Green clubs

This paper treats programs in which firms voluntarily agree to meet environmental standards as “green clubs”: clubs, because they provide non-rival but excludable reputation benefits to participating firms; green, because they also generate environmental public goods. The model illuminates a central tension between the congestion externality familiar from conventional club theory and the free-riding externality familiar from the theory on private provision of public goods. We compare three common program sponsors—governments, industry, and environmental groups. We find that if monitoring of the club standard is perfect, a government constrained from regulating club size may prefer to leave sponsorship to industry if public-good benefits are sufficiently low, or to environmentalists if public-good benefits are sufficiently high. If monitoring is imperfect, an important question is whether consumers can infer that a club is too large for its standard to be credible. If they can then the government may deliberately choose an imperfect monitoring mechanism as a way of regulating club size indirectly. If they cannot then this reinforces the government's preference for delegating sponsorship.     

Green,greener, greenest: Eco-label gradation and competition

This paper analyzes two common features of markets in which eco-label programs certify that products are “green”: gradation—single programs offering multiple certification standards (e.g., platinum, gold, silver)—and competition—multiple programs vying to certify to their respective standards. We find that, depending on whether programs are sponsored by industry, environmental groups, or a government, they have strikingly different incentives to grade or compete. Industry sponsors are indifferent about both; environmentalist sponsors optimally grade or compete with other environmentalist sponsors only if consumer preferences for green consumption are skewed in a specific way; and government sponsors׳ decisions depend on the relative importance of private vs. public benefits generated by the green market. We find also that it is no accident that green markets frequently have an environmentalist program competing with an industry one. For each of the cases examined, our analysis is consistent with casual empirical evidence.     

North–south trade in reusable goods: Green design meets illegal shipments of waste

In a stylized model of international trade, firms in the North indirectly export second-hand products to a representative firm in the South to be reused as intermediate goods, with potential trade gains. The level of reusability of waste products – or green design – is a crucial choice variable in the North. This is because, in the presence of imperfect international monitoring, non-reusable waste can be illegally mixed with reusable waste. I explore the driving forces for illegal waste movement, with a particular focus on local waste regulations such as the EU׳s Directive on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment. Under mild conditions, it is shown that increasingly stringent regulations in the North can induce Northern firms to reduce product reusability. Consequently, the flow of non-reusable waste to the South increases, magnifying the pollution haven effect.     

Opportunities for better use of collective action theory in research and governance for invasive species management

Controlling invasive species presents a public-good dilemma. Although environmental, social, and economic benefits of control accrue to society, costs are borne by only a few individuals and organizations. For decades, policy makers have used incentives and sanctions to encourage or coerce individual actors to contribute to the public good, with limited success. Diverse, subnational efforts to collectively manage invasive plants, insects, and animals provide effective alternatives to traditional command-and-control approaches. Despite this work, there has been little systematic evaluation of collective efforts to determine whether there are consistent principles underpinning success. We reviewed 32 studies to identify the extent to which collective-action theories from related agricultural and environmental fields explain collaborative invasive species management approaches; describe and differentiate emergent invasive species collective-action efforts; and provide guidance on how to enable more collaborative approaches to invasive species management. We identified 4 types of collective action aimed at invasive species—externally led, community led, comanaged, and organizational coalitions—that provide blueprints for future invasive species management. Existing collective-action theories could explain the importance attributed to developing shared knowledge of the social-ecological system and the need for social capital. Yet, collection action on invasive species requires different types of monitoring, sanctions, and boundary definitions. We argue that future government policies can benefit from establishing flexible boundaries that encourage social learning and enable colocated individuals and organizations to identify common goals, pool resources, and coordinate efforts.     

Redistribution and pollution taxes with non-linear Engel curves

This paper analyses optimal corrective taxation and optimal income redistribution. The Pigouvian pollution tax is higher if pollution damages disproportionally hurt the poor due to equity weighting of pollution damages. Moreover, under general utility functions, optimal pollution taxes should be set below the Pigouvian tax if the poor spend a disproportionate fraction of their income on polluting goods. However, if Engel curves are linear, optimal pollution taxes should follow the first-best rule for the Pigouvian corrective tax even if the government wants to redistribute income and the poor spend a disproportional part of their income on polluting goods. The often-used quasi-linear, CES and Stone-Geary utility functions all have linear Engel curves. If Engel curves are linear, and if pollution taxes are not optimised, Pareto-improving green tax reforms exist that move the pollution tax closer to the Pigouvian tax. Simulations demonstrate that optimal corrective taxes should be Pigouvian if the demand for polluting goods is derived from a LES demand system, but deviate from the Pigouvian taxes if demand for polluting goods demand is derived from a PIGLOG demand system.     

Strategic environmental policy; eco-dumping or a green strategy?

The Porter hypothesis claims that a strong environmental policy best serves the interests of a nation's export industry. While this hypothesis seems to be based on some form of bounded rationality, this paper argues that governments may have good reasons for setting an especially strong environmental policy even though firms are fully rational. If the available abatement technology turns the environment into an “inferior input”, competitiveness is spurred by a strong environmental policy. The government should take advantage of this, and set an especially strict emission quota or an especially high emission tax. The findings in the paper also has consequences for the desirability of international cooperation with respect to national environmental policy. If a strict environmental policy spurs competitiveness, the environment is better protected without cooperation.     

Environmental policy with upstream pollution abatement technology firms

This paper examines how the existence of an upstream abatement technology sector affects optimal environmental policy. We explore whether the policy should be especially stringent in order to spur a successful export industry based on abatement technology. Furthermore, we investigate if a stringent policy can be used to increase competition in the upstream sector. Our point of departure is a three-stage game between a government in a country with a polluting downstream industry, and a limited number of upstream firms supplying abatement technologies. The government moves first, and may use its environmental policy strategically to influence the behavior of the upstream technology firms. We find that an especially stringent environmental policy towards the polluting downstream sector may be well founded, as it increases competition between the technology suppliers, leading to lower abatement costs. However, to our surprise, an especially stringent environmental policy is not a particularly good industrial policy with respect to developing successful new export sectors based on abatement technology.     

Income inequality and willingness to pay for environmental public goods

We study how the distribution of income among members of society, and income inequality in particular, affects social willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental public goods. We find that social WTP for environmental goods decreases (increases) with income inequality if and only if environmental goods and manufactured goods are substitutes (complements). We derive adjustment factors for benefit transfer to control for differences in income distributions between a study site and a policy site. For illustration, we quantify how social WTP for environmental public goods depends on the respective income distributions for empirical case studies in Sweden and the World at large. We find that the adjustment for income inequality can be substantial.     

绿色食品生产补偿的理论机理与政策设计

制约我国绿色食品发展的重要因素之一是其生态环境成本难以通过市场来兑现。为解决这一问题,文章以生态补偿为突破口,首先从理论上明确绿色食品生产具有正外部性,政府对其生产企业或农户进行补偿具有合理性和必要性,然后进一步探讨其制度构建与政策设计。（1）构建一个包括政府、生产者、消费者三方的博弈模型,着重分析绿色食品供需过程中、政府影响下生产者和消费者的利益动机和博弈行为。模型结果显示,存在能够满足绿色食品供需平衡的1个纯战略纳什均衡解和1个混合战略纳什均衡解,这两个纳什均衡解的实现条件均要求政府对绿色食品生产者提供补偿和对消费者实施优惠政策。（2）利用C-D生产函数建构的利润函数和恢复费用法探讨绿色食品生产补偿标准范围,结果表明最低补偿标准应满足生产者生产绿色食品和生产普通食品利润相等,而最高补偿标准则应对绿色食品生产中创造的环境效益进行支付。（3）文章最后从“建立经济政策支持体系,构筑科技进步支撑体系,完善品牌质量保障体系,培育产业化生产体系”等4方面提出了现阶段我国绿色食品生产补偿的政策建议。     

Green markets, eco-certification, and equilibrium fraud

Consumers voluntarily pay significant price premiums to acquire unobservable environmental attributes in green markets. This paper considers the performance of eco-certification policy under circumstances where consumers cannot discern environmental attributes in goods, but are able to form rational expectations regarding the extent of illicit activities in the green market. The main results are: (i) fraud is less prevalent in green markets when entry barriers limit the number of firms; (ii) conventional environmental policies on polluting techniques increase the incidence of fraud, and can even preclude the use of non-polluting techniques which would otherwise emerge in green markets; (iii) voluntary eco-certification policies can decrease fraud, increase output, and raise profits per firm; and (iv) in cases where the socially optimal resource allocation can be supported, the optimal policy involves negative unit certification fees, positive fixed certification fees and is revenue-generating for the certifying agent.     

The efficiency of paying compensation in the Pigovian solution to externality problems

This note examines the efficiency of giving the victim of an externality the revenue raised by a tax on the injurer when the injurer and victim bargain with each other and act strategically. If the government has full information about the externality problem, then compensation is compatible with, but is not required for, the attainment of efficiency. If the government has limited information, then the desirability of compensation depends on the parties' behavior. In general, there is not an a priori case against compensation.     

Corporate governance and green innovation

We study the relationship between corporate governance and firms׳ environmental innovation. Exploiting changes in antitakeover legislation in the US, we show that worse governed firms generate fewer green patents relative to all their innovations. This negative effect is greater for firms with a smaller share of institutional ownership, with a smaller stock of green patents, and with more binding financial constraints. Investigating regulatory and industry variations, we also find more pronounced effects for firms operating in states with lower pollution abatement costs, and in sectors less dependent on energy inputs. Overall, our results suggest that ineffective corporate governance may constitute a major obstacle to environmental efficiency.     

生态补偿的理论基础:一个分析性框架

总结分析了生态补偿的理论基础框架和基本理论依据。认为,自然资源环境利用的不可逆性是生态补偿的自然要求和生态学基础;环境资源产权权利界定是生态补偿的法理基础和制度经济学基础;公共物品属性是生态补偿政策途径选择的公共经济学基础;外部性的内部化是生态补偿的核心问题和环境经济学基础;自然资源环境资本论是生态补偿的价值基础和确定补偿标准的理论依据。     

Vertical fiscal externalities and the environment

We show that imposition of a state-level environmental tax in a federation crowds out pre-existing federal taxes. We explain how this vertical fiscal externality can lead unilateral state-level environmental policy to generate a welfare gain in the implementing state, at the expense of other states, even absent any environmental benefits. Using a computable general equilibrium model of the Canadian federation, we show that vertical fiscal externalities can be the major determinant of the welfare change following environmental policy implementation by a state government. Our numerical simulations indicate that – as a consequence of vertical fiscal externalities – state governments can reduce greenhouse gas emissions by over 20 percent without any net cost to themselves.     

Factors for implementing end-of-life product reverse logistics in the Chinese manufacturing sector

Dedicated, skilled and relatively cheap manpower coupled with efficient manufacturing techniques has elevated China’s status as the world’s factory. China is now capable of producing virtually any product, from cheap toys to some of the most sophisticated goods and equipment. The resultant economic benefits and associated enormous consumption due to rise in per capita income are accompanied by an equally unprecedented negative environmental impact arising from the huge increase of end-of-life (EoL) products. This study aims to understand and prioritise EoL product reverse logistics (RL) factors from Chinese manufacturing sector perspective. Multiple case studies in five different industries within the manufacturing sector have been carried out and analytic hierarchy process (AHP) has been employed to prioritise the governing factors for the successful RL implementation in the Chinese manufacturing sector. Results indicate that Chinese firms are unlikely to embark on RL operations without external factors such as strict government legislation.     

International externalities, strategic interaction, and domestic politics

Domestic politics can sometimes play an influential role when externalities have strategic and international implications. If voters delegate the choice to policymakers and if individual countries independently determine their environmental policy using a consumption tax on the emissions generating good, the result could be an outcome that is inferior to the one preferred by the median voter in the absence of delegation. On the other hand, if the international externality is unilateral in nature, rather than reciprocal, we find that delegation is largely irrelevant, since voters’ choice of policymaker is no longer strategic in character. Similarly, if voters anticipate policymakers successfully coordinating their policies at a later stage, there also will be no difference between the policymakers’ and the median voters’ aggregate weighting of environmental emissions.     

Positive framing does not solve the tragedy of the commons

We investigate whether positive framing increases cooperation in three social dilemmas with slightly different properties: a linear public goods (PG) game, a non-linear PG game, and a common pool resource (CPR) game. Results from our laboratory experiments show that contributions to a linear PG are higher if the externality is framed positively, rather than negatively, corroborating earlier findings by Andreoni (1995). By contrast, we find no such framing effects in the non-linear PG game or the CPR game. In these games, the best response in the material payoffs is to contribute less if others contribute more, counteracting effects of pro-social preferences. Positive framing therefore does not help to solve the tragedy of the commons.     

Die Rolle von Kommunikation in der Umweltbewertung

Goal and Scope

Planning projects concerning the environment often provoke problems due to a lack of transparency of the applied scales and the appropriate evaluation methods. This paper therefore examines the general structure of all valuation processes before describing the character of the economic evaluation method in detail. From this point of view, requirements on planning processes are coming out which are to be achieved if their duty — the provision of public goods — is to be carried out efficiently.

Features

It will be shown that from an economist’s perspective a planning procedure acts as a surrogate of the market in coordinating individual’s preferences. The reasons for the inefficient level of the provision of environmental goods by private producers are their main characteristics: non-rivality and non-excludability; therefore public goods do not possess prices. Thus environmental goods have to be produced by cooperation and planning processes have to guarantee this. The main character of planning procedures is be seen in communication processes which is documented by a narrative study.

Results and Conclusions

Planning projects concerning the environment are strongly contingent on communication processes. Thus, they are also controllable by communication. The interdisciplinary research in communications shows that cooperative behaviour which is required for planning projects that should provide public goods can be benefited by applicative communication technologies. In this juncture (social) norms more and more emerge to act an important part in conveying cooperative behaviour. Especially so called ‘Sozialtechniken’ seem to be able to activate such norms.

Outlook

From the economist’s point of view planning projects concerning the environment mostly desiderate two things: Firstly, the procedures and methods which are applied to evaluate the regarding environmental goods in many cases suffer from transparency. Secondly, individual’s preferences predominant by the local population and accordingly by the directly involved parties are mostly not acquired adequately to achieve an efficient allocation of environmental goods. Applying more communication technologies to solve these two problems in the future both an increase of efficiency and an increase of the acceptability of such planning projects can be expected.     

Pollution havens and industrial agglomeration

This paper examines the pollution haven hypothesis using a spatial-economy model of two countries and two sectors. The manufacturing sector generates cross-border pollution which reduces cross-sectoral productivity of agricultural goods, and lowers local income. We derive a demand-reducing effect that discourages firms to move to the country with laxer environmental regulations, in the absence of any comparative advantage. Our analysis also demonstrates that manufacturing agglomeration forces can alleviate the pollution-haven effect: a pollution haven may not arise if environmental regulation is slightly more stringent in the larger country.     

Environmental solutions sparked by environmental history

Environmental solutions require a decision-making process that is ultimately political, in that they involve decisions with uncertain outcomes and stakeholders with conflicting viewpoints. If this process seeks broad alignment between the government and public, then reconciling conflicting viewpoints is a key to the legitimacy of these decisions. We show that ecological baselines can be particularly powerful tools for creating a common understanding for public support (legitimacy) and conformity to new rules or regulations (legality) that enable the solution. They are powerful because they move the discussion of solutions from the abstract to the concrete by providing a conceptual model for a common expectation (e.g., restoring habitat). They provide narratives of the past (ecological histories) that readjust the future expectations of individuals on how to perceive and respond to new policy. While ecological baselines offer scientists benchmarks for reinstating ecological functions, they also normalize public and government discussion of solutions. This social normalization of public issues may assist government policy and influence social views, practices, and behaviors that adopt the policy. For science to more effectively inform conservation, we encourage interdisciplinary thinking (science- and human-centered) because it can provide public support and government legitimacy for investing in environmental solutions.