The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Calgary, SS 454, 2500 University Drive NW, Calgary, Canada T2N 1N4;2. Darmstadt University of Technology, Germany;3. Centre for Energy Policy and Economics, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), Zürich, Switzerland;1. Institute for International Studies, CCITSMR, Wuhan University, Wuhan Hubei 430072,China;2. China Energy Group, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley CA 94720, USA;3. Climate Change, Environment and Energy Study Center, Wuhan University, Wuhan Hubei 430072,China;1. Department of Finance, South University of Science and Technology of China, Shenzhen, China;2. Research Center on Modern Logistics, Graduate School at Shenzhen, Tsinghua University, Shenzhen, China;3. School of Civil and Environment Engineering, Harbin Institute of Technology Shenzhen Graduate School, Shenzhen, China;4. Energy Analysis and Environmental Impacts Division, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA;5. Department of Energy Economics, School of Economics, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China;1. Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Escuela Técnica Superior de Edificación, Avda. Juan de Herrera 6, 28040, Madrid, Spain;2. Western Sydney University, School of Computing, Engineering and Mathematics, Locked Bag 1797, Penrith, NSW, 2751, Australia;3. School of Built Environment, Curtin University, Perth, Australia;4. Department of Housing and Interior Design, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, South Korea;1. School of Environment and Energy, Peking University, Shenzhen 518055, China;2. Harbin Institute of Technology Shenzhen Graduate School, Shenzhen, China |
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| Abstract: | We evaluate the efficacy of international trade in carbon emission permits when countries are guided strictly by their national self-interest. To do so, we construct a calibrated general equilibrium model that jointly describes the world economy and the strategic incentives that guide the design of national abatement policies. Countries’ decisions about their participation in a trading system and about their initial permit endowment are made non-cooperatively; so a priori it is not clear that permit trade will induce participation in international abatement agreements or that participation will result in significant environmental gains. Despite this, we find that emission trade agreements can be effective; that smaller groupings pairing developing and developed-world partners often perform better than agreements with larger rosters; and that general equilibrium responses play an important role in shaping these outcomes. |
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