重庆灰霾治理试点工作中的政企动态博弈分析

针对重庆市挥发性有机物整治试点工作中面临的与企业博弈的实际问题，设定模型边界条件，建立基于完全信息的动态博弈分析模型，通过逆推归纳法分析博弈不同阶段下参与企业与政府的理性策略选择，求解此完全信息动态博弈模型的子博弈精炼纳什均衡并获得该情况下的博弈双方最终支付。研究表明，提高“许诺的可信性”和“威胁的可信性”是动态博弈的核心问题，通过交出决定权、切断沟通等多种方式可破解VOC试点博弈僵局。

Analysis on Dynamic Game between Government and Enterprises in Haze Pollution Control Pilot Work of Chongqing

Based on the practical problems in the pilot work of VOCs control, took the govern-ment and enterprises as participants in a game, set up corresponding model boundary conditions and established a dynamic game analysis model based on complete information according to the actual situation of VOC control pilot work of Chongqing. Analyzed different participants＇; respective rational strategy choice under different stages in the game with the method of backwards induction. By solving the sub-game refining Nash equilibrium of this model, provided the final payoffs of both sides participating in the game. Suggested that improving promise credibility and threat credibility is the core issue of dynamic game and analyzed how to avoid invalid threats and pro-mises, such as handing over the decision power, cutting off communication, etc.