Tanks A Lot – Trevor: For enduring process safety contributions

Trevor Kletz has left an indelible mark on worldwide chemical process safety. He generously shared his insight for decades and I have been fortunate to have spent my process safety career in the shadow of Trevor Kletz’s influence. In the early 1980s I purchased one of the first commercially available process safety awareness training modules. The module was entitled the “Hazards of Over and Under Pressurizing Tanks,” developed by Trevor, and distributed by the Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE). The module contained a collection of short case histories and each incident provided a message on fundamentals. It was an easy to use module with a couple of dozen vivid 35 mm slides and focused on the frail nature of tanks.This paper, “Tanks A Lot – Trevor” mimics the IChemE approach of three decades ago and could serve as an introductory awareness lesson for the newbie or trainee who desires to learn about the frail nature of tanks. But most likely, it will serve as a reminder to the seasoned reader of things he or she has previously seen or worse yet, experienced.Storage tanks in chemical plants, oil refineries, related distribution terminals and pressure vessels associated in these industries are vital components and a major investment within their facilities. These essential vessels come in all sizes and many shapes and are built to various codes. They may hold large inventories of hazardous materials.Tanks can and do very safely contain a wide variety of raw materials, intermediates and finished products for years. If the tank or its accessories are poorly designed, abused by operations or are neglected with respect to effective inspection and basic maintenance, bad things can happen.This paper includes a few tank system fundamentals as well as case histories of failures in design, operation, inspection and maintenance. Previous vessel incidents must be understood.     

Design and operating practices for safe conveying of particulate solids

I am pleased to offer this treatise on the conveying of particulate solids. In doing so I wish to acknowledge the immense contributions of Trevor Kletz in providing guidance to the chemical process industries in many areas including inherently safer design principles and operating practices.     

Toward an inherently safer design and operation of batch and semi-batch processes: The N-oxidation of alkylpyridines

This work shows an application of inherent safety principles to a reaction widely used in the pharmaceutical industry. More specifically, it incorporates the teachings of Trevor Kletz into the design of an inherently safer process for the N-oxidation of alkylpyridines. This reaction is of interest because of the hazards resulting from the undesired, gas-generating decomposition of hydrogen peroxide, the oxidizing agent. The generation of oxygen, combined with the flammability of the alkylpyridines, represents a serious fire and explosion hazard for this process. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how an inherently safer process can be potentially achieved by designing improved reactors and by assessing conditions that reduce or eliminate the hazards. Furthermore, it is shown that such improvement in safety increases the efficiency of the process and results in a cost reduction.     

The importance of (process safety) leadership

It is indeed an honour to be invited to contribute the inaugural Trevor Kletz & Sam Mannan Guest Perspective on Process Safety. Unfortunately I did not ever meet Trevor, though I worked at a plant he was a design consultant on, but I worked with Sam for several years, together focused on how we could improve process safety outcomes.For this paper I want to write about a key area in process safety that I believe underpins everything we do. If we get it really wrong, we can't come back from the brink. If we get it a little wrong, we can usually recover, with a lot of work and effort. If we get it right, things just work. So, what am I talking about, is it design, maintenance, operations? No, I am talking about leadership. This underpins everything else we do in process safety yet is an oft neglected aspect. I think this is a fitting start to this series, because both Trevor and Sam believed in effective communication, which is a key element of leadership. I hope it will set the scene for future articles to incorporate aspects of leadership when others will delve into more detailed topics.     

What you don’t manage will leak: A tribute to Trevor Kletz

This paper expands on a simple concept shared with us over three decades ago by Trevor Kletz: what you don’t have can’t leak. Despite many efforts at eliminating hazards through inherently safer process methodologies, as encouraged by Kletz and others, the reality is that the use of hazardous materials and processes is still quite common. Therefore, we consider those processes that still handle hazardous materials – the cases where what you do not manage will leak and may cause a fire, explosion or toxic release. Our intended audience is quite broad. As Kletz has noted over the years, it is not just the people running a process who are responsible for its safety, but also those who make decisions on its design, operation, maintenance, staffing, etc. We hope that this paper contributes to an understanding of why we continue to have hazardous materials leak, potentially leading to accidents that cause fatalities, serious injuries, property damage, and environmental harm.We expand on the fundamental equation for risk, a function of both the frequency and the consequence of a possible event, by considering the effects of poor operational discipline on risk, and ultimately, on the possible leak or release of the hazardous material. Continued safe operation involving hazardous materials depends on and is sustained by the operational discipline of everyone involved in the design of processes and their continuing operation and maintenance. What we do not manage will leak and therein lays the fundamental challenge that Kletz continues to emphasize today.     

A tribute to Trevor Kletz: What we are doing and why we are doing it

The goal of my tribute to Trevor Kletz is to show a view of his overall influence on many of the elements of process safety: how he helped establish a strong foundation on which we are building our future process safety risk reduction efforts.     

液化石油气罐车卸车作业事故——安全阀意外开启泄压原因调查

为了提高液化石油气罐车采用压缩机卸车法作业的安全性,通过对某液化石油气罐车卸车作业时其顶部安全阀意外开启泄压的事故原因进行调查,查明了导致罐车顶部安全阀意外开启泄压的直接原因是操作工人违章作业导致储罐与罐车罐体内气相液化石油气压差安全裕量严重不足所致。同时探讨了在夏季高温环境采用压缩机法对液化石油气罐车卸车作业时液化石油气罐车顶部安全阀整定值设定、液化石油气储罐与罐车罐体内气相液化石油气压差安全裕量的重要性。     

Trevor Kletz,friend and mentor

I am very pleased to have this opportunity to present these thoughts on my personal relationship with Trevor Kletz and the impact he has had on my own career in the field of process safety.     

Quantification of inherent safety aspects of the Dow indices

The Dow fire and explosion index (F&EI) and chemical exposure index (CEI) have been successfully implemented in a Visual Basic environment as a tool for the inherent safety assessment of chemical processes. Subprograms were developed to quantify the inherent safety aspects of the Dow indices. These aspects are presented graphically with the indices on the vertical axis and an inherent safety indicator on the horizontal axis. Dow indices of the MIC storage unit involved in the Bhopal disaster were evaluated to quantify the effects of process temperature, pressure and inventory of hazardous materials on the index values.

As operating pressure was reduced, the F&EI decreased in accordance with the principles of inherent safety. The change in F&EI due to reduction of inventory was more significant than that resulting from pressure reduction. The results show that the F&EI change, given the same range of the independent variables (quantity of hazardous materials, operating temperature and pressure), is larger when a unit in the process area is evaluated compared to a unit in a storage area (tank farm). Reduction of the inventory of hazardous materials had no direct effect on the CEI for vapor releases, whereas the size of the hole diameter impacted the CEI to a great extent. However, there is a significant change in the CEI as the inventory of materials decreases for liquid releases involving temperatures above their flash and boiling points. Pressure reduction decreases the CEI, whereas temperature reduction leads to an increase in the CEI when these parameters are treated independently.     

基于QRA角度评价LNG储罐类型的选择

为提高LNG储存的安全性,基于QRA(定量风险评价),利用应急危险定位分析软件分别进行了LNG中小型储罐及大型储槽泄漏事故分析和LNG带压储罐充注压力专项对比分析。结果表明:立式圆柱常压储罐应选择高径比接近于1的罐体而压力罐的选择受高径比的影响很小;当对常压储罐高度有要求时,球形罐是比立式圆柱罐更好的选择;在大型LNG储槽中,常压储槽自身压力很大,可以起到抑制BOG(蒸发气体)产生的作用;在饱和状态下,压力罐的充注压力并非越小越好,需进行针对性分析计算,选取最适合的充注与设计压力。掌握LNG储罐事故后果与罐体形状与类型之间的关系可加强并丰富对其储罐类型选择的认识,可较好的为提高其储存安全性提供数据支撑与理论基础。     

Study of the situation deduction of a domino accident caused by overpressure in LPG storage tank area

The production and storage of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) is gradually becoming larger and more intensive, which greatly increases the risk of the domino effect of an explosion accident in a storage tank area while improving production and management efficiency. This paper describes the construction of the domino effect scene of an explosion accident in an LPG storage tank area, the analysis of the characteristics of the LPG tank explosion shock wave and the target storage tank failure, and the creation of an ANSYS numerical model to derive the development trend and expansion law of the domino accident in the LPG storage tank area. The research showed that: 400 m³ tank T1 explosion shock waves spread to T2, T4, T5, T3, and T6, and the tank overpressures of 303 kPa, 303 kPa, 172 kPa, 81 kPa, and 61 kPa respectively. The critical values of the target storage tank failure overpressure-range threshold were 70 kPa and 60 m. After the explosion of the initial unit T1 tank, at 38 ms, the T2 and T4 storage tanks failed and exploded; at 56 ms, the T5 storage tank exploded for the third time; at 82 ms, the T3 storage tank exploded for the fourth time; and at 102 ms, the T6 storage tank exploded for the fifth time. With the increase of explosion sources, the failure overpressure of the target storage tank increased, and the interval between explosions continuously shortened, which reflected the expansion effect of the domino accident. The domino accident situation deduction in the LPG storage tank area provided a scientific basis for the safety layout, accident prevention and control, emergency rescue, and management of a chemical industry park.     

液化石油气储运容器不同受热条件下的温度压力的估算

提出了液化石油气储运容器在不同受热条件下,容器内的温度和压力的简化的计算方法,可用于此类火灾原因的分析认定、安全分析等,对火灾的扑救也具有十分重要的意义。     

A journey into Process Safety with Trevor Kletz

I offer a personal perspective on the Process Safety contributions of Trevor Kletz and how his lessons have helped shaped both my career and my own views on the topic.     

Insight into the safety distance of ground and underground installations in typical petrochemical plants

Petrochemical plants are continuously turning into large-size corporations, the installations of facilities show a developing trend from ground to underground because of the difference in land using rate. In this regard, the safety distance of petrochemical equipment buried in both ground and underground cases were investigated based on risk assessment. As a case study, gasoline tank and LPG tank set on the ground and underground are singled out to compare the risks involved. The research showed that the setting case of installation had a great influence on safety distance. Two cases have 80% reduction of equivalent safety distance compared with the rest of the cases. It was found that when the gasoline storage tank was placed underground alone, the PLL value decreased by 36.7%. Only LPG tank was placed underground, and the PLL decreased by 6.33%, and the gasoline and LPG storage tanks were placed underground simultaneously, the PLL value declined by 42.3%. Thus, the layout of plants could be further optimized, which can greatly improve the performances of land use efficiency and safety. In addition, this paper, the selection of embedding methods and the sensitivity of underground case to overpressure was resumed from two aspects: soil properties and burial depth. For the soil properties, it was found that the water saturated sandy soil with high air content and the low density unsaturated sandy soil had better effects on weakening overpressure. Such properties are particularly beneficial to reducing the occurrence rate of accidents. In terms of burial depth, it can be observed that as the burial depth was changed from 0.5m to 1.1m, the value of overpressure has dropped dramatically. When the burial depth was 2m, the damage to personnel and buildings has been greatly reduced beyond 2m from the explosion center.     

事故树分析法在LPG储罐火灾爆炸事故中的应用

LPG(液化石油气)属于危险化学品之一,LPG储罐发生火灾爆炸的机率大,造成的损失比较严重,故对其火灾爆炸事故进行研究具有重要意义。LPG储罐爆炸根据其发生机理分为化学爆炸(燃爆)和物理爆炸两种模式。本文通过对LPG储罐燃爆﹑物理爆炸两类事故进行系统分析,建立了以LPG储罐燃爆、物理爆炸为顶事件的事故树。通过对其事故树的定性分析,得到了影响顶事件的各个最小割(径)集。通过计算底事件的结构重要度,确定了影响LPG储罐火灾爆炸事故的主要因素,并提出了相应的改进措施,进而提高LPG储罐的安全性和运行可靠性。     

现行标准下某在用LPG卧式储罐的设计制造和检验分析

液化石油气卧式储罐是我国石油化工行业常用的储存设备,其设计检验和评估分析尤为重要.本文以公司某超期服役的在用LPG卧式储罐为例,结合TSG R21-2016《固定式压力容器安全技术监察规程》等现行国家标准和规定对其进行了设计制造和检验验收的再分析,最后根据最新的全面检验结果对该LPG储罐现阶段服役状况进行了分析总结,符...     

火灾爆炸危险指数法的应用

介绍了运用火灾爆炸危险指数法对液化石油气储罐和加油站内埋地汽油罐进行安全评价的实例，主要是估算其发生爆炸可能影响的范围以及所造成的损失，并提出相应的安全对策。     

The Viareggio LPG accident: Lessons learnt

On June 29th, 2009 the derailment of a freight train carrying 14 LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) tank-cars near Viareggio, in Italy, caused a massive LPG release. A gas cloud formed and ignited triggering a flash-fire that resulted in 31 fatalities and in extended damages to residential buildings around the railway line. The vulnerability of the area impacted by the flash-fire emerged as the main factor in determining the severity of the final consequences. Important lessons learnt from the accident concern the need of specific regulations and the possible implementation of safety devices for tank-cars carrying LPG and other liquefied gases under pressure. Integrated tools for consequence assessment of heavy gas releases in urban areas may contribute to robust decision making for mitigation and emergency planning.     

液化石油气站储罐区火灾爆炸危险性分析与安全措施

选择具体的液化石油气储配站,分析了该站的危险特性、危险产生的途径及可能造成的后果。在没有任何防护措施的情况下,采用蒸气云爆炸和沸腾液体扩展蒸气云爆炸模型,对该站一个50m3储罐发生泄漏造成的火灾爆炸事故后果进行预测,得出火灾爆炸后的安全距离为大于211．0m。在储配站不能满足此安全距离的基础之上,从防止产生爆炸性气体环境、消除点火源和抑制事故扩大三方面来提出有效的安全措施,降低事故发生的概率及事故造成的损失。其中,站址选在全年最小频率风向的上风侧且周围空旷的地区,罐上设置液位计、压力表、温度计及可燃气体报警器可防止产生爆炸性气体环境;罐及管道设静电接地,法兰用铜线跨接,站内设警示标志可消除点火源;生产区与辅助区间设置隔离墙,罐区周围设置砖混围堤,罐上设安全阀可抑制火灾爆炸事故扩大。     

冷冻堵漏法在危险化学品泄漏事故中的应用

为了研究液化气体泄漏冷冻堵漏的堵漏机制,运用流体力学、传热学等知识对液化石油气（LPG）储罐（槽罐）泄漏时泄漏口处产生局部低温的现象进行了研究,探讨了LPG液相泄漏和气相泄漏2种不同泄漏形式的低温效应。结果表明:液相泄漏时,泄漏口处温度下降程度与泄漏口面积成正比,且随着罐体内部压力的减小而减弱,推导出喷水冷冻堵漏的成冰时间公式;气相泄漏时,对罐内压力与温度的平衡关系进行模拟并建立了数学模型;发现由于LPG气、液相之间对流换热和汽化吸热效应的差异,导致液相与气相之间的温度差,此温度差是罐体外壁产生结霜分层现象的主要原因。