GMOs and Global Justice: Applying Global Justice Theory to the Case of Genetically Modified Crops and Food |
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Authors: | Kristian H?yer Toft |
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Institution: | (1) Erik Eriksens Gade 12, 4mf., 2300 Copenhagen S, Denmark |
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Abstract: | Proponents of using genetically modified (GM) crops and food in the developing world often claim that it is unjust not to
use GMOs (genetically modified organisms) to alleviate hunger and malnutrition in developing countries. In reply, the critics
of GMOs claim that while GMOs may be useful as a technological means to increase yields and crop quality, stable and efficient
institutions are required in order to provide the benefits from GMO technology. In this debate, the GMO proponents tend to
rely on a simple utilitarian type of calculus that highlights the benefits of GMOs to the poor, but that overlooks the complex
institutional requirements necessary for GMO production. The critics, recognizing the importance of institutional conditions,
focus primarily on the negative impacts of institutional deficiencies, thereby overlooking the basically Rawlsian claim that
institutions per se may generate claims to justice. This article investigates how GMOs might generate claims to global justice and what type
of justice is involved. The paper argues that the debate on GMOs and global justice can be categorized into three views, i.e.,
the cosmopolitan, the pluralist, and the sceptic. The cosmopolitan holds that GMOs can and should be used for alleviating
global hunger, whereas the sceptic rejects this course of action. I will argue here for a moderately cosmopolitan approach,
relying on the pluralist view of institutions and the need to exploit the benefits of GMOs. This argument rests on the premise
that global cooperation on GMO production provides the relevant basis for assessing the use of GMOs by the standard of global
distributive justice. |
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