Bargaining over natural resources: Governments between environmental organizations and extraction firms |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Sustainability Science and Department of Economics, Leuphana University of Lüneburg, 21335 Lüneburg, Germany;2. Department of International Economic Policy, University of Freiburg, 79085 Freiburg i. Br., Germany |
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Abstract: | We consider the resource-extraction policy of a government that is lobbied by an environmental organization and an extraction firm from foreign countries. To analyze this situation, we propose a sequential Nash bargaining solution: The government bargains with both lobbies simultaneously. Should this trilateral negotiation fail, it chooses one lobby for a bilateral negotiation. The disagreement point then is to bargain with the other lobby. Finally, should this second bilateral negotiation break down, the government chooses the welfare-maximizing policy.As long as cumulative extraction is low, such that stock-dependent extraction costs are also low and extraction profits are high, the environmental organization has a weak bargaining position, but it takes influence to reduce extraction. Once that cumulative extraction has increased so much that extraction profits are below a threshold, the bargaining positions change, and the environmental organization gets compensated by the extraction firm for not letting the trilateral negotiation fail. |
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Keywords: | Nash bargaining Dynamic bargaining Lobbying International political economy Environmental policy Exhaustible-resource extraction Stock-pollution |
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