ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR AGRICULTURAL NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL1

ABSTRACT. The limited success of command-and-control policies for reducing nonpoint source (NPS) water pollution mandated under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) has prompted increased interest in economic incentive policies as an alternative control mechanism. A variety of measures have been proposed ranging from fairly minor modifications of existing policies to substantial revisions including watershed-wide polices that rely on economic incentives. While greater use of economic incentive policies, such as environmental bonds and point/nonpoint source trading is being advocated in the reauthorization of the CWA, the expected effects of individual proposals will be modest. The characteristics of NPS pollution, namely uncertainty and asymmetrical information, underscores that there is no single, ideal policy instrument for controlling the many types of agricultural NPS water pollution. Some of the usual incentive-based policies, such as effluent taxes, are not well suited to the task. Individual incentive policies proposed for the reauthorized CWA, such as pollution trading or deposit/refund systems, are not broadly applicable for heterogeneous pollution situations. Economic incentive policies may be appropriate in some cases, and command-and-control policies will be preferable in others and may in fact complement incentive policies.     

COST‐EFFECTIVE POINT‐NONPOINT TRADING: AN APPLICATION TO THE SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN1

ABSTRACT: Point‐nonpoint trading has been suggested as a relatively efficient approach for reducing nutrient pollution in the Chesapeake Bay and elsewhere. However, relatively little economic research has examined the design of trading programs involving nonpoint sources. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the economics of several fundamental design choices for point‐nonpoint trading programs. The Susquehanna River Basin (SRB) in Pennsylvania as an example, although many of the insights should generally apply to other regions as well.     

Point‐Nonpoint Trading – Can It Work?1

Ribaudo, Marc O. and Jessica Gottlieb, 2011. Point‐Nonpoint Trading – Can It Work? Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 47(1):5‐14. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2010.00454.x Abstract: Water quality trading between point and nonpoint sources is of great interest as an alternative to strict command and control regulations on point sources for achieving water quality goals. The expectation is that trading will reduce the costs of water quality protection, and may speed compliance. The United States Environmental Protection Agency has issued guidance to the States on developing point‐nonpoint trading programs, and United States Department of Agriculture is encouraging farmer participation. However, existing point‐nonpoint trading programs have resulted in very few trades. Supply side and demand side impediments seem to be preventing trades from occurring in most trading programs. These include uncertainty over the number of discharge allowances different management practices can produce, high transactions costs of identifying trading partners, baseline requirements that eliminate low‐cost credits, the reluctance of point sources to trade with unfamiliar agents, and the perception of some farmers that entering contracts with regulated point sources leads to greater scrutiny and potential future regulation. Many of these problems can be addressed through research and program design.     

POINT‐NONPOINT SOURCE WATER QUALITY TRADING: A CASE STUDY IN THE MINNESOTA RIVER BASIN1

ABSTRACT: Contrary to the general trend of only a few actual trades occurring within point‐nonpoint source water quality trading programs in the United States, two trading projects in the Minnesota River Basin, created under the provisions of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits, have generated five major trades and numerous smaller ones. In this paper, these two projects are described to illustrate their origins, implementation, and results. It was found that several factors contributed to the relatively high number of trades in these projects, including the offsetting nature of the projects (hence a fixed number of credits that the point sources were required to obtain), readily available information on potential nonpoint source trading partners, and an effectively internal trading scheme used by one of the two projects. It was also found that long term structural pollution control measures, such as streambank stabilization, offered substantial cost savings over point source controls. Estimates of transaction costs showed that the total costs of the trading projects were increased by at least 35 percent after transaction costs were taken into account. Evidence also showed that in addition to pollution reduction, these two trading projects brought other benefits to the watershed, such as helping balance environmental protection and regional economic growth.     

ADDRESSING TOTAL PHOSPHORUS IMPAIRMENTS WITH WATER QUALITY TRADING1

ABSTRACT: Water quality trading is a voluntary economic process that provides an opportunity for dischargers to reduce the costs associated with meeting a discharge limitation. Trading can provide a cost effective solution for point sources (i.e., wastewater treatment plants) to meet strict effluent limitations set in response to total maximum daily loads (TMDLs). A successful trading program often depends on first determining the trading suitability of a pollutant for a particular watershed. A simple technical approach has been developed to identify sub‐watersheds within the Raritan River Basin, New Jersey, where water quality trading could provide a cost effective and scientifically feasible method for addressing total phosphorus impairments. The methodology presented will serve as a model to conduct similar analyses in other watersheds. The Raritan River Basin was divided into 12 subwatershed‐based study areas. Point‐nonpoint source trading opportunities were examined for each study area by examining the point and nonpoint source total phosphorus loading to impaired water bodies. Of the 12 subwatersheds examined, four had a high potential for implementing a successful trading program. Since instream phosphorus concentrations are closely related to soil erosion, an additional analysis was performed to examine soil erodibility. Recommendations are presented for conducting an economic analysis following the feasibility study.     

Baseline requirements can hinder trades in water quality trading programs: Evidence from the Conestoga watershed

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) are promoting point/nonpoint trading as a way of reducing the costs of meeting water quality goals. Farms can create offsets by implementing management practices such as conservation tillage, nutrient management and buffer strips. To be eligible to sell offsets or credits, farmers must first comply with baseline requirements. USEPA guidance recommends that the baseline for nonpoint sources be management practices that are consistent with the water quality goal. A farmer would not be able to create offsets until the minimum practice standards are met. An alternative baseline is those practices being implemented at the time the trading program starts, or when the farmer enters the program. The selection of the baseline affects the efficiency and equity of the trading program. It has major implications for which farmers benefit from trading, the cost of nonpoint source offsets, and ultimately the number of offsets that nonpoint sources can sell to regulated point sources. We use a simple model of the average profit-maximizing dairy farmer operating in the Conestoga watershed in Pennsylvania to evaluate the implications of baseline requirements on the cost and quantity of offsets that can be produced for sale in a water quality trading market, and which farmers benefit most from trading.     

An Ex Post Evaluation of Ohio’s Great Miami Water Quality Trading Program1

Newburn, David A. and Richard T. Woodward, 2011. An Ex Post Evaluation of Ohio’s Great Miami Water Quality Trading Program. Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 48(1): 156‐169. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2011.00601.x Abstract: Market‐based approaches to address water quality problems have resulted in only limited success, especially in trading programs involving both point and nonpoint sources. We analyze one of the largest point‐nonpoint trading programs – the Great Miami Trading Program in Ohio, administered by the Miami Conservancy District (MCD). Our evaluation focuses on the economic and institutional aspects of the program, including cost effectiveness, efficiency of bidding, transaction costs, trading ratios, and innovation. We use a unique dataset consisting of all bids from agricultural nonpoint sources and interviews of soil and water conservation district (SWCD) agents in the watershed. We find that the MCD’s reliance on county‐level SWCD offices to recruit and advise farmers has been essential to achieve relatively high rates of farmer participation. Additionally, the MCD is able to partly free ride on the administrative costs that SWCD offices receive to assist federal conservation programs, which is helpful to lower costs for a fledgling trading program. However, the involvement of SWCD offices reduced the potential cost savings from the reverse auction structure because some agents were able to learn about the threshold price over the six rounds of bidding and help farmers bid strategically. Overall, the program structure serves as an effective model for future trading programs in other regions that seek to involve agricultural nonpoint sources.     

Economic and Ecological Rules for Water Quality Trading1

Horan, Richard D. and James S. Shortle, 2011. Economic and Ecological Rules for Water Quality Trading. Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 47(1):59‐69. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2010.00463.x Abstract: Emissions trading in textbook form uses markets to achieve pollution targets cost‐efficiently. This result is accomplished in markets that regulators can implement without knowing pollution abatement costs. The theoretical promise of emissions trading, along with real‐world success stories from air emissions trading, has led to initiatives to use trading for water pollution control. Yet, trading, particularly when it involves nonpoint sources of pollution, requires significant departures from the textbook concept. This paper explores how features of water quality problems affect the design of markets for water pollution control relative to textbook emissions markets. Three fundamental design tasks that regulators must address for pollution trading to achieve an environmental goal at low cost are examined: (1) defining the point and nonpoint commodities to be traded, (2) defining rules governing commodity exchange, and (3) setting caps on the commodity supplies so as to achieve an environmental target. We show that the way in which these tasks are optimally addressed for water quality markets differs significantly from the textbook model and its real‐world analogs. We also show that the fundamental appeal of emissions trading is lost in the case of realistic water quality markets, as market designs that reduce the costs of achieving water quality goals may no longer be implementable without the regulatory authority having information on abatement costs.     

Irrigation Water Allocation Using an Inexact Two‐Stage Quadratic Programming with Fuzzy Input under Climate Change

Agricultural irrigation accounts for nearly 70% of the total water use around the world. Uncertainties and climate change together exacerbate the complexity of optimal allocation of water resources for irrigation. An interval‐fuzzy two‐stage stochastic quadratic programming model is developed for determining the plans for water allocation for irrigation with maximum benefits. The model is shown to be applicable when inputs are expressed as discrete, fuzzy or random. In order to reflect the effect of marginal utility on benefit and cost, the model can also deal with nonlinearities in the objective function. Results from applying the model to a case study in the middle reaches of the Heihe River basin, China, show schemes for water allocation for irrigation of different crops in every month of the crop growth period under various flow levels are effective for achieving high economic benefits. Different climate change scenarios are used to analyze the impact of changing water requirement and water availability on irrigation water allocation. The proposed model can aid the decision maker in formulating desired irrigation water management policies in the wake of uncertainties and changing environment.     

INCREASING REGULATORS' CONFIDENCE IN POINT-NONPOINT POLLUTANT TRADING SCHEMES1

ABSTRACT: One of the principal stumbling blocks to regulatory agencies' adopting pollutant trading schemes is the complex of uncertainties surrounding any change in institutions. This is especially true if nonpoint pollution sources are to be involved along with point sources. Regulators are understandably reluctant to switch from tried-and-true point source permit systems, even if trading schemes can be shown (on paper, at least) to result in lower public expenditures. We propose a set of practical criteria for point-nonpoint pollutant trading systems that promise to increase regulators' confidence that the new system will be equally effective in controlling pollution and at the same time more likely to capture efficiencies in pollution reduction practices.     

OPTIMIZING NONPOINT SOURCE CONTROLS IN WATER QUALITY REGULATION1

ABSTRACT: A stochastic programming framework is developed to evaluate the economic implications of reliability criteria and multiple effluent controls on nonpoint source pollution. An integrated watershed simulation model is used to generate probability distributions for agricultural effluents in surface and ground water resulting from agricultural practices. Results from the planning model indicate that reliability and multiple effluent constraints significantly increase the cost of nonpoint controls but the effects vary by control alternative. The analysis indicates that an evaluation of multiple water quality objectives can be an important planning tool for designing nonpoint source controls for innovative programs to promote cost-effective water quality regulation.     

Exploring Nontraditional Participation as an Approach to Make Water Quality Trading Markets More Effective

Water quality trading (WQT) has the potential to be a low‐cost means for achieving water quality goals. WQT allows regulated wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) facing discharge limits the flexibility to either reduce their own discharge or purchase pollution control from other WWTPs or nonpoint sources (NPSs) such as agricultural producers. Under this limited scope, programs with NPSs have been largely unsuccessful at meeting water quality goals. The decision to participate in trading depends on many factors including the pollution control costs, uncertainty in pollution control, and discharge limits. Current research that focuses on making WQT work tends to identify how to increase participation by traditional traders such as WWTPs and agricultural producers. As an alternative, but complementary approach, we consider whether augmenting WQT markets with nontraditional participants would help increase the number of trades. Determining the economic incentives for these potential participants requires the development of novel benefit functions requiring not only economic considerations but also accounting for ecological and engineering processes. Existing literature on nontraditional participants in environmental markets tends to center on air quality and only increasing citizen participation as buyers. Here, we consider the issues for broadening participation (both buyers and sellers) in WQT and outline a multidisciplinary approach to begin evaluating feasibility.     

Rhetoric and Reality of Water Quality Trading and the Potential for Market‐like Reform1

Stephenson, Kurt and Leonard Shabman, 2011. Rhetoric and Reality of Water Quality Trading and the Potential for Market‐Like Reform. Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 47(1):15‐28. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2010.00492.x Abstract: Many public interest groups, government agencies, and professional economists argue that current approaches to water quality trading are a cost‐effective, politically practical innovation for achieving water quality standards, in part by addressing one of the most difficult water quality improvement challenges – limiting the discharge from nonpoint sources. A critical analysis shows that these claims for current water quality trading programs are often unrealized. This rhetoric, without adherence to principles of market‐like reform, can undermine the support of regulated parties for meaningful water quality policy reform, contribute to missed opportunities to implement cost‐effective programs, and postpone successfully meeting the challenge of limiting nonpoint source discharges. A better understanding and application of market‐like principles can result in an improved design of trading as well as general water quality management programs.     

Toward quantifying the effectiveness of water trading under uncertainty

This paper presents a methodology for quantifying the effectiveness of water-trading under uncertainty, by developing an optimization model based on the interval-parameter two-stage stochastic program (TSP) technique. In the study, the effectiveness of a water-trading program is measured by the water volume that can be released through trading from a statistical point of view. The methodology can also deal with recourse water allocation problems generated by randomness in water availability and, at the same time, tackle uncertainties expressed as intervals in the trading system. The developed methodology was tested with a hypothetical water-trading program in an agricultural system in the Swift Current Creek watershed, Canada. Study results indicate that the methodology can effectively measure the effectiveness of a trading program through estimating the water volume being released through trading in a long-term view. A sensitivity analysis was also conducted to analyze the effects of different trading costs on the trading program. It shows that the trading efforts would become ineffective when the trading costs are too high. The case study also demonstrates that the trading program is more effective in a dry season when total water availability is in shortage.     

A WATER QUALITY‐BASED APPROACH FOR WATERSHED WIDE BMP STRATEGIES1

ABSTRACT: Watershed management strategies generally involve controlling nonpoint source pollution by implementing various best management practices (BMPs). Currently, stormwater management programs in most states use a performance‐based approach to implement onsite BMPs. This approach fails to link the onsite BMP performance directly to receiving water quality benefits, and it does not take into account the combined treatment effects of all the stormwater management practices within a watershed. To address these issues, this paper proposes a water quality‐based BMP planning approach for effective nonpoint source pollution control at a watershed scale. A coupled modeling system consisting of a watershed model (HSPF) and a receiving water quality model (CE‐QUAL‐W2) was developed to establish the linkage between BMP performance and receiving water quality targets. A Monte Carlo simulation approach was utilized to develop alternative BMP strategies at a watershed level. The developed methodology was applied to the Swift Creek Reservoir watershed in Virginia, and the results show that the proposed approach allows for the development of BMP strategies that lead to full compliance with water quality requirements.     

THE STATUS OF NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION: ITS NATURE,EXTENT AND CONTROL1

Nonpoint source pollution remains as the primary reason for the designation of many of the Nation's streams as “water quality limited.” This means that even with the application of technology-based effluent limitations on point sources, ambient water quality standards will not be met. This paper explores several of the reasons why nonpoint sources are so difficult to come to grips with. These reasons include: (1) the inability to expand the definition of nonpoint sources to encompass nonengineering attributes, (2) the relatively primitive state of characterizing nonpoint sources, (3) the lack of prior success in conducting programs to study and alleviate nonpoint problems, and (4) an uncertain approach to providing incentives for control practices.     

Where Did the Agricultural Nonpoint Source Trades Go? Lessons from Virginia Water Quality Trading Programs

Governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and agricultural organizations promote water quality trading programs as an innovative policy to engage agricultural producers in conservation activities. Cost analyses suggest regulated sources can reduce compliance costs by purchasing agricultural nonpoint source credits. Yet, such “point‐nonpoint” trades are rare. This article assesses the demand for agricultural nonpoint sources in well‐developed nutrient trading programs in Virginia for industrial and municipal wastewater treatment plants, municipal stormwater programs, and land developers. Evidence suggests nutrient trading programs in Virginia will not stimulate investments in pollutant reduction practices on working agricultural lands. The lack of demand for agricultural nonpoint source credits can be attributed to a substantial degree to the design features and incentives present in multiple overlapping regulatory programs. The legal setting that dampens regulated source demand for nonpoint source credits in Virginia is broadly representative of conditions found elsewhere in the United States.     

Water Quality Model Uncertainty Analysis of a Point‐Point Source Phosphorus Trading Program1

Kardos, Josef S. and Christopher C. Obropta, 2011. Water Quality Model Uncertainty Analysis of a Point‐Point Source Phosphorus Trading Program. Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 47(6):1317–1337. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2011.00591.x Abstract: Water quality modeling is a major source of scientific uncertainty in the Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) process. The effects of these uncertainties extend to water quality trading programs designed to implement TMDLs. This study examines the effects of water quality model uncertainty on a nutrient trading program. The study builds on previous work to design a phosphorus trading program for the Nontidal Passaic River Basin in New Jersey that would implement the watershed TMDL for total phosphorus (TP). The study identified how water quality model uncertainty affects outcomes of potential trades of TP between wastewater treatment plants. The uncertainty analysis found no evidence to suggest that the outcome of trades between wastewater treatment plants, as compared with command and control regulation, will significantly increase uncertainty in the attainment of dissolved oxygen surface water quality standards, site‐specific chlorophyll a criteria, and reduction targets for diverted TP load at potential hot spots in the watershed. Each simulated trading scenario demonstrated parity with or improvement from the command and control approach at the TMDL critical locations, and low risk of hot spots elsewhere.     

Policy Utopias for Nutrient Credit Trading Programs with Nonpoint Sources

A promising program to address water contamination from nutrients is water quality trading (WQT), whereby entities with high abatement costs purchase credits from entities with lower abatement costs. The concept has found some success with point source water pollution, but very few trades have occurred in over 50 programs in the United States (U.S.) that have focused on nonpoint sources (NPSs). To understand why success has been slow, we identified three environments needed for programs to succeed: physical, economic, and institutional. We estimate that only 5% of watersheds in the U.S. currently listed as nutrient impaired provide a viable physical environment for trading nitrogen; 13% are suitable for phosphorus. Economic and institutional challenges would shrink that domain even further. Therefore, we find places with the ideal physical, economic, and institutional environments necessary for feasible WQT programs are virtual policy utopias — rare places with ideal environments. Fortunately, a growing literature provides the tools necessary to identify where these policy utopias are and to expand that domain through a better understanding about how to manage WQT programs more effectively.     

WATER QUALITY SIMULATION AND PUBLIC LAW 92–500 Case Study: Southwestern Illinois1

ABSTRACT: Section 208 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 has provided the Southwestern Illinois Metropolitan and Regional Planning Commission (SIMAPC) with a unique opportunity for comprehensive planning of the region's water quality. SIMAPC initiated the 208 study by researching available technology for the analysis of point and nonpoint sources of pollution and establishing criteria by which to judge the various technniques. This led to SIMAPC'S choice of continuous simulation of stream and reservoir water quality as the most appropriate analytical tool for their needs. A continuous simulation model was calibrated and verified on three basins in the SIMPAC region. It was then used to produce load source analysis, pollution event frequency analysis, and pollution event duration analysis for ten pollutants under existing stream conditions and then under alternative future conditions. These results enabled the weighting of pollutant sources, analysis of the effectiveness of control measures, and quantitative analysis of the marginal benefit of each alternative.