The value of information in resource exploration: The interaction of strategic plays and institutional rules |
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| Authors: | R Mark Isaac |
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| Institution: | 1. GEUS, Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland, Øster Voldgade 10, DK-1350 Copenhagen, Denmark;2. Department of Geosciences and Natural Resource Management, University of Copenhagen, Øster Voldgade 10, DK-1350 Copenhagen K, Denmark;1. Geothermal Energy and Geofluids Group, Institute of Geophysics, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland;2. SCCER-SoE, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland;3. Department of Engineering Geology and Hydrogeology, RWTH Aachen, Aachen, Germany;4. Department of Hydrogeology, TU Berlin, Berlin, Germany;5. Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA |
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| Abstract: | Several characteristics of information used in resource exploration have led to conjectures that the private market will provide a suboptimal amount of such information. A public information provision has been proposed as a remedy, both for problems of underproduction and overproduction of private information. This paper demonstrates that, barring exceptional conditions, public provision of information cannot be guaranteed to be a generic solution to the private information overprovision problem. In fact, an example is developed to demonstrate the possibility that public information exacerbates the private overprovision problem. |
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