How the sizewell B inquiry is grappling with the concept of acceptable risk

There is no agreed level of safety that is ‘acceptable’. Those responsible for managing and regulating safety believe that they can establish adequate parameters, but they recognize that those standards must meet with ‘public approval’. This paper examines one way in which that approval is sought, namely the quasijudicial examination of the merits of a proposal to construct Britain's first pressurized water reactor at the Sizewell B site on the Suffolk coast. The authors argue that the Sizewell B Inquiry appears to operate on the assumption that acceptable risk levels can be determined through argument and cross-examination. In its approach to the determination of acceptable risk the Inquiry seems dependent on professional judgement and expertise as assessed by legal minds trained to sift evidence. To ensure that all the necessary evidence comes before it, the Inquiry has established procedures to initiate the preparation and examination of expert viewpoints. The authors examine how far this approach is likely to command public confidence, and the extent to which the Inquiry pinned down the elusive concept of acceptable risk.