A socio-technical approach of risk management applied to collisions involving fishing vessels |
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| Affiliation: | 1. University of South Brittany, Laboratory “Ergonomics and Safety of Maritime Activities”, Rue de saint Maudé, F-56321 Lorient, Cedex, France;2. University of South Brittany, Laboratory “Ergonomics and Safety of Maritime Activities”, Rue de saint Maudé, F-56321 Lorient, Cedex, CNRS, IRCCyN, PsyCoTec, B.P. 92101, F-44321 Nantes, Cedex 31, France;1. NSW Department of Primary Industries, Fisheries Conservation Technology Unit, PO Box 4321, Coffs Harbour, NSW 2450, Australia;2. Marine and Estuarine Ecology Unit, School of Biological Sciences, University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD 4072, Australia;3. Sterling Trawl Gear Services, 187 Ernest St., Manly, QLD 4179, Australia;4. Department of Statistics, The University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland, New Zealand;1. Health Economics Research Unit, University of Aberdeen, United Kingdom;2. Glasgow Centre for Population Health, United Kingdom;3. NHS Health Scotland, United Kingdom;1. School of Navigation, Wuhan University of Technology, 122 Luoshi Road, Wuhan, Hubei 430070, China;2. Hubei Key Laboratory of Inland Shipping Technology, Wuhan, 430063, China;3. Safety and Security Science Group, Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, Delft University of Technology, Delft, 2628BX, The Netherlands;1. School of Environmental and Forest Sciences, University of Washington and The Nature Conservancy, Seattle, WA, United States;2. School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, United States;3. NOAA Fisheries, Northwest Fisheries Science Center, United States;4. College of Earth, Ocean, and Environment, Emeritus, University of Delaware, United States;5. Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Canada;6. School of Fisheries & Ocean Sciences, University of Alaska Fairbanks, United States;7. Coastal and Marine Laboratory, Florida State University, United States;8. School of Life Sciences and Julie Ann Wrigley Global Institute of Sustainability, Arizona State University, United States;9. Department of Marine and Environmental Sciences, Northeastern University, United States;10. University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science, United States;11. Department of Marine and Coastal Sciences, Rutgers University, United States;12. Institute of Hydrobiology and Fisheries Sciences, University of Hamburg, Germany;13. Horn Point Laboratory, University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science, Cambridge, MD, United States;14. Department of Environmental Science and Policy, University of California Davis, United States;15. CSIRO Oceans and Atmosphere, Hobart, Tasmania, Australia;1. School of Business and Economics, UiT The Arctic University of Norway, Norway;2. Norwegian Institute of Food, Fisheries and Aquaculture Research Nofima, Norway |
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| Abstract: | To make a study of accident and risk management, it is necessary to analyze the socio-technical system in which these accidents occur. The strategies by which the actors involved respond to critical situations can only be understood within their own context, by recognizing the exigencies and constraints of the system in which they operate. According to the chart of migrations and transgressions of professional practices [Amalberti, R., 2001. The paradoxes of almost totally safe transportation systems. Safety Science 37, 109–126], a system, any system, is conceived as responding to the triple pressure of social regulations, available technology and the financial returns of performance. Without curbs or checks, the system would evolve toward an increase in performance and individual profit. Barriers define the boundaries within which operations are considered to be safe.A case-by-case analysis of collisions at sea enabled us to identify two basic causes: undetected signals, and wrong diagnoses. It has also allowed us to define the real operating space of the functional units (fishing vessels) most often involved in collisions, as well as the permeable areas of the safety barriers, through which operations are allowed to migrate toward unsafe zones. As far as the collision risk is concerned, functional units work in a borderline area, close to the limits of safe behavior. To prevent accidents, it will be necessary to reinforce these too-permeable safety barriers, thus limiting the migration factor and bringing the functional units back into an area in which the factors of safety, performance and individual profits are all acceptable. |
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