电气安全技术（三）——火灾爆炸危险场所的电气安全

爆炸和火灾危险场所的分级 按形成爆炸火灾危险的可能性大小将危险场所分级，其目的是为了有区别地选择电气设备和采取防护措施。目前国内将爆炸火灾危险场所按照气体爆炸、粉尘爆炸及火灾危险分为三大类，每类危险场所各分若干区域等级。具体划分见表1、表2和表3。     

在用防爆电气设备隐患控制

为加强爆炸危险场所的安全管理,1995年1月22日原劳动部颁布实施的《关于颁发（爆炸危险场所安全规定）的通知》中,就对爆炸危险场所做出了全面详细的安全规定,其内容涉及了危险等级划分、危险场所的技术安全、安全管理、罚则等内容,同时,国家又相继发布了一系列标准,用以规范防爆电气设备的选型、安装、维护、检修等工作。     

重大危险隐患的安全评价与安全文化建设

科学地实施危险隐患（重大事故隐患、爆炸危险场所）的安全评价，发现重大事故隐患，运用实际检测数据进行量化评估与分级，与此同时，认真注意有针对性的安全文化建设，提高员工的安全意识，达到对危险隐患进行安全管理的目的。     

爆炸危险场所安全规定

爆炸危险场所安全规定（劳动部１９９５年１月２８日颁发）第一章总则第一条为加强对爆炸危险场所的安全管理，防止伤亡事故的发生，依据《中华人民共和国劳动法》的有关规定，制定本规定。第二条本规定所称爆炸危险场所是指存在由于爆炸性混合物出现造成爆炸事故危险而必...     

火力发电厂爆炸危险场所分析及预防措施的探讨

通过对火力发电厂爆炸危险场所的爆炸机理及事故原因分析,指出了火力发电厂应重点关注的爆炸危险场所及采取的防爆措施.     

涂装作业场所超细干粉灭火设备设计

涂装作业场所使用的油漆和溶剂一般是易燃易挥发的液体,因而此类场所的火灾爆炸危险很大.一旦发生事故,将会造成巨大的财产和人员损失.本文针对此类场所火灾爆炸事故的特点,分析对比了各种消防系统对此类场所火灾爆炸事故的控制能力,提出了超细干粉灭火系统相对于其他消防系统对于控制此类场所火灾爆炸危险的优点,同时也对探测器的选型进行了讨论,并结合实例进行了超细干粉灭火设备在涂装作业场所的应用设计.     

煤气爆炸危险场所防爆电气设备选型

介绍了煤气爆炸危险场所的区域划分,说明了电气设备的防爆标志包括防爆型式、类别、级别和温度组别4个部分,对煤气场所防爆电气设备进行了选型,以防止电气火花的形成,减小煤气生产场所的爆炸危险.     

如何有效控制粉尘爆炸危险场所工艺设备防爆

主持人,你好!如何有效预防生产过程可燃性粉尘爆炸危险场所发生粉尘爆炸,粉尘爆炸危险场所工艺设备应如何安全连接,在紧急情况下如何处置,存在粉尘爆炸危险的工艺设备的防爆要求有哪些?易安网友易安网友,你好!粉尘爆炸危险场所工艺设备的连接,如不能保证动火作业安全.     

防爆设备常见隐患及排查

正爆炸事故频繁发生,引起了全国对防爆领域的关注。本文举例阐述了爆炸危险场所常见防爆设备安全隐患,并提出了专业解决思路。爆炸危险场所广泛存在于石油、化工、煤炭、航空航天、船舶、港口、粮食加工及贮存、海洋工程、燃气工程、军工、制药、机械、纺织、电力、轻工等行业或领域。爆炸危险场所的防爆安全是一个系统工程,防爆技术专业性较强,     

1．2L Harttman管式与20L球型爆炸测试装置爆炸猛度实验研究

随着现代工业的发展，粉尘爆炸的危险性几乎涉及到所有的粉体工业部门，因此对粉尘爆炸危险场所进行危险性分析成为一种必然。粉尘爆炸的猛度参数是危险性分析的重要参数，反应了粉尘爆炸的猛烈程度，同时也是设计和选用泄爆、隔爆、抑爆等不同防爆技术方法的基础。然而，对于不同的测试装置所测得猛度参数有所不同。本文分别利用1．2L Haitmann管与20L球形爆炸装置对玉米淀粉的爆炸猛度参数进行了测试，并对相应结果进行了对比分析。     

Simulation of scenario characteristics of LPG tank explosion accident and its contribution to emergency planning: A case study

Leakage and explosion of hazardous chemicals during road transportation can cause serious building damage and casualties, and adoption of highly-efficient emergency rescue measures plays a critical role in reducing accidental hazards. Considering a liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) transport tanker explosion accident that occurred in Wenling, Zhejiang Province, China on June 13, 2020 as example, this study proposes a risk assessment framework. This framework recreates the leakage and explosion of the accident process using FLACS v10.9, suggests plans for evacuation, describes the rescue areas of different levels, and explores the influence of environmental factors on the evacuation and rescue areas. The results show that simulated and predicted distributions of fuel vapour cloud concentration and explosion overpressure can provide a reference basis for rapid rescue activities; the characterization of the dynamic effects of wind speed, wind direction, and temperature with respect to the evacuation and rescue areas can be used as theoretical support for on-site adjustment of rescue forces. The role of obstacles can prevent the expansion of the evacuation areas under low wind-speed conditions, and the presence of highly congested obstacles determines the level of the rescue area. The results obtained are important for the risk analysis and the development of emergency rescue measures in case of explosion accidents associated with transportation of hazardous chemicals on high-hazard and high-sensitive road sections.     

Does your facility have a dust problem: Methods for evaluating dust explosion hazards

The hazards of dust explosions prevailing in plants are dependent on a large variety of factors that include process parameters, such as pressure, temperature and flow characteristics, as well as equipment properties, such as geometry layout, the presence of moving elements, dust explosion characteristics and mitigating measures. A good dust explosion risk assessment is a thorough method involving the identification of all hazards, their probability of occurrence and the severity of potential consequences. The consequences of dust explosions are described as consequences for personnel and equipment, taking into account consequences of both primary and secondary events.While certain standards cover all the basic elements of explosion prevention and protection, systematic risk assessments and area classifications are obligatory in Europe, as required by EU ATEX and Seveso II directives. In the United States, NFPA 654 requires that the design of the fire and explosion safety provisions shall be based on a process hazard analysis of the facility, process, and the associated fire or explosion hazards. In this paper, we will demonstrate how applying such techniques as SCRAM (short-cut risk analysis method) can help identify potentially hazardous conditions and provide valuable assistance in reducing high-risk areas. The likelihood of a dust explosion is based on the ignition probability and the probability of flammable dust clouds arising. While all possible ignition sources are reviewed, the most important ones include open flames, mechanical sparks, hot surfaces, electric equipment, smoldering combustion (self-ignition) and electrostatic sparks and discharges. The probability of dust clouds arising is closely related to both process and dust dispersion properties.Factors determining the consequences of dust explosions include how frequently personnel are present, the equipment strength, implemented consequence-reducing measures and housekeeping, as risk assessment techniques demonstrate the importance of good housekeeping especially due to the enormous consequences of secondary dust explosions (despite their relatively low probability). The ignitibility and explosibility of the potential dust clouds also play a crucial role in determining the overall risk.Classes describe both the likelihood of dust explosions and their consequences, ranging from low probabilities and limited local damage, to high probability of occurrence and catastrophic damage. Acceptance criteria are determined based on the likelihood and consequence of the events. The risk assessment techniques also allow for choosing adequate risk reducing measures: both preventive and protective. Techniques for mitigating identified explosions risks include the following: bursting disks and quenching tubes, explosion suppression systems, explosion isolating systems, inerting techniques and temperature control. Advanced CFD tools (DESC) can be used to not only assess dust explosion hazards, but also provide valuable insight into protective measures, including suppression and venting.     

煤矿瓦斯爆炸事故隐患及风险的表征方法

为治理煤矿瓦斯爆炸事故隐患,管控其风险大小,基于证据对瓦斯爆炸事故隐患进行了系统辨识,利用逻辑图分析了隐患之间的耦合关系和风险演化路径;从事件发生的可能性、事件自身的严重性以及受体的暴露程度3个方面对瓦斯爆炸风险进行表征,并提出三维风险矩阵对事故风险进行分级评价。该方法可以为瓦斯爆炸事故隐患辨识、风险分析、风险评价以及设计事故预防措施提供借鉴。     

Risk-based quantitative method for determining blast-resistant and defense loads of petrochemical buildings

Petrochemical buildings are usually distributed near chemical installations and have a high risk of explosion because of the concentration of people. In order to effectively design and protect buildings against explosion, it is needed to determine the blast-resistant and defense loads reasonably. Based on the theory of risk, a triangular pyramid explosion risk model was established in this study, which combined the overpressure p, duration t, and frequency f of the explosion scene at the same time. The first principle of “acceptable cumulative frequency” and the key principle of “maximum explosion risk” were formulated. According to this method, the explosion risk of eight leakage units with 10 groups of leakage hole size and three dangerous wind directions were obtained. According to the cumulative explosion frequency curve and the explosion risk curve, blast-resistant and defense loads of the four walls were determined quantitatively. Among the four walls, the explosion overpressure were 44.0–74.5 kPa, and the corresponding duration were 34.1–39.1 ms. The cumulative explosion frequency were 2.11E−5 to 8.58E−5 times annually. The explosion risk value were 3.64E−3 to 5.35E−3 kPa·ms annually. The results indicated that it was of great importance for the calculation of the explosion risk to reasonably divide the leakage unit and determine the leakage frequency. The explosion scene and its frequency, the volume of the obstructed region, and the distance of the explosion source were the key variables that affected the explosive load. The final blast-resistant and defense load values were found in the case of the middle hole size leakage. Blast-resistant and defense loads not only met the risk acceptance standard but also considered the overpressure and the duration of explosion. At present, they have been extensively applied in the blast-resistant design and engineering transformation of buildings in SINOPEC.     

干式煤气柜火灾爆炸危险性评价与对策

分析了导致10万m3干式煤气柜火灾爆炸的危险因素,对火灾爆炸事故采用故障树法,分析事故发生的可能原因,提出了安全对策措施.     

基于灰色-物元模型的煤矿瓦斯爆炸风险评估

为了明确风险因素间的作用路径并提出科学可行的瓦斯爆炸灾害风险评估方法,首先基于3类危险源理论梳理分析以往典型瓦斯爆炸案例,识别并提取14个影响因素;然后通过集成灰色系统理论和物元可拓模型,构建灰色-物元评估模型;最后以山西省某煤矿的实际调研数据为例,计算各影响因素的权重和关联函数,梳理风险因素致灾的逻辑关系,得出该矿井2个具体工作面的瓦斯爆炸风险等级。研究表明:1号工作面中的平均瓦斯涌出量、煤尘爆炸指数、采掘机械化水平与2号工作面中的瓦斯体积分数均处于较不安全级别,2个工作面的综合风险等级分别为一般安全与较安全级别。     

Risk assessment method of polyethylene dust explosion based on explosion parameters

The explosion characteristic parameters of polyethylene dust were systematically investigated. The variations in the maximum explosion pressure (P_max), explosion index (K_st), minimum ignition energy (MIE), minimum ignition temperature (MIT), and minimum explosion concentration (MEC) of dust samples with different particle sizes were obtained. Using experimental data, a two-dimensional matrix analysis method was applied to classify the dust explosion severity based on P_max and K_st. Then, a three-dimensional matrix was used to categorize the dust explosion sensitivity based on three factors: MIE, MIT, and MEC. Finally, a two-dimensional matrix model of dust explosion risk assessment was established considering the severity and sensitivity. The model was used to evaluate the explosion risk of polyethylene dust samples with different particle sizes. It was found that the risk level of dust explosion increased with decreasing particle size, which was consistent with the actual results. The risk assessment method can provide a scientific basis for dust explosion prevention in the production of polyethylene.     

基于扎根理论的瓦斯爆炸风险累积效应研究*

为研究瓦斯爆炸风险在事故发展中的累积过程，揭示瓦斯爆炸事故的风险累积机理，引入累积效应的研究思想。首先界定风险累积概念，分析风险累积过程；然后运用案例研究、专家调查等方法分析瓦斯爆炸风险累积的累积源、途径，并应用扎根理论方法提取风险类型并研究风险累积过程；在此基础上，运用系统动力学软件绘制瓦斯爆炸风险累积路径图，将风险的累积过程可视化。研究表明:瓦斯爆炸风险存在累积过程，主要通过加和累积和放大累积方式累积，累积时间越长，越易引发新风险，其中管理风险累积影响人、物、环的状态，而人、物、环风险累积过程直接影响瓦斯爆炸事故发生进程。研究结果为瓦斯爆炸事故原因分析提供1种新方法，对煤矿企业的事故预防和风险管控具有一定指导和参考意义。     

爆炸灾害的预防和控制乃当务之急

我国爆炸事故近年来屡屡发生，灾害严重，损失巨大。爆炸灾害的预防与控制己是当务之急。当前的主要研究内容，有各种工业粉尘爆炸、气液贮罐爆炸、工业生产中的静电灾害、各种爆炸灾害的实验观测和监控技术、防护与控制技术、模拟与仿真技术、易燃易爆物的危险性评估和系统安全性分析、燃烧转爆炸机理和热爆炸（热自燃）机理等方面。简略介绍了爆炸灾害预防、控制国家重点实验室的筹建工作，希望得到同行专家的指导和帮助，并开展合作研究。     

运用本质安全原理预防煤粉爆炸

旨在将本质安全原理与粉尘爆炸(以煤粉爆炸为例)的风险控制联系起来。利用20 L球形爆炸装置的标准测试方法测试煤粉及煤粉-CaCO3混合物的爆炸下限、最大爆炸压力、压力上升速度等爆炸特性。基于本质安全基本原理和试验结果,讨论预防煤粉爆炸的各种基本方法,并重点阐述本质安全原理与粉尘爆炸影响因素、不同的预防方法、过程设备的选择等之间的关系,对已制定的爆炸风险控制措施进行完善和补充。