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建筑工程质量监督的博弈分析
引用本文:王凯全,应惠亚. 建筑工程质量监督的博弈分析[J]. 中国安全生产科学技术, 2007, 3(4): 60-63
作者姓名:王凯全  应惠亚
作者单位:江苏工业学院环境与安全工程系,常州,213164
摘    要:应用完全信息静态博弈建立了建设主体单位和质量监督机构的博弈关系,通过设置恰当的参考点使收益矩阵更为科学。用混合战略纳什均衡求出了均衡点。讨论得出,质量监督机构可以根据各个建设主体单位在工程项目建设过程中所投入的成本来确定监督力度大小的概率,而建设主体单位违规的概率与质量监督机构罚款的力度及其不作为所得的负效用有关。

关 键 词:建筑工程质量  质量监督  博弈分析  完全信息
文章编号:1673-193X(2007)-04-0060-04
修稿时间:2007-06-26

Game analysis on the construction quality supervision
WANG Kai-quan,YING Hui-ya. Game analysis on the construction quality supervision[J]. Journal of Safety Science and Technology, 2007, 3(4): 60-63
Authors:WANG Kai-quan  YING Hui-ya
Abstract:Static games with complete information was used to establish the relationship between principal parts of construction and quality supervision organization.Proper reference point was set to make gain matrix more reasonable.Trim point was calculated using mix tactic Nash equilibrium.By analyzing,quality supervision organizations can determine the probability of supervision according to the expense which each principal part of construction spending during the course of construction.And the principal parts of construction,whose probability of getting out of line is related to the amercement given by quality supervision organizations and negative avail owing to nonfeasance.
Keywords:construction quality  quality supervision  game theory  complete information
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