Food sharing among retaliators: sequential arrivals and information asymmetries

Many animals share food, that is, to tolerate competitors at a defensible clump. Most accounts of resource sharing invoke special evolutionary processes or ecological circumstances that reduce their generality. Surprisingly, the Hawk–Dove game has been unable to address in a simple and general way why so many group foraging animals share food. We modify the Hawk–Dove game by allowing a finder the opportunity of retaliating if joiners escalate and by considering the consequences of information asymmetries concerning resource value among players. Introducing the first change, the retaliator strategy was sufficient to predict widespread sharing in habitats where food clumps are of intermediate richness. When information asymmetry between finder and joiner is created by allowing the quality of clumps to vary, we show that the conditions for sharing are even more easily met and apply to a wider range of resource qualities. Our model therefore offers one of the most parsimonious and potentially general evolutionary accounts of the origin of non-aggressive resource sharing.     

Positives and pathologies of natural resource management on private land‐conservation areas

In managed natural resource systems, such as fisheries and rangelands, there is a recognized trade‐off between managing for short‐term benefits and managing for longer term resilience. Management actions that stabilize ecological attributes or processes can improve productivity in the supply of ecosystem goods and services in the short term but erode system resilience at longer time scales. For example, fire suppression in rangelands can increase grass biomass initially but ultimately result in an undesirable, shrub‐dominated system. Analyses of this phenomenon have focused largely on how management actions influence slow‐changing biophysical system attributes (such as vegetation composition). Data on the frequency of management actions that reduce natural ecological variation on 66 private land‐conservation areas (PLCAs) in South Africa were used to investigate how management actions are influenced by manager decision‐making approaches, a largely ignored part of the problem. The pathology of natural resource management was evident on some PLCAs: increased focus on revenue‐generation in decision making resulted in an increased frequency of actions to stabilize short‐term variation in large mammal populations, which led to increased revenues from ecotourism or hunting. On many PLCAs, these management actions corresponded with a reduced focus on ecological monitoring and an increase in overstocking of game (i.e., ungulate species) and stocking of extralimitals (i.e., game species outside their historical range). Positives in natural resource management also existed. Some managers monitored slower changing ecological attributes, which resulted in less‐intensive management, fewer extralimital species, and lower stocking rates. Our unique, empirical investigation of monitoring‐management relationships illustrates that management decisions informed by revenue monitoring versus ecological monitoring can have opposing consequences for natural resource productivity and sustainability. Promoting management actions that maintain resilience in natural resource systems therefore requires cognizance of why managers act the way they do and how these actions can gradually shift managers toward unsustainable strategies.     

The effect of dominance hierarchy on the use of alternative foraging tactics: a phenotype-limited producing-scrounging game

Group living is thought to be advantageous for animals, though it also creates opportunities for exploitation. Using food discovered by others can be described as a producer-scrounger, frequency-dependent game. In the game, scroungers (parasitic individuals) do better than producers (food finders) when scroungers are rare in the group, but they do worse when scroungers are common. When the individuals' payoffs do not depend on their phenotype (i.e. a symmetric game), this strong negative frequency dependence leads to a mixed stable solution where both alternatives obtain equal payoffs. Here, we address the question of how differences in social status in a dominance hierarchy influence the individuals' decision to play producer or scrounger in small foraging groups. We model explicitly the food intake rate of each individual in a dominance-structured foraging group, then calculate the Nash equilibrium for them. Our model predicts that only strong differences in competitive ability will influence the use of producing or scrounging tactics in small foraging groups; dominants will mainly play scrounger and subordinates will mostly use producer. Since the differences in competitive ability of different-ranking individuals likely depend on the economic defendability of food, our model provides a step towards the integration of social foraging and resource defence theories. Received: 30 July 1997 / Accepted after revision: 15 November 1997     

Entry Deterrence and Signaling in a Nonrenewable Resource Model

We analyze a nonrenewable resource model in which an incumbent firm faces potential entry from a rival firm. The incumbent has private information about its stock size but the rival can observe extraction. With observable extraction and unobservable stock, the rival can use extraction as a signal about stock, from which it can infer whether entry is likely to be profitable. We characterize the necessary conditions for pooling and separating perfect Bayesian equilibria in a signaling game of resource extraction and provide examples of each. We show that the incumbent will often prefer pooling to separating even though welfare is higher in separating equilibrium.     

Strategic investment in reputation

Although collective efforts are common in both animal and human societies, many human and probably animal social dilemmas have no obvious cooperative solution, which is a challenge for evolutionary biologists. In public goods games, i.e. the experimental paradigm for studying the sustainability of a public resource with human subjects, initial cooperation usually declines quickly. Recently, it has been shown that the interaction with another social game in which good reputation attracts help, can maintain a high level of cooperation in the public goods game. Here we show experimentally that humans use different strategies in the public goods game conditional on whether the player knows that his decisions will be either known or unknown in another social game. The knowledge of being recognized as the same individual in both scenarios motivates players to invest in their reputation and thus sustain the public resource. However, cooperation declines immediately when individual identities switch from being recognizable to being unrecognizable between the two interacting games.Communicated by M. Borgerhoff-Mulder     

Traps and transformations influencing the financial viability of tourism on private‐land conservation areas

The ability of private conservation organizations to remain financially viable is a key factor influencing their effectiveness. One‐third of financially motivated private‐land conservation areas (PLCAs) surveyed in South Africa are unprofitable, raising questions about landowners’ abilities to effectively adapt their business models to the socioeconomic environment. In any complex system, options for later adaptation can be constrained by starting conditions (path dependence). We tested 3 hypothesized drivers of path dependence in PLCA ecotourism and hunting business models: (H1) the initial size of a PLCA limits the number of mammalian game and thereby predators that can be sustained; (H2) initial investments in infrastructure limit the ability to introduce predators; and (H3) rainfall limits game and predator abundance. We further assessed how managing for financial stability (optimized game stocking) or ecological sustainability (allowing game to fluctuate with environmental conditions) influenced the ability to overcome path dependence. A mechanistic PLCA model based on simple ecological and financial rules was run for different initial conditions and management strategies, simulating landowner options for adapting their business model annually. Despite attempts by simulated landowners to increase profits, adopted business models after 13 years were differentiated by initial land and infrastructural assets, supporting H1 and H2. A conservation organization's initial assets can cause it to become locked into a financially vulnerable business model. In our 50‐year simulation, path dependence was overcome by fewer of the landowners who facilitated natural ecological variability than those who maintained constant hunting rates and predator numbers, but the latter experienced unsustainably high game densities in low rainfall years. Management for natural variability supported long‐term ecological sustainability but not shorter term socioeconomic sustainability for PLCAs. Our findings highlight trade‐offs between ecological and economic sustainability and suggest a role for governmental support of the private conservation industry.     

Movement ecology: size-specific behavioral response of an invasive snail to food availability

Immigration, emigration, migration, and redistribution describe processes that involve movement of individuals. These movements are an essential part of contemporary ecological models, and understanding how movement is affected by biotic and abiotic factors is important for effectively modeling ecological processes that depend on movement. We asked how phenotypic heterogeneity (body size) and environmental heterogeneity (food resource level) affect the movement behavior of an aquatic snail (Tarebia granifera), and whether including these phenotypic and environmental effects improves advection-diffusion models of movement. We postulated various elaborations of the basic advection diffusion model as a priori working hypotheses. To test our hypotheses we measured individual snail movements in experimental streams at high- and low-food resource treatments. Using these experimental movement data, we examined the dependency of model selection on resource level and body size using Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC). At low resources, large individuals moved faster than small individuals, producing a platykurtic movement distribution; including size dependency in the model improved model performance. In stark contrast, at high resources, individuals moved upstream together as a wave, and body size differences largely disappeared. The model selection exercise indicated that population heterogeneity is best described by the advection component of movement for this species, because the top-ranked model included size dependency in advection, but not diffusion. Also, all probable models included resource dependency. Thus population and environmental heterogeneities both influence individual movement behaviors and the population-level distribution kernels, and their interaction may drive variation in movement behaviors in terms of both advection rates and diffusion rates. A behaviorally informed modeling framework will integrate the sentient response of individuals in terms of movement and enhance our ability to accurately model ecological processes that depend on animal movement.     

Patch dynamics based on Prisoner's Dilemma game: superiority of golden rule

There has been much literature on ecological model of Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game. This game illustrates that cooperation can evolve in situations where individuals tend to look after themselves. In order to explain some behaviors of altruism in animal societies, the strategy All Cooperate (AC), often called the Golden Rule, is more appropriate than other strategies. However, very little is known about the superiority of AC. In the present article, we study patch dynamics based on non-iterated PD game, applying two different methods: island and lattice models. Each patch is assumed to be either vacant or composed of a population of AC or All Defect (AD), where AD means a selfish strategy. Both models exhibit a phase transition between a phase where both AC and AD survive, and a phase where AD is extinct. The latter phase means that AC beats AD completely. In the case of lattice model, the extinction of AD easily occurs and the abundance of AC takes a larger value, compared with the island model. Our models can be also extended to general iterated PD game; we describe the reason why AC can outperform any other strategy.     

Biosecurity threats: the design of surveillance systems,based on power and risk

We consider the problem of designing a surveillance system to detect a broad range of invasive species across a heterogeneous sampling frame. We present a model to detect a range of invertebrate invasives whilst addressing the challenges of multiple data sources, stratifying for differential risk, managing labour costs and providing sufficient power of detection. We determine the number of detection devices required and their allocation across the landscape within limiting resource constraints. The resulting plan will lead to reduced financial and ecological costs and an optimal surveillance system.     

日照阳光生态市建设框架

以“社会-经济-自然”复合生态系统理论为指导,通过系统辨识、系统模拟、系统分析和系统设计,找出了日照市社会经济发展的利导因子、限制因子和存在问题,弄清了复合生态系统的功能和过程,提出了日照市人口、资源、环境与产业的发展战略。     

盐城市区污水资源化海涂生态工程研究

盐城市区污水资源化海涂生态工程是根据“控源导流”整治战略构建的一项示范工程。拟将盐城市区污水截流入网,用污水渠道送至海涂生态工程,实现污水治理和资源化利用的结合。全程实行４级水质控制,生态工程的场址选择遵循“四忌四宜”原则,即忌人群、忌饮水、忌生食食品、忌超载,宜苇、宜林,宜草,宜粮。     

基于生态足迹法的区域水资源生态承载力计算与评价——以珠海市为例

研究了人类社会对水资源的消耗、对自然生态环境的影响以及该影响的量化方法和量化指标,将生态足迹法引入区域水资源承载力系统,构建珠海市水资源生态承载力计算模型,分析计算水资源供给对区域经济社会发展的生态承载力,并对该地区的水资源生态承载力进行生态盈亏和敏感性评价.结果表明,总体上珠海市水资源系统呈现生态亏损,亏损率为37%,水资源生态承载呈现超载现象,珠海市城市化进程中流动人口增长对区域水资源的生态承载压力较大.研究结果还表明,将生态足迹模型运用到地区水资源承载力中具有较高的可信度,对地方尺度具有适用性.     

A Bioeconomic Model of Marine Reserve Creation

This paper employs a dynamic and spatial model of renewable resource exploitation to investigate the effects of marine reserve creation. The model combines a metapopulation model incorporating resource patch heterogeneity and dispersal with a behaviorally based spatially explicit harvesting model that assumes that fishermen choose location in a manner that eliminates spatial arbitrage opportunities. The combined spatial bioeconomic model is used to simulate the effects of reserve creation under various ecological structures. We identify parameter configurations and ecological dispersal processes that give rise to a double-payoff in which both aggregate biomass and harvest increase after an area of the fishery is set aside and protected from exploitation.     

Pastoralists' responses to variation of rangeland resources in time and space.

We explore the response of pastoralists to rangeland resource variation in time and space, focusing on regions where high variation makes it unlikely that an economically viable herd can be maintained on a single management unit. In such regions, the need to move stock to find forage in at least some years has led to the evolution of nomadism and transhumance, and reciprocal grazing agreements among the holders of common-property rangeland. The role of such informal institutions in buffering resource variation is well documented in some Asian and African rangelands, but in societies with formally established private-property regimes, where we focus, such institutions have received little attention. We examine agistment networks, which play an important role in buffering resource variation in modern-day Australia. Agistment is a commercial arrangement between pastoralists who have less forage than they believe they require and pastoralists who believe they have more. Agistment facilitates the movement of livestock via a network based largely on trust. We are concerned exclusively with the link between the characteristics of biophysical variation and human aspects of agistment networks, and we developed a model to test the hypothesis that such a link could exist. Our model builds on game theory literature, which explains cooperation between strangers based on the ability of players to learn whom they can trust. Our game is played on a highly stylized landscape that allows us to control and isolate the degree of spatial variation and spatial covariation. We found that agistment networks are more effective where spatial variation in resource availability is high, and generally more effective when spatial covariation is low. Policy design that seeks to work with existing social networks in rangelands has potential, but this potential varies depending on localized characteristics of the biophysical variability.     

A game model for dominance relations among group-living animals

We present here an attempt to understand behaviors of dominant individuals and of subordinate individuals as behavior strategies in an asymmetric “hawk-dove” game. We assume that contestants have perfect information about relative fighting ability and the value of the resource. Any type of asymmetry, both relevant to and irrelevant to the fighting ability, can be considered. It is concluded that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) depend on the resource value (V), the cost of injury (D), and the probability that the individual in one role will win (x). Different ESSs can exist even when values of V, D, and x are the same. The characteristics of dominance relations detected by observers may result from the ESSs that the individuals are adopting. The model explains some characteristics of dominance relations, for example, the consistent outcome of contests, the rare occurrence of escalated fights, and the discrepancy between resource holding potential (RHP) and dominance relations, from the viewpoint of individual selection. Received: 7 May 1997 / Accepted after revision: 17 October 1997     

A dynamic programming implemented resource competition game theoretic model

Resource competition is commonly occurred in animal populations and studied intensively by researchers. Previous studies have applied game theoretic model by finding Nash equilibrium to investigate this phenomenon. However computation of the Nash equilibrium requires an understanding of the payoff matrix that allocates the rewards received by players when they adopt each of the strategies in the game. In our study we present a dynamic programming implemented framework to compute 2 × 2 intraspecific finite resource allocation game's payoff matrix explicitly. We assume that two distinct types of individuals, aggressive and non-aggressive, are in the population. Then we divide the entire animal development period into three different stages: initialization, quasilinear growth and termination. Each stage for each type of players is specified with their own development coefficient, which determines how resource consumption could convert into strength as reward. Each player has equal and finite resource at the beginning of their development and fights against other players in the population to maximize its own potential reward. Based on these assumptions it is reasonable to use backward induction dynamic programming to compute payoff matrix. We present numerical examples for three different types of aggressive individuals and compute the payoff matrices correspondingly. Then we use the derived payoff matrices to determine the Nash equilibrium and Evolutionary Stable Strategy. Our research provide a framework for future quantitative studies on animal resource competition problems and could be expanded to n-players interspecific stochastic asymmetric resource allocation problem by changing some settings of dynamic programming formulation.     

A free lunch in the commons

We derive conditions under which raising costs through a regulatory constraint or a fully expropriated tax can increase the profits arising from a common-pool resource. The basic model assumes a fixed number of identical agents with linear costs selling in a single period at an exogenous price. A necessary and sufficient condition for a cost increase to be profitable is that aggregate output from the resource be locally convex in aggregate effort. We also show that cost increases can be profitable even if price is endogenous, agents are heterogeneous, entry is costless, or agents are playing a Markov-perfect equilibrium of a dynamic game. We also discuss more general welfare implications of the result along with its relation to existing results for a Cournot oligopoly.     

Positive framing does not solve the tragedy of the commons

We investigate whether positive framing increases cooperation in three social dilemmas with slightly different properties: a linear public goods (PG) game, a non-linear PG game, and a common pool resource (CPR) game. Results from our laboratory experiments show that contributions to a linear PG are higher if the externality is framed positively, rather than negatively, corroborating earlier findings by Andreoni (1995). By contrast, we find no such framing effects in the non-linear PG game or the CPR game. In these games, the best response in the material payoffs is to contribute less if others contribute more, counteracting effects of pro-social preferences. Positive framing therefore does not help to solve the tragedy of the commons.     

城镇地区生态安全评价及对策——以上海崇明岛为例

从区域生态安全内涵出发,基于可持续发展理论、自然—经济—社会复合生态系统理论和压力(pressure)—状态(state)—响应(response)概念模型,从资源环境负荷、生态环境状态、人类社会响应3方面构建城镇生态安全评价指标体系。选择上海崇明岛处于核心地位且代表着不同城镇化水平(较高、中等、较低)的城桥镇、堡镇、陈家镇为研究对象,通过实地调研、监测、实验分析等方式获取指标数据,应用层次分析法(AHP)确定指标权重,并通过综合指数模型进行安全评价。评价结果表明:3个城镇生态安全综合评价结果为城桥镇(0.773 3)>陈家镇(0.762 8)>堡镇(0.749 0),社会经济的发展对资源环境的负荷较小,生态环境现状水平良好,但人类响应措施滞后;随着城镇化进程的加快,部分生态环境要素可能有恶化趋势,现已进入预警状态。     

Disturbance and resource availability act differently on the same suite of plant traits: revisiting assembly hypotheses

Understanding the mechanisms of trait selection at the scale of plant communities is a crucial step toward predicting community assembly. Although it is commonly assumed that disturbance and resource availability constrain separate suites of traits, representing the regenerative and established phases, respectively, a quantification and test of this accepted hypothesis is still lacking due to limitations of traditional statistical techniques. In this paper we quantify, using structural equation modeling (SEM), the relative contributions of disturbance and resource availability to the selection of suites of traits at the community scale. Our model specifies and reflects previously obtained ecological insights, taking disturbance and nutrient availability as central drivers affecting leaf, allometric, seed, and phenology traits in 156 (semi-) natural plant communities throughout The Netherlands. The common hypothesis positing that disturbance and resource availability each affect a set of mutually independent traits was not consistent with the data. Instead, our final model shows that most traits are strongly affected by both drivers. In addition, trait-trait constraints are more important in community assembly than environmental drivers in half of the cases. Both aspects of trait selection are crucial for correctly predicting ecosystem processes and community assembly, and they provide new insights into hitherto underappreciated ecological interactions.