住宅火灾风险可接受标准与最优投入成本研究

住宅建筑火灾发生频率高,严重威胁着人民的生命及财产安全。从风险可接受视角讨论建筑火灾的风险可接受标准以及公众风险支付意愿,可辅助火灾风险承担人优化性能化防火设计方案。通过收集2006—2015年住宅火灾个人死亡率数据,计算以5年为单位的个人可容忍风险区间,根据FN曲线确定住宅建筑火灾可接受风险标准,得出我国住宅火灾风险处于可容忍区域。在住宅火灾风险可接受性标准基础上,使用生活质量指数(LQI)模型,讨论在现行社会条件下公众对建筑火灾损失风险支付意愿,并预测了2019年和"十三五"时期的最优投入预算。     

城市燃气事故生命损失风险可接受标准研究

为提高我国城市燃气风险管理水平，帮助风险管理者科学地分配维护资源，探讨提出了我国城市燃气事故生命损失风险可接受标准；采用AIR指标法确定了个人风险可接受标准范围为(2.397 3×10-7,4.794 7×10-7)；运用F-N曲线法结合ALARP原则，确定了社会风险可接受标准，最大可接受风险的截距为4.794 7×10-7，可忽略风险的截距为4.794 7×10-8；利用生活质量指数推导模型，计算了达到城市燃气事故可忽略风险水平的最优安全投入成本；基于风险动态原则，分析提出了风险可接受标准的更新办法。研究结果表明:我国城市燃气行业可接受风险水平低于煤矿、大坝、化工等危险行业的可接受风险水平；虽然我国城市燃气事故死亡率逐年降低，但要达到可忽略的风险水平，每年还需大量安全资金投入。     

我国煤矿可接受风险标准研究

为更加深入了解煤矿的风险状况,辅助行业风险决策,探讨和确定我国煤矿可接受风险标准。采用平均个人风险值法(AIR),以5 a为周期分别研究2003—2007年和2008—2012年煤矿的个人死亡率,进而确定2013—2017年的煤矿个人可接受风险标准参考范围。通过事故累计概率-死亡人数(FN曲线)曲线确定可供参考的煤矿社会可接受风险标准,并基于生活质量指数(LQI)的社会可接受风险评价准则计算降低煤矿可接受风险标准的最优安全投入。结果表明,我国煤矿的个人风险水平远高于国内外其他行业,煤矿社会风险仍处于不可接受风险区,制定煤矿可接受风险标准值对行业风险管理实施具有较大的理论与实际意义。     

有限约束条件下安全科技水平经济贡献率的分析

经济生活水平的不断提高,人类社会越来越关心安全与健康.我国对安全的研究起步较晚,尤其在涉及安全投入与产出的经济领域,相关研究才刚刚起步.安全领域科技投入的盲目性使得安全科技投入实际发挥作用很小,从而造成了社会资源的浪费.分析了安全科技水平经济贡献率的研究意义,提出了安全科技水平经济贡献率的量化方法,利用安全科学与经济学的相关理论,推导了安全科技水平经济贡献率的计算模型,最后测算了1995-2005年间我国安全科技水平的平均经济贡献率为1.64%.     

基于风险的重大危险源选址规划研究

本文针对重大危险源选址中普遍采用的安全距离方法的一些缺点,研究提出了基于风险的重大危险源选址规划方法.介绍了基于个人风险和社会风险的选址规划指标,给出了推荐的风险可接受标准,以及风险计算的一般程序.该方法在某天然气工程的选址规划中进行了实际应用,计算给出了该工程的个人风险等值线分布图和社会风险(F-N)曲线.结果表明,工程的5×10-5、1×10-5、5×10-6每年的个人风险的安全距离均能够得到满足;工程的F-N曲线落入了推荐标准的ALARP区,基本满足要求,但还应在设计阶段进一步采取措施,降低风险.     

基于大坝缺陷的群坝风险排序方法研究

为解决庞大数量的病险水库除险加固工程的除险加固先后次序,提出了以风险指数为评判核心的群坝风险排序方法。从大坝安全管理系统的三大缺陷(大坝缺陷、基础设施缺陷、OMS缺陷)入手,先给出水库大坝实际缺陷和潜在缺陷的相关特征参数;再通过各缺陷特征参数脆弱度的计算确立坝体脆弱指数;并由溃坝后生命损失、经济损失及社会与环境影响,将溃坝后果划分为4个级别并赋值相应后果系数;然后依据脆弱指数与后果系数,深入研究水库大坝风险指数的计算方法与计算流程,获得了基于大坝缺陷的群坝风险排序方法;最后,以江西省夏园、井冈冲、前进、凤岭和殷山共5座水库为工程案例进行实例分析,分析结果表明,该方法能够客观比较各水库大坝的风险情况,便于使用。     

民航安全风险定量评价模型研究

在对民航风险评价的现状和常用的定量风险评价方法进行分析的基础上,建立民航安全风险定量评价模型。在计算风险的可能性时,不仅考虑了风险的历史发生概率,而且利用风险发生概率影响因素所发生的变化对风险的历史发生概率进行修正,从而得出在当前情况下风险的发生概率,并且首次提出指数型权重的概念;在计算风险的后果时,考虑风险的直接损失和间接损失,并通过计算多种可能后果的期望的形式,综合考虑多种可能的后果情况;通过上述的可能性和严重性从而达到对安全风险进行定量评价的目的。最后,给出了一个算例,其结果表明该模型具有很强的实用性。     

安全生产效益的分析评价及其与安全投入的关系

通过把握和界定安全效益、安全投入等反映安全生产的经济活动特征和规律的经济学范畴的内涵,指出从企业的经营利润指标上看安全投入不能带来直接经济效益,只产生远期(长远)的、潜在的间接性效益,包括间接经济效益和非经济效益,安全投入的效益具有间接性、潜在性、隐形性、不确定性和迟滞性。由于生产安全事故风险不可能为零,当事故预防水平达到一定程度(可接受的程度及其以下)时,通过增加经济投入提高预防水平而对于事故风险的削减无明显的效果,就应考虑与经济效益的结合问题。笔者提出安全投入数量限度问题和安全投入的阈值;并进一步建立安全效益评价模型和安全投入与安全指标的函数关系模型,对安全投入与安全水平(安全指标)、安全效益的关联关系进行了定性分析。     

定量风险评价在炼化一体化项目中的应用

本文阐述了定量风险评价的指标、模型和一般程序,给出了定量风险评价的标准,采用定量风险评价的方法对某企业规划建设的炼化一体化项目进行个人风险和社会风险水平计算。个人风险计算结果表明,该炼化一体化项目所在厂区内没有出现1×10-3的风险等值线,1×10-4、1×10-5和1×10-6的风险等值线也没有超出厂区边界,说明该炼化一体化项目厂区内部和周边人员所面临的个人风险是可以接受的。社会风险计算结果表明,该炼化一体化项目的社会风险曲线处在可容许区范围内,没有进入不可容许区和ALARP区,说明该项目的社会风险也是可以接受的。本文采用的定量风险评价方法可为规划或已建炼化一体化项目进行风险水平评估提供必要的参考依据。     

基于隐患管理的安全风险动态防控水平评估分级方法

第一类危险源的安全风险防控措施失效的外在表现形式是安全隐患,因此,安全隐患大小、数量等数据可以反推出单位安全风险的动态管控水平.本文通过对隐患数据的综合分析,给出了一种对单位安全风险动态管控水平进行评估的方法,实现了风险动态管控水平的定量分级.     

ZigBee定位技术在灌河大桥工程建设施工现场安全管理中的应用

以灌河大桥工程建设为研究对象和实践平台,系统分析了在大桥工程建设过程中可能存在的安全风险,提出了结合ZigBee定位技术与语音合成技术,对大桥工程建设过程中可能发生人员伤亡风险进行语音预警,实现大桥工程建设现场安全管理的信息化。并利用LQI改进DV-Hop定位算法,对ZigBee定位算法进行了一定的优化,使之能适用于大桥工程建设现场的复杂环境。同时,设计了大量的系统配置命令,可以随时对系统参数进行修改,使之在工程实践中更易于部署。     

民航安全信息管理能力评价体系研究

对民航单位的安全信息管理能力进行科学有效的评价有助于提高其安全信息管理水平,进而提升安全绩效。借鉴已有信息管理研究成果,提出基于资源、过程及效果综合视角的民航安全信息管理能力模型,并结合民航单位调研访谈构建了由58个指标构成的初始指标集,通过指标聚类、样本聚类、变异系数3种方法筛选得到32个代表性指标。利用因子分析法、专家打分法、变异系数确定各指标权重,最后通过安全信息管理能力的模拟值与安全现状的相关分析验证各方法的有效性,并确定了评价指标体系。     

企业安全生产责任的图表分析法研究

企业的任何一项安全生产业务都可以分解为一系列安全生产责任,完成一项安全生产业务,都需有若干个步骤,要几个部门或人员参加。为了最大限度地节省人力、物力和财力资源,提高效率,应尽量避免安全生产责任的交叉和步骤的重复,并且做到安全生产责任落实到企业部门或人员。本文充分利用图表直观的特点,提出了一种用图表分析企业安全生产责任的方法,明确了企业安全生产业务责任图表的基本概念及其编制过程,给出了分析案例。     

An integrated safety management with construction management using 4D CAD model

This paper describes an integrated system for safety and construction management using the 4D CAD model. Safety is integrated with the construction management process throughout design, planning and control phases. Design information about building components and planning information about activities has been gathered to formulate the 4D CAD model. The rule-based system analyzes this combined information to automatically detect any working-at-height hazards and also indicates necessary safety measures in terms of activities and requirements. These safety measures are inserted into the construction schedule and visualized on the 4D CAD together with the other construction sequences. A prototype is developed and verified with a project case study. The results show that the developed system can be a collaboration tool for designers, project engineers, safety officers, and other project participants. It can raise safety awareness of the team and it leads to revisions of design and plan to be consistent with safety. Safety measures are apparently on the schedule; therefore, right resources are allocated, safety constraints are considered and alleviated ahead of time, and the safety control can explicitly refer to as well. This contributes to the success of safety management in the construction industry.     

Accident in a French dynamite factory: An example of an organisational investigation

The 27th of March 2003, an explosion caused the death of four employees in a Nitrochimie pyrotechnic plant, at Billy Berclau, in the north of France. Following the accident, the ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development appointed INERIS to perform an investigation. According to the terms of reference, the investigation would cover technical (origins of the explosion, extent of damages) as well as organisational issues, as defined by SEVESO II safety management system requirements. This paper has a threefold purpose. It intends first to illustrate with an empirical case the current trend in safety auditing and accident investigation, targeting organisational factors, alongside human factors. There are not so many published cases of accidents analysed with an organisational perspective. Secondly, it shows that it is possible to investigate organisational dimensions (through articulation of safety engineering, safety management and human and social sciences) within reasonable time frames and a reasonable amount of resources. By focusing on key actors and asking appropriate questions related to key dimensions, investigating organisational accidents might not necessarily imply spending much more resources than other steps such as damage assessment, chronological construction or identification of technical scenarios, although there are also some prerequisite conditions needed to achieve this. Finally this paper should be seen as a technical communication beyond the pyrotechnic industry.     

J-value analysis of different regulatory limits for workers and the public

The J-value technique allows an objective determination to be made of the resources that should be applied cost effectively to improve heath and safety. This is essential if capabilities are to be employed optimally and risks reduced in a way that reflects their severity. Although other considerations such as good practice and socio-political influences may affect a final decision on the resources to be sanctioned, the incorporation of these additional factors should be made transparent if the decision is no longer to be based on cost effectiveness. The J-value provides an objective criterion by which to judge when “reasonable practicability” has been achieved in committing resources for safety improvement, which is the legal requirement under health and safety law in the UK.Moreover, the J-value methodology also allows other related issues to be addressed objectively. Regulatory bodies apply different limits for workers and the general public, with higher risks being permitted for workers. Although a factor of about 10 has been used in several contexts, no objective rationale has been developed for this particular figure until now. However, it is shown that application of the J-value analysis can provide a justification for a ratio of workers’ risk to public risk of approximately this size if certain reasonable assumptions are made. Thus the paper provides the first quantitative explanation for the different levels of protection demanded by regulators nationally and internationally for workers and public.     

Methodological application of system dynamics for evaluating traffic safety policy

System dynamics (SDs) is a methodology that can be used to understand the behavior and dynamics of complex systems over time. SD utilizes a range of tools and techniques such as influence and causal loop diagrams, computer simulation and optimization. SD has been used to facilitate the analysis of complex physical and social systems, e.g. water resources, climate change and industrial accidents. One of the key reasons for its growing popularity is that it allows policy experimentation and facilitates the discussion of ‘what-if’ scenarios. Within the realm of road traffic research, SD has been primarily used to examine micro level issues such as the interactions between the driver, infrastructure and the vehicle. Even though such micro level analysis are important, macro traffic safety policies can create more sustainable systems that pre-empt safety issues and reduce likelihood of traffic accidents. This paper develops two models to demonstrate how the methodology of SD can facilitate and encourage macro and meso level analysis of traffic safety policy. The first model is used to assess policy options so as to encourage the purchase of cars with higher safety ratings. The second model, is used to evaluate the impact of public transport policies on travel time and traffic safety considerations. The strength and weaknesses of the SD methodology in road transport/safety analysis are also examined. It is suggested that SD is most appropriate for formulating macro level policy as it can account for the dynamic complexity associated with the road transport system.     

For whom does safety pay? The case of major accidents

Government agencies regularly use the argument that ‘safety pays’ as a way of motivating employers to attend to occupational health and safety. This paper looks at the effectiveness of this argument in the case of catastrophic hazards. It suggests that, while it may be true that safety pays in an abstract sense, this is irrelevant unless it can be shown that safety pays for relevant decision makers. All too often it does not. The article illustrates its claims by drawing on the literature on the Zeebrugge, Bhopal and Piper Alpha disasters, as well as on a study of a mine disaster in Australia.     

Accidents in “normal” operation – Can you see them coming?

Despite the increased understanding of how accidents occur in the chemical process industry, today's safety measures and indicators do not prevent these accidents from occurring. Finding a way to better, proactively, identifying precursors to imminent safety risks, could help organizations to focus their limited resources. The protocol proposed and demonstrated in this paper shows a way to do this. Basis is to examine usually low consequence, high likelihood reoccurring disruptions or deviations in the process (e.g. defects, disturbances, anomalies) for their relevance to process safety and define those possibly leading to accidents as ‘precursors’. As a next step ineffective supervising and managerial control processes and their underlying latent conditions, causing the persistence of these precursors, are identified and it was shown how these cause safety barriers to become ineffective and to open the way to accidents. In conclusion, this paper demonstrates that the proposed 7-stage protocol developed to this end can explicitly and proactively indicate safety risks, and find the controlling latent conditions causing the trouble. It will help organizations to direct their resources to improve safety, which will include their control structure and their normal way of working and will yield higher efficiency as a side benefit.     

A methodology to model causal relationships on offshore safety assessment focusing on human and organizational factors

INTRODUCTION: Focusing on people and organizations, this paper aims to contribute to offshore safety assessment by proposing a methodology to model causal relationships. METHOD: The methodology is proposed in a general sense that it will be capable of accommodating modeling of multiple risk factors considered in offshore operations and will have the ability to deal with different types of data that may come from different resources. Reason's "Swiss cheese" model is used to form a generic offshore safety assessment framework, and Bayesian Network (BN) is tailored to fit into the framework to construct a causal relationship model. The proposed framework uses a five-level-structure model to address latent failures within the causal sequence of events. The five levels include Root causes level, Trigger events level, Incidents level, Accidents level, and Consequences level. To analyze and model a specified offshore installation safety, a BN model was established following the guideline of the proposed five-level framework. A range of events was specified, and the related prior and conditional probabilities regarding the BN model were assigned based on the inherent characteristics of each event. RESULTS: This paper shows that Reason's "Swiss cheese" model and BN can be jointly used in offshore safety assessment. On the one hand, the five-level conceptual model is enhanced by BNs that are capable of providing graphical demonstration of inter-relationships as well as calculating numerical values of occurrence likelihood for each failure event. Bayesian inference mechanism also makes it possible to monitor how a safety situation changes when information flow travel forwards and backwards within the networks. On the other hand, BN modeling relies heavily on experts' personal experiences and is therefore highly domain specific. IMPACT ON INDUSTRY: "Swiss cheese" model is such a theoretic framework that it is based on solid behavioral theory and therefore can be used to provide industry with a roadmap for BN modeling and implications. A case study of the collision risk between a Floating Production, Storage and Offloading (FPSO) unit and authorized vessels caused by human and organizational factors (HOFs) during operations is used to illustrate an industrial application of the proposed methodology.