退耕还林:农户、地方政府与中央政府的博弈关系

自退耕还林工程实施以来,该工程进展顺利,并取得了显著的成绩.但随着财政补贴陆续到期,却未能解决退耕还林农户的长远生计问题.从博弈论的视角探讨退耕还林实施中的行为主体关系有利于该工程成果的巩固和工程的持续推进.文章首先评述退耕还林的相关文献,然后,用动态博弈模型分析农户与政府以及中央政府与地方政府的利益互动关系.文章得出的关键结论有:在贴现因子足够大的条件下任何短期的机会主义行为所带来的收益都小于长期合作所带来的长远收益,农户和政府采取长期合作是理性的选择行为;在中央政府先行动的情况下,地方政府实施退耕还林工程所带来的收益要大于中央政府后行动所带来的收益.基于上述结论,文章提出要确保国家政策的稳定性从而提高政府的信誉度、永久性地对退耕还林农户发放财政补贴、提高农户的贴现值从而稳定其预期、确保地方政府执行退耕还林工程的收益等政策建议.

Converting Farm Land to Forestry: An Analysis of the Game Relations of Households, Government and the Central Government

Converting farm land to forestry has made remarkable achievements since its implementation. But converting farm land to forestry failed to solve the long-term livelihood of farmers who converted farm land to forestry along with that the financial subsidies have expired. From the game model,analyzing rehtions of main bodies in the project of converting farm land to forestry contribates to promote the project. The article firstly reviewed relevant literature of converting farm land to forestry, and gave a detailed analysis on the game relations of households,local government and the central government with a changeable game model. The article draw the conclusions that the long-time cooperation betwveen tarmers and goverments is rational when short-term benefits of any opportunistic behaviors are less than long-term gains and under the conditions that the central government takes actions earlier than local government, benefits brought by local governments implementing converting farm land to forestry are larger than benefits brought by the central government taking late actions. Based on the above findings, the article made some policy recommendations which includes improving the credibility of national policies, issuance of permanent financial subsidies, increasing the discounted value of the farmers so as to stabilize its expect, and ensuring the local government income from converting farm land to forestry.