动态惩罚机制下企业安全生产行为演化分析

为揭示动态惩罚机制下企业安全生产行为规律,以企业成本和收益为基础,通过区域内所有企业的博弈,运用演化博弈理论研究不同策略下企业对安全生产投入达标行为演化趋势.研究结果表明:当政府监管能力有约束时,无论企业是否明确预设控制目标,均可能出现投机心理,而政府加大惩罚力度可有效改善整体安全生产水平;同时,企业明确控制目标时,通...

Evolutionary analysis on work safety behavior in firms under dynamic punishment mechanism

In order to explore laws of work safety behavior in firms under dynamic punishment mechanism,with costs and benefits as bases,evolution trend of enterprises'investment in safety production under different strategies was studied by using evolutionary game theory among firms in the region.The results show that when government's supervision ability is obviously restricted,a company is likely to be speculative no matter whether it is clear about safety production control target,but the government can effectively improve overall safety production level by strengthening penalties.At the same time,when firms have a clear control goal,behavior of all companies can be effectively improved by adjusting the goal reasonably.Moreover,it is found that government should not only enhance information exposure of safety production to social firms,but also reasonably determine preset goals,and punishment level,as well as actively guide the region to nurture a good initial state,so as to promote development of company groups in a good direction.