An Oligopoly Game of CDR Strategy Deployment in a Steady-State Net-Zero Emission Climate Regime |
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Authors: | Babonneau Frédéric Bahn Olivier Haurie Alain Vielle Marc |
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Affiliation: | 1.ORDECSYS, Chêne-Bougeries, Switzerland ;2.Escuela de Negocios, Universidad Adolfo Iba?ez, Santiago, Chile ;3.GERAD and Department of Decision Sciences, HEC Montréal, Montreal, Canada ;4.University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland ;5.LEURE, école Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland ; |
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Abstract: | In this paper, we propose a simple oligopoly game model to represent the interactions between coalitions of countries in deploying carbon dioxide removal (CDR) strategies in a steady-state net-zero emission climate regime that could take place by the end of the twenty-first century. The emission quotas and CDR activities obtained in the solution of this steady-state model could then be used as a target for end-of-period conditions in a dynamic integrated assessment analysis studying the transition to 2100. More precisely, we analyze a steady-state situation where m coalitions exist and behave as m players in a game of supplying emission rights on an international emission trading system. The quotas supplied by a coalition must correspond to the amount of CO2 captured through CDR activities in the corresponding world region. We use an extension of the computable general equilibrium model GEMINI-E3 to calibrate the payoff functions and compute an equilibrium solution in the noncooperative game. |
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