中国地区间跨界污染治理的两阶段多边补偿机制研究

近年来,以雾霾、河流污染等为代表的跨界污染问题严重影响了我国经济社会的可持续协调发展。本文将跨界污染治理视为典型的地区间外溢性公共品,从公共经济学的视角出发,分析了我国地区间跨界污染治理的种种困境,并通过构建两阶段多边博弈模型,探讨了补偿机制的可行性。本文首先构建了一个跨地区的污染模型,通过中央政府干预或不干预的博弈分析发现,当污染存在地区内部及跨地区的外溢性时,如果中央政府不介入而由企业自行设定产出水平,那么企业的污染排放水平将超过社会有效率的水平。在此基础上,本文进一步构建了一个两阶段多边补偿机制博弈模型,即由中央政府设计一个地区内部企业与居民之间以及跨地区之间的补偿机制,来解决以上的无效性问题。结果显示,当企业支付的补偿金额取决于居民设定的补偿系数,而居民得到的补偿金额又取决于企业设定的补偿系数时,相互影响的博弈关系使得企业和居民从自身的利益出发,将补偿系数设定在企业污染对于居民边际损害的水平,从而企业生产水平会达到有效状态,两阶段多边补偿机制实现了有效的污染排放。本文在庇古税思想的基础上,通过放松庇古税对外部性相关信息的强假设,构建了一个两阶段多边补偿机制,即由企业缴纳庇古税后,中央将征收的庇古税补偿给居民,这样不仅内部化了企业污染给居民造成的负外部性,还进一步平衡了地区间的跨界污染治理问题。

Two-stage multilateral compensation mechanism of transboundary pollution control across regions in China

Recently,transboundary pollution problems,such as fog and haze and river pollution,has impeded the sustainable coordinated development of economy and society seriously in China.Based on the perspective of public economics,this article analyzes the various dilemmas of transboundary pollution control across regions in China,which is taken as classical public goods with spillovers across regions,and then explores the feasibility of the compensation mechanism through a two-stage multilateral game model.A pollution model across regions is constructed,and by analyzing the two cases with or without the central government intervention we find that,when the pollutions show spillovers within or across regions,if firms can set output level without the central government intervention,then pollution emission levels of firms will surpass the social efficient level.Thus this article deals with the inefficiency problem discussed above by constructing a game model of two-stage multilateral compensation mechanism,namely a compensation mechanism between firms and residents within a region,and across regions,which is designed by the central government.The result implies,when the compensation paid by firms depends on the compensation parameter set by residents,while the compensation given to residents depends on the compensation parameter set by firms,the mutual-affected relationship makes firms and residents set the compensation parameter at the residents marginal damage level from pollution.As a result,the production of firms will reach a efficient level,and the two-stage multilateral compensation mechanism will realize effective pollution emissions.Based on the basic idea of Pigou tax,this article constructs a two-stage multilateral compensation mechanism by relaxing the strong assumption of relevant information about externalities in Pigou tax mechanism,namely the central government gives the compensation which is Pigouvian taxed from firms to residents,which can internalize the negative externalities from pollution,but also can further balance the trans-boundary pollution problems across regions.