A New Rationale for Not Picking Low-Hanging Fruits: the Separation of Ownership and Control |
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Authors: | Claude Denis Tidball Mabel |
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Institution: | 1.LEDi, Université de Bourgogne-Franche Comté, Dijon, France ;2.CEE-M, Université de Montpellier, CNRS, INRAE, Institut Agro, Montpellier, France ; |
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Abstract: | Recent attempts at explaining the energy-efficiency gap rely on considerations related to organizational and behavioral/cognitive failures. In this paper, we build on the strategic delegation literature to advance a complementary explanation. We show that strategic market interaction may encourage business owners to instill a bias against energy efficiency in managerial compensation contracts. Since managers respond to financial incentives, their decisions will reflect this bias, resulting in a lack of investment. |
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