Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition

In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition.     

Dynamic adjustment to land taxation policy: Neutrality and welfare implications

In this paper we use a dynamic three sector model to examine the neutrality and welfare effects of land income taxes. We find that (1) taxes that are neutral in long run equilibrium need not be neutral in the short run; (2) short run neutrality depends upon the tax treatment of development costs and losses; and (3) many of the neutrality results hold under both static and rational expectations assumptions. We also find that, even without externality assumptions, nonneutrality in the short run does not necessarily entail a welfare cost and may be welfare-enhancing when agents have less-than-perfect foresight.     

Enforcement costs and the incentive to evade controls on production

Economists have long favored emission taxes as a method of controlling pollution. One reason for the widespread support of emission taxes has been the assumption that emission taxes would be easier to enforce than other policies. However, recent developments in the discussion of pollution control allow more specific comparisons of enforcement costs and yield the conclusion that there may exist at least one alternate regulatory scheme that would be easier to enforce than emission taxes.     

The welfare effects of fuel conservation policies in a dual-fuel car market: Evidence from India

We estimate a model of vehicle choice and kilometers driven to analyze the long-run impacts of fuel conservation policies in the Indian car market. We simulate the effects of petrol and diesel fuel taxes and a diesel car tax, taking into account their interactions with the pre-existing petrol fuel tax and car sales taxes. At levels sufficient to reduce total fuel consumption by 7%, the increased diesel and petrol fuel taxes both yield deadweight losses (net of externalities) of about 4 (2010) Rs./L. However, at levels sufficient to reduce total fuel consumption by 2%, the increased petrol fuel tax results in a deadweight loss per liter of fuel conserved that is greater than that caused by the diesel fuel tax. This reflects both the high pre-existing tax on petrol fuel and the high own-price elasticities of fuel demand in India. A tax on diesel cars that results in the same diesel market share as the large diesel fuel tax actually has a negative deadweight loss per liter of fuel conserved. The welfare effects of all three policy instruments are positive, once the external benefits of reducing fuel consumption are added to the excess burden of taxation.     

A cultural model of private provision and the environment

This paper analyses an overlapping generations model of environmental externalities and capital accumulation where private contributions to environmental quality are motivated by a desire to socialize others into environmental attitudes. In this framework, the formation of environmental preferences is the result of a cultural transmission process depending on the extent of private contributions. In the short run, we show that three equilibria may arise: a first one where all green agents contribute to the environment, a second one where nobody contributes to the environment and a third interior one. We show that the capital-accumulation process and the change in preferences that occur in this economy lead the interior equilibrium to be selected, in which some, but not all, green agents contribute to the environment. The model thus provides an economic rationale for the gap between the number of people who care about the environment and the number who adopt pro-environmental behaviours. We also show that the fraction of contributors rises with capital, so that we explain the negative relationship between this gap and country income. Last, we show that this gap is particularly detrimental for welfare, and analyse the impact of a number of public policies.     

Are energy efficiency standards justified?

This paper develops an analytical framework for comparing the welfare effects of energy efficiency standards and pricing policies for reducing gasoline, electricity, and nationwide carbon emissions. The model is parameterized with US data and includes key externalities in the energy/transportation sectors and possible underinvestment in energy efficiency due to “misperceptions” over energy savings. Even with large misperceptions, the extra welfare gains from complementing efficient pricing policies with energy efficiency standards are zero for reducing gasoline and 5 percent for reducing electricity. And when viewed as substitutes, these standards forgo 60 percent or more of the potential welfare gains from corresponding pricing policies. A combination of energy efficiency and emissions standards is more than three times as costly as carbon pricing when there is no misperception over energy savings, and even with large misperceptions, combining carbon pricing with gasoline/electricity taxes is better than combining it with energy efficiency standards.     

Environmental policy and human capital inequality: A matter of life and death

This paper analyzes the economic implications of an environmental policy when we account for the life expectancy of heterogeneous agents. In a framework in which everyone suffers from pollution but health status also depends on individual human capital, we find that the economy may be stuck in a trap in which inequality rises steadily, especially when the initial pollution intensity of production is too high. We emphasize that such inequality is in the long run costly for the economy in terms of health and growth. Therefore, we study whether a tax on pollution associated with an investment in pollution abatement can be used to address this situation. We show that a stricter environmental policy may allow the economy to escape from the inequality trap while enhancing the long-term growth rate when the initial inequality in human capital is not too large.     

Re-evaluating the role of energy efficiency standards: A behavioral economics approach

The economic models that prescribe Pigovian taxation as the first-best means of reducing energy-related externalities are typically based on the neoclassical model of rational consumer choice. Yet, consumer behavior in markets for energy-using durables is generally thought to be far from efficient, giving rise to the concept of the “energy-efficiency gap.” This paper presents a welfare analysis of energy policies that is based on a behavioral model of temptation and self-control, introduced by Gul and Pesendorfer 23 and 24. We find that, in the presence of temptation, (i) Pigovian taxes alone do not yield a first-best outcome, (ii) when viewed as substitutes, energy efficiency standards can dominate Pigovian taxes, and (iii) a policy combining standards with a Pigovian tax can yield higher social welfare than a Pigovian tax alone, implying that the two instruments should be viewed as complements rather than substitutes.     

Climate and international trade policies when emissions affect production possibilities

In this paper, we develop a model of international trade and climate change in which emission discharges arising from production have a feedback effect on national production sectors by impacting upon effective factor endowments. With this context, the objectives are, first, to provide a general characterization of Pareto-efficient climate and trade policies and, second, to examine the possibility – starting from non-Pareto-efficient equilibria – for Pareto-improving environmental policies. We provide conditions under which several particular reforms of carbon taxes are welfare improving.     

Is Chinese trade policy motivated by environmental concerns?

This paper analyses whether China's export VAT rebates and export taxes are driven by environmental concerns. Since China struggles to enforce environmental regulation, trade policy can be used as a second-best environmental policy. In a general equilibrium model it is possible to show that the second-best export tax increases in a product's pollution intensity. The empirical analysis investigates whether the export tax equivalent of partial VAT rebates and export taxes are higher for products which are more pollution intensive along several dimensions. The results indicate that the VAT rebate rates are set in a way that discourages exports of water pollution intensive, SO₂ intensive and energy intensive products from 2007 on. Moreover, the conservation of natural resources such as minerals, metals, wood products and precious stones seems to be a key determinant of China's export VAT rebate rates. There is little evidence that export taxes are motivated by environmental concerns.     

Tax evasion and optimal environmental taxes

This paper introduces a new argument to the debate about the role of environmental taxes in modern tax systems. Some environmental taxes, particularly taxes on gasoline or electricity, are more difficult to evade than taxes on labor or income. When the tax base is shifted in a revenue-neutral manner toward these environmental taxes, the result is a net reduction in the amount of tax evasion. Using a carbon tax as a motivating example, the “tax evasion effect” is shown to sharply reduce the welfare cost of controlling emissions. A simple computable general equilibrium model suggests that the impact of considering tax evasion can be large: costs are lowered by 28% in the United States, by 89% in China, and by 97% in India. In countries with high levels of pre-existing tax evasion, a carbon tax will pay for itself through improvements in the efficiency of the tax system.     

Redistribution and pollution taxes with non-linear Engel curves

This paper analyses optimal corrective taxation and optimal income redistribution. The Pigouvian pollution tax is higher if pollution damages disproportionally hurt the poor due to equity weighting of pollution damages. Moreover, under general utility functions, optimal pollution taxes should be set below the Pigouvian tax if the poor spend a disproportionate fraction of their income on polluting goods. However, if Engel curves are linear, optimal pollution taxes should follow the first-best rule for the Pigouvian corrective tax even if the government wants to redistribute income and the poor spend a disproportional part of their income on polluting goods. The often-used quasi-linear, CES and Stone-Geary utility functions all have linear Engel curves. If Engel curves are linear, and if pollution taxes are not optimised, Pareto-improving green tax reforms exist that move the pollution tax closer to the Pigouvian tax. Simulations demonstrate that optimal corrective taxes should be Pigouvian if the demand for polluting goods is derived from a LES demand system, but deviate from the Pigouvian taxes if demand for polluting goods demand is derived from a PIGLOG demand system.     

Cost-sharing approach for air quality control implementation A case study

The objective of the study was to investigate and develop new alternative approaches to effectively meeting the federal SOx and particulate ambient air quality standards at cost savings. Since air pollution control costs would very likely be passed along to the consumer, it is in the best interests of the consumer and industry to find the least-cost alternative policies. Cost-sharing possesses advantages not shared by other control schemes, such as emissions taxes, auctioning of “pollution certificates,” or other methods. The results of this paper indicate that the cost-sharing approach is useful for particulates control in order to minimize the burden of plants already performing substantial control who may require significant added capital investment beyond their initial amount. For SO_ξ emissions control the cost-sharing analysis calculations show significant savings in nearly all situations, whether or not stack gas treatment methods were assumed available. Furthermore, the cost-sharing approach may allow further savings when the particular cost requirements of an individual firm differ substantially from the average engineering cost estimates. A cost-sharing option should thus be included in implementation plans as an option to be used by industries at their own initiative. The spatial characteristics of emissions resulting from a particular application of the cost-sharing approach are considered. A spatial airshed emissions allocation model is discussed as a useful method of evaluating cost sharing.     

The “second dividend” and the demographic structure

The demographic structure of a country influences economic activity. The “second dividend” modifies growth. Accordingly, in general equilibrium, the second dividend and the demographic structure are interrelated. This paper aims at assessing empirically the “second dividend” in a dynamic, empirical and intertemporal setting that allows for measuring its impact on growth, its intergenerational redistributive effects, and its interaction with the demographic structure. The paper uses a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations, an energy module and a public finance module that distinguishes between non-ageing-related public spending and a pension regime. Policy scenarios compare the consequences of different scenarios of recycling a carbon tax through lower proportional income taxes rather than higher public lump-sum expenditures. They are computed for two countries with different demographics (France and Germany). Results suggest that the magnitude of the “second dividend” is significantly related with the demographic structure. The more concentrated the demographic structure on cohorts with higher income and saving rate, the stronger the effect on capital supply of the second dividend. The second dividend weighs on the welfare of relatively aged working cohorts. It fosters the wellbeing of young working cohorts and of future generations. The more concentrated the demographic structure on aged working cohorts, the higher the intergenerational redistributive effects of the second dividend.     

The economics of cooperation over collective bads

Pollution reciprocated among nations is analyzed graphically as a traded collective bad. The model is contrasted to analogous methods of studying trade in public goods. The model then is interpreted in terms of pollution taxes. Equilibrium and optimal outcomes are characterized by the tax policies needed to support them. Finally, obstacles to tax-trade solutions are noted and institutional solutions are suggested.     

Vertical fiscal externalities and the environment

We show that imposition of a state-level environmental tax in a federation crowds out pre-existing federal taxes. We explain how this vertical fiscal externality can lead unilateral state-level environmental policy to generate a welfare gain in the implementing state, at the expense of other states, even absent any environmental benefits. Using a computable general equilibrium model of the Canadian federation, we show that vertical fiscal externalities can be the major determinant of the welfare change following environmental policy implementation by a state government. Our numerical simulations indicate that – as a consequence of vertical fiscal externalities – state governments can reduce greenhouse gas emissions by over 20 percent without any net cost to themselves.     

Double dividend hypothesis, golden rule and welfare distribution

This paper analyzes the double dividend issues within the framework of overlapping generations models. We characterize the necessary conditions for obtaining a double dividend, i.e. an improvement of environmental and non-environmental welfare when the revenue from the pollution tax is recycled into a change in the labor tax rate. We show that, depending on the initial capital stock and on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, conditions may be defined to simultaneously allow (i) the obtaining of a long-term double dividend, (ii) the economy to move closer to the modified golden rule and (iii) in the short term, an improvement in the welfare of the two present generations.     

Carbon taxation,OPEC and the end of oil

I develop a differential game between an oil cartel and an importer investing in research and development (R&D) to reduce the cost of a green substitute to oil. In equilibrium, the cartel is forced to deter the substitute, which thus imposes a price ceiling falling over time. Credible carbon taxes are below the Pigovian level, implying the importer cannot internalise the full pollution externality, much less capture resource rents. Without carbon pricing, the importer curtails long-run pollution using a costly R&D programme. Normatively, climate policy will be more expensive if relying on green R&D programmes only.     

Best policy response to environmental shocks: Applying a stochastic framework

The paper develops a general framework for the analysis of environmental shocks in growing economies. Endogenous capital investments allow identifying the dual role of capital as a buffer against shocks and a source of pollution. We study the effects of recurring natural disasters on optimal growth and efficient environmental policies. Emissions may cause continuous fluctuations, entail discrete and recurring jumps, or trigger so-called “tipping points” with large costs to the economy. Closed-form solutions are provided for all the model variants. We discuss possible applications in environmental economics and identify current research gaps.     

Alternative transportation fuel standards: Welfare effects and climate benefits

This paper develops an integrated model of the fuel and agricultural sectors to analyze the welfare and greenhouse gas emission (GHG) effects of the existing Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), a Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) and a carbon price policy. The conceptual framework shows that these policies differ in the incentives they create for the consumption and mix of different types of biofuels and in their effects on food and fuel prices and GHG emissions. We also simulate the welfare and GHG effects of these three policies which are normalized to achieve the same level of US GHG emissions. By promoting greater production of food-crop based biofuels, the RFS is found to lead to a larger reduction in fossil fuel use but also a larger increase in food prices and a smaller reduction in global GHG emissions compared to the LCFS and carbon tax. All three policies increase US social welfare compared to a no-biofuel baseline scenario due to improved terms-of-trade, even when environmental benefits are excluded; global social welfare increases with a carbon tax but decreases with the RFS and LCFS due to the efficiency costs imposed by these policies, even after including the benefits of mitigating GHG emissions.