农村水环境治理行动的演化博弈分析

新常态下,我国环境承载力已经达到或接近上限,农村水环境也存在着"边治理、边污染"和地方政府监管乏力问题,究其根源是缺乏农村水环境治理的内生机制,在中央政府投入大量精力、财力的同时,其他利益相关主体却存在不同利益诉求和行为导向冲突,因而厘清农村水环境治理行动中的主体博弈关系有助于突破此现实困境,形成良好的行动机制。本文利用演化博弈模型,分析了地方政府、企业和农户三方博弈主体在农村水环境治理行动中的演化过程。研究结果表明,系统演化具有多重复杂情景,在良好的演化情景下,只要农户参与治理的意愿高,地方政府最终将趋向于引导行动,企业也相应选择净化策略,三方实现共同治理,农村水环境质量将得到显著改善;相反地,在不良演化情景下,即使农户愿意参与治理、或企业愿意采取净化策略,都无法得到地方政府的支持和系统中其他主体的响应,系统将锁定于不良状态,最终造成农村水环境治理的"公地悲剧";在一般情景下,通过调节各方策略的参数值,发现只要地方政府和企业联合起来致力于通过一系列引导和扶持策略保障农户从参与农村水环境治理中获得切实利益,可使系统跳出不良状态,形成三方共同治理的良好局面。实例分析结果进一步验证了只要政府和企业联合行动以切实保障农户的利益,就有利于促进农村水环境质量提升。据此提出促进三方共同参与、保障农户利益的农村水环境治理行动对策建议。

Evolutionary game analysis on rural water environmental governance

As the economy enters a'new normal',China'environment has reached the upper limit of the carrying capacity,and the rural water environment also has the problems of'while pollution while treatment'and local government supervision fatigue.The basic reason is the lack of rural water environment governance endogenous mechanism.When the central government has invested a lot of energy and financial resources,other stakeholders have different interest demands and oriented behavior conflicts.Therefore,to clarify the relationship among the main bodies of rural water environmental governance will help to break through this dilemma and then form into better action mechanism.The evolution process of governance in the rural water environment within the tripartite game subjects of local governments,companies and farmers is analyzed based on an evolutionary game model.The results show that the system evolves with a multi-repetitive complex scene.Under the favorable situation,as long as the farmers are willing to participate in governance,local governments will eventually tend to play guiding roles,and companies will also choose purifying strategy,then the whole system will evolve to better state,and rural water environmental quality will be significantly improved.Conversely,in the worse scenario,even if farmers are willing to participate,or companies willing to take the purification strategies,but the local government still won't support or other participants won't cooperate together,then the system will be locked and turned into the bad state,resulting in'the public tragedy'of rural water environmental governance.Under the general situation,it shows that by adjusting the value of parameters of strategies of all parties,as long as local governments and companies are committed to implement a series of guidance and support strategies to protect farmers to get benefits from the participation of rural water environmental governance,the system will get rid of the bad state,and then it will form a good situation of tripartite co-governance.On these basis,a case of rural water environment treatment action is analyzed,to further validate that as long as the government and companies take the protection of farmers'interests with joint action,the rural water environment quality would be improved.Finally,the countermeasures and suggestions to promote the participation of the three parties,and to protect the interests of farmers in rural water environmental management action are proposed.