Erkenntnisfortschritt und Theorienbewertung. Drei konkurrierende Ansätze in der Wissenschaftstheorie |
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Authors: | Gerard Radnitzky |
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Institution: | 1. Lehrstuhl Wissenschaftstheorie der Universit?t, D-5500, Trier
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Abstract: | Explicating the concept of cognitive progress means at the same time articulating an ideal of science. A desirable ideal: explain a lot and offer certainty. Working out the ideal with the “foundationalist-positivist” approach. If the question, “When is it rational to accept a theory?” is answered, “When it has sufficient inductive support,” this leads to insoluble problems. The Popperian alternative: rational theory preference despite fallibility of methods for determining truth or greater accuracy of representations. The sorts of risks for a theory differ in explanation and in prediction. Corresponding to the risks are the chances for cognitive progress. Instead of a cumulative index, itemized indication of success and failure in explanation and prediction with regard for importance of the questions at issue. |
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