| 企业内部安全监督考核机制的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 王玉玲.企业内部安全监督考核机制的博弈分析[J].工业安全与环保,2007,33(7):53-55. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王玉玲 |
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| 作者单位： | 中国环境管理干部学院环境工程系,河北秦皇岛,066004 |
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| 摘 要： | 在市场经济条件下,各方都有自己的经济利益,导致企业内部的安全监督检查存在严重的形式主义,甚至弄虚作假、敷衍了事.通过博弈模型的讨论,使安全工作者(尤其是安全领导者)认识到严格执行各种安全监督考核机制的重要性.
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| 关 键 词： | 安全监督 奖励 博弈分析 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007-01-05 |
Game Analysis on Supervision Mechanism in Safety Management of Enterprise |
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| WANG Yu-ling.Game Analysis on Supervision Mechanism in Safety Management of Enterprise[J].Industrial Safety and Dust Control,2007,33(7):53-55. |
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| Authors: | WANG Yu-ling |
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| Institution: | Dept. of Engineering,Envionmental Management College of China Qinhuangdao,Hebei 066004 |
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| Abstract: | In the market economy,all parts have their own economic interest,so that there exist some problems in safety supervision of enterprises,such as formalism,fraud,deception,and so on.Through discussions on game model,people(especially the leadership) are gradually knowing about the importance of strictly performing safety supervision mechanism. |
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| Keywords: | safety supervision game analysis |
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