Socially Strategic Ecological Restoration: A Game-Theoretic Analysis Shortened: Socially Strategic Restoration |
| |
Authors: | Mark Buckley Brent M Haddad |
| |
Institution: | (1) Department of Environmental Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, California 95064, USA |
| |
Abstract: | Major transitions in a multiple-use or mosaic landscape often lead to frictions among new and existing users. In this article,
we consider the problem of ecological restoration within a mosaic landscape in which restoration activities elicit feedbacks
from individuals and groups that are harmed by restoration outcomes. Using game theory, we identify three potential outcomes
ranked by the extent of restoration of ecosystem services and processes: nonstrategic, noncooperative strategic equilibrium,
and cooperative bargaining solution. We identify conditions under which additional restoration can decrease the overall flow
of ecosystem services and processes. A “strategic restorationist” will cease new restoration activities when the net effect
of defensive response moves by farmers offsets gains. Imperfect information regarding expected payoffs to farmers can lead
to inefficient overshooting or undershooting the optimal scale, geographical positioning, and form of restoration. Gains to
all parties from cooperation might exist. As a case study and to aid model design, we consider restoration activities on California’s
upper Sacramento River.
An erratum to this article is available at . |
| |
Keywords: | Restoration Conflict Cooperation Game theory Sacramento River Agriculture Landowners |
本文献已被 PubMed SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|