进行环保监督一定程度上能促进企业和政府组成的系统向优良状态演化,但新闻媒体是否进行环保监督受政府对环境监管程度的影响,取决于报道成本和预期收益的大小;③政府的作用举足轻重,增大单位环境税额和处罚力度能促使企业合法减排,而对其不严格监管可能使环境质量恶化。因此,为促进环境质量改善,需不断推动环保理念传播,设法降低企业减排成本和政府监管成本,扩大新闻媒体监督职责范围,提高其监督的主动性,并对政府增加生态环境保护维度考核。

关 键 词:新闻媒体  环保监督  污染治理  演化博弈

Evolutionary Game of Environmental Pollution Control from the Perspective of Environmental Protection Supervision by News Media
LIU Dezhi and YANG Kun. Evolutionary Game of Environmental Pollution Control from the Perspective of Environmental Protection Supervision by News Media[J]. Chinese Journal of Environmental Management, 2019, 11(5): 127-134
Authors:LIU Dezhi and YANG Kun
Affiliation:School of Economics and Management, Chang''an University, Xi''an 710064, China and School of Economics and Management, Chang''an University, Xi''an 710064, China
Abstract:In order to urge the government strictly perform the duties of environmental regulation, introduce the news media into the process of environmental pollution control together with the government and enterprises.Using evolutionary game theory to build the tripartite game payoff matrix, the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) between government and firms, news media and the government in different situations are discussed, to explore the role of news media in environmental pollution control. Moreover, the results of the evolution are validated through the example simulation, to draw conclusions and make policy recommendations.Evolution and numerical simulations show that for enterprises and governments, when the expected profits of one strategy are always greater, their decision-making process are not affected by the other party''s and news media strategy, and there is ESS.To some extent, the environmental supervision of news media can promote the evolution of the first system to a good state. However, whether news media conduct supervision or not depends on the government''s degree of environmental regulation and the size of profits and costs. The government plays an important role in pollution control; increases the unit environmental tax and punishment force can promote enterprises legally reduce emissions of pollutants, while the government''s lax supervision may worsen the environmental quality. Generally, when the government conducts strict regulation, news media do not conduct supervision. Therefore, in order to promote the improvement of environmental quality, it is necessary to continuously strengthen the propaganda of environmental protection ideology, try to reduce the cost of enterprises'' emission reduction and the government''s regulation cost, expand the supervision responsibilities of the news media, and improve their supervision initiative.Besides that, increase the assessment of the government''s environmental dimension,timely adjustment of policies in light of changes in environmental conditions.
Keywords:news media  environmental supervision  pollution control  evolutionary game
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