环境税条件下项目可进入与退出期权博弈分析

环境税是解决当前日趋严重的环境与经济发展冲突问题的有效手段之一,研究其如何影响投资者进入与退出项目的竞争策略是更好地制定环境税收政策的前提。与现有文献不同,本文应用期权博弈理论,构建煤电项目双寡头期权博弈模型,分进入和退出两种情况分析项目最优转换策略,并且定量分析环境税税率对最优转换临界值的影响。结果表明:环境税税率与最优转换临界值呈正比关系,即环境税率越低,项目越容易进入,并且更加难以退出;当存在竞争威胁时,投资者会加速进入与退出项目,当环境税强度逐渐变大时,将超过项目相互竞争的影响并起主要作用;在进入情况时存在等待、抢先进入和同时进入均衡,在退出情况时存在不退出、抢先退出和同时退出均衡,最后,分别给出各个均衡条件下环境税政策及影响,为政府制定环境税政策提供一种分析思路。

An Symmetrical Duopoly Investment Game Model Under Environmental Tax Based on Entry and Exit Option

Environmental tax is an effective way to solve the current worsening of the environment and economic and development. To examine how tax affects the investors to competitive strategy of entering and exiting the project is a better prerequisite for the development of environmental tax policy. Different from the existing literature, this article uses option game theory to build duopoly game model in coal-fired power project, analyzes optimal conversion strategy of the entry and the exit project, and clualitatively the effects aralyzes of environmental tax rate to the optimal conversion threshold. Results show that: the optimal environmental tax rate has positive correlation between the optimal conversion threshold value.The lower environmental tax rate,it is easiler to enter the project,but will be more difficult to withdraw from the project.When there is competitive threat,investors will accelerate the speed to enter or withdraw from the project.When the environmental tax intensity gradually become larger, it will exceed influerce brought by competition among projects.In entry situation,the equilibrium is waiting,preemption and simultaneous;in exit situation the equilibrium is hold,preemption and simultaneous,and environmental tax policy's impact is given respectively. This paper provides an analysis of environmental tax policy for government.