Reputation is valuable within and outside one’s own social group

To find conditions under which humans cooperate within groups of unrelated individuals has been of major interest in the behavioral sciences. The experimental paradigm for studying potential cooperation in social dilemmas is the public goods game. Here humans regularly fail to sustain a public resource cooperatively. However, the need to maintain good reputation for other social interactions, such as indirect reciprocity, has been identified as an effective mechanism to sustain cooperation in public goods situations. As a side effect of building a good reputation through cooperative actions, an individual provides direct benefits to members of his/her own social group. These benefits could be an incentive to reward a good reputation of group members. Here we show experimentally that building a good reputation through cooperative behavior in a public goods situation is rewarded in future social interactions, not only within ones own social group but also, at a similar level, in other social groups: humans regard cooperative behavior of others as an honest signal irrespective of past direct personal benefits. Reputation gained within as well as outside ones own social group can be a driving force for selfish individuals to cooperate in public goods situations, and thereby sustain any public resource.Communicated by T. Czeschlik     

Positive framing does not solve the tragedy of the commons

We investigate whether positive framing increases cooperation in three social dilemmas with slightly different properties: a linear public goods (PG) game, a non-linear PG game, and a common pool resource (CPR) game. Results from our laboratory experiments show that contributions to a linear PG are higher if the externality is framed positively, rather than negatively, corroborating earlier findings by Andreoni (1995). By contrast, we find no such framing effects in the non-linear PG game or the CPR game. In these games, the best response in the material payoffs is to contribute less if others contribute more, counteracting effects of pro-social preferences. Positive framing therefore does not help to solve the tragedy of the commons.     

Toward a delineation of the circumstances in which cooperation can be sustained in environmental and resource problems

Play in standard laboratory Public Good games suggests that on average, humans are quite prone to cooperate. Yet cooperation is often absent in real world social dilemmas, including many environmental problems. We propose that this discrepancy arises because in the Public Good game, the worst freeriders can do is to not contribute to the public account, while in many real world environmental situations freeriders can even appropriate contributions made by others before the public good is produced. We introduce the Claim Game that modifies the Public Good game by allowing for appropriating the contributions of others before the public good is produced. The impact of such possible takings on public good production is dramatic. No public good is produced, not even in the initial stages of interaction. We link our findings to the relevance of common pool games for modeling environmental problems, and stress the need to experimentally test environmental institutions within harsher social dilemmas than the standard Public Good game.     

2010年亚运会对广州市可持续发展的影响

2010年举办的第16届亚运会将是广州有史以来承办的最大型的综合性体育赛事。分析了亚运会的举办将对广州市经济、社会发展、城市与环境建设等方面的影响,并提出了全面贯彻可持续发展思想,进一步办好亚运会的建议:立足长远,社会效益与经济效益并重;加大生态环境建设力度;加大宣传力度,推动公众参与;加强区域合作,协调区域发展。     

Die Rolle von Kommunikation in der Umweltbewertung

Goal and Scope

Planning projects concerning the environment often provoke problems due to a lack of transparency of the applied scales and the appropriate evaluation methods. This paper therefore examines the general structure of all valuation processes before describing the character of the economic evaluation method in detail. From this point of view, requirements on planning processes are coming out which are to be achieved if their duty — the provision of public goods — is to be carried out efficiently.

Features

It will be shown that from an economist’s perspective a planning procedure acts as a surrogate of the market in coordinating individual’s preferences. The reasons for the inefficient level of the provision of environmental goods by private producers are their main characteristics: non-rivality and non-excludability; therefore public goods do not possess prices. Thus environmental goods have to be produced by cooperation and planning processes have to guarantee this. The main character of planning procedures is be seen in communication processes which is documented by a narrative study.

Results and Conclusions

Planning projects concerning the environment are strongly contingent on communication processes. Thus, they are also controllable by communication. The interdisciplinary research in communications shows that cooperative behaviour which is required for planning projects that should provide public goods can be benefited by applicative communication technologies. In this juncture (social) norms more and more emerge to act an important part in conveying cooperative behaviour. Especially so called ‘Sozialtechniken’ seem to be able to activate such norms.

Outlook

From the economist’s point of view planning projects concerning the environment mostly desiderate two things: Firstly, the procedures and methods which are applied to evaluate the regarding environmental goods in many cases suffer from transparency. Secondly, individual’s preferences predominant by the local population and accordingly by the directly involved parties are mostly not acquired adequately to achieve an efficient allocation of environmental goods. Applying more communication technologies to solve these two problems in the future both an increase of efficiency and an increase of the acceptability of such planning projects can be expected.     

Trade''s Dynamic Solutions to Transboundary Pollution

This study develops a differential game to examine the effects of trade liberalization on transboundary water pollution. Water pollution is due to wastewater emissions from countries in a shared waterway along the U.S.–Mexico border with available data of pollution abatement costs, public health damages, and trade benefits. Noncooperative and cooperative games are examined with changes in trade policy and public health damages. Results show trade liberalization leads Mexico to curtail pollution in both games. Cooperation and trade liberalization limit emissions from both countries and curtail strategic behavior of the United States from Mexico's pollution control efforts in the noncooperative game.     

Contagious cooperation,temptation, and ecosystem collapse

Real world observations suggest that social norms of cooperation can be effective in overcoming social dilemmas such as the joint management of a common pool resource—but also that they can be subject to slow erosion and sudden collapse. We show that these patterns of erosion and collapse emerge endogenously in a model of a closed community harvesting a renewable natural resource in which individual agents face the temptation to overexploit the resource, while a cooperative harvesting norm spreads through the community via interpersonal relations. We analyze under what circumstances small changes in key parameters (including the size of the community, and the rate of technological progress) trigger catastrophic transitions from relatively high levels of cooperation to widespread norm violation—causing the social–ecological system to collapse.     

Game theoretic analysis of environmental impact assessment system in China

Environmental impact assessment (EIA) system has been established in China since 1973. In present EIA cases, there are four participants in general: governments, enterprises, EIA organizations and the public. The public has held responsible for both social costs and social duties. The public supervises social costs produced by enterprises discharging pollutant in EIA. However public participation is mostly deputized by governments, which severely weaken the independence of the public as one participant in EIA. In this paper, EIA refers to the different attitudes of the participants whose optional strategies may be described by a proper game model. According to disfigurements in EIA, three sides (governments, enterprises, and EIA organizations) dynamic iterative game theory, dynamic game theory of incomplete information, and perfect Bayesian equilibrium theory to analyze the reciprocity relation among governments, EIA organizations and enterprises. The results show that in a short period, economic benefit is preponderant over social benefit. Governments and enterprises both do not want to take EIA to reveal social costs. EIA organizations’ income comes from enterprises and the collusions are built between them to vindicate economic benefit. In a long run, social benefit loss caused by environmental pollution must be recuperated sooner or later and environmental deterioration will influence the achievements of economic benefit, so both governments and enterprises are certain to pursue high social benefit and willing to take EIA, helpful to increase private benefit. EIA organizations will make fair assessment when their economic benefit are ensured. At present, the public as silent victims can not take actual part in EIA. The EIA system must be improved to break the present equilibrium of three sides, bringing the public to the equilibrium to exert public supervision.     

Income inequality and willingness to pay for environmental public goods

We study how the distribution of income among members of society, and income inequality in particular, affects social willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental public goods. We find that social WTP for environmental goods decreases (increases) with income inequality if and only if environmental goods and manufactured goods are substitutes (complements). We derive adjustment factors for benefit transfer to control for differences in income distributions between a study site and a policy site. For illustration, we quantify how social WTP for environmental public goods depends on the respective income distributions for empirical case studies in Sweden and the World at large. We find that the adjustment for income inequality can be substantial.     

Pastoralists' responses to variation of rangeland resources in time and space.

We explore the response of pastoralists to rangeland resource variation in time and space, focusing on regions where high variation makes it unlikely that an economically viable herd can be maintained on a single management unit. In such regions, the need to move stock to find forage in at least some years has led to the evolution of nomadism and transhumance, and reciprocal grazing agreements among the holders of common-property rangeland. The role of such informal institutions in buffering resource variation is well documented in some Asian and African rangelands, but in societies with formally established private-property regimes, where we focus, such institutions have received little attention. We examine agistment networks, which play an important role in buffering resource variation in modern-day Australia. Agistment is a commercial arrangement between pastoralists who have less forage than they believe they require and pastoralists who believe they have more. Agistment facilitates the movement of livestock via a network based largely on trust. We are concerned exclusively with the link between the characteristics of biophysical variation and human aspects of agistment networks, and we developed a model to test the hypothesis that such a link could exist. Our model builds on game theory literature, which explains cooperation between strangers based on the ability of players to learn whom they can trust. Our game is played on a highly stylized landscape that allows us to control and isolate the degree of spatial variation and spatial covariation. We found that agistment networks are more effective where spatial variation in resource availability is high, and generally more effective when spatial covariation is low. Policy design that seeks to work with existing social networks in rangelands has potential, but this potential varies depending on localized characteristics of the biophysical variability.     

The social and ecological determinants of common pool resource sustainability

We study a dynamic common pool resource game in which current resource stock depends on resource extraction in the previous period. Our model shows that for a sufficiently high regrowth rate, there is no commons dilemma: the resource will be preserved indefinitely in equilibrium. Lower growth rates lead to depletion. Laboratory tests of the model indicate that favorable ecological characteristics are necessary but insufficient to encourage effective CPR governance. Before the game, we elicit individual willingness to follow a costly rule. Only the presence of enough rule-followers preserves the resource given favorable ecological conditions.     

Material interests, moral reputation, and crowding out species protection on private land

We consider how the reputation of being socially responsible works as an effective source of motivation in protecting a public good, such as endangered species. This paper investigates the mechanism design for endangered species protection on private land under asymmetric information about reputation and land quality. We examine optimal monetary transfer by designing an efficient mechanism which takes into account the crowding out effect of monetary rewards on socially responsible behavior. We find landowners who have good reputation contribute more than the optimum level. Landowners with poor reputation sacrifices information rent; rather they buy reputation.     

Fiscal spending and the environment: Theory and empirics

During economic crises, governments often increase fiscal spending to stimulate the economy. While the fiscal spending surge may be temporary, spending composition is often altered in favor of expenditures on social programs and other public goods which may persist over time. We model and measure the impact of fiscal spending patterns on the environment. The model predicts that a reallocation of government spending composition towards social and public goods reduces pollution. However, increasing total government spending without altering its composition does not reduce pollution. We empirically test these predictions for air and water pollutants showing that they are fully supported.     

Critical environmental indicators: performance indices and assessment models for sustainable rural development planning

Sustainable development planning must be based on environmental and biophysical baseline indices that effectively define comparative development potential and environmental constraints. As such, indices must define the comparative advantage of the natural resource base and measure the fundamental capacity to sustain production rates of natural resource goods and services used to create societal well being. Complex biophysical and socioeconomic characteristics affect the identification and selection of sustainable development strategies. When derived from effective baseline indicators, indices may be used to define the spatial and temporal distribution of economically viable production opportunities and may be expressed in derived indices that realistically describe basic production opportunities and guide the selection of feasible, long-term development strategies. Specifically, representative indices are critical in the identification of development goals and realistic objectives and can be used to evaluate, select and implement sustainable development strategies and plans. It is stressed that the relevancy and effectiveness of public policies depend on the identification of representative evaluation models and baseline indices to define development strategies that are both environmentally sustainable and economically viable. In this context, the role of baseline indicators that define natural resource production capacities is discussed. This includes potential resource uses, derived benefits and their economic and environmental impacts. Key thematic indicators are suggested that may be especially useful in identifying development alternatives and impacts. This suggested that clearly defined environmental pollution limits or impact standards be used to define public risk tolerance limits and carrying capacity constraints. It is argued that these measures may be more effective in directing policy choices than economic valuation of non market goods and services that represent environmental externalities associated with resource exploitation options and economic development strategies. To this end, examples of thematic indicators and derived indices are introduced that may prove effective in resource assessment, economic evaluation and strategic development planning.     

Green clubs

This paper treats programs in which firms voluntarily agree to meet environmental standards as “green clubs”: clubs, because they provide non-rival but excludable reputation benefits to participating firms; green, because they also generate environmental public goods. The model illuminates a central tension between the congestion externality familiar from conventional club theory and the free-riding externality familiar from the theory on private provision of public goods. We compare three common program sponsors—governments, industry, and environmental groups. We find that if monitoring of the club standard is perfect, a government constrained from regulating club size may prefer to leave sponsorship to industry if public-good benefits are sufficiently low, or to environmentalists if public-good benefits are sufficiently high. If monitoring is imperfect, an important question is whether consumers can infer that a club is too large for its standard to be credible. If they can then the government may deliberately choose an imperfect monitoring mechanism as a way of regulating club size indirectly. If they cannot then this reinforces the government's preference for delegating sponsorship.     

Motivating children's cooperation to conserve forests

Forests are essential common-pool resources. Understanding children's and adolescents’ motivations for conservation is critical to improving conservation education. In 2 experiments, we investigated 1086 school-aged children and adolescents (6–16 years old) from the United States, China, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Testing participants in groups, we assessed their motivation for conservation based on collective-risk common-pool goods games in which they were threatened with losing their endowment unless the group donation exceeded a threshold needed to maintain the forest. Extrinsic motivations, rather than intrinsic, tended to lead to successful cooperation to maintain a forest. Certainty of losing individual payoffs significantly boosted successful cooperative conservation efforts across cultures (success rates were 90.63% and 74.19% in the 2 risk-extrinsic conditions, and 43.75% in the control condition). In U.S. participants, 2 extrinsic incentives, priming discussions of the value of forests and delay of payoffs as punishment, also increased success of cooperative conservation (success rates were 97.22% and 76.92% in the 2 extrinsic-incentive conditions, and 29.19% and 30.77% in the 2 control conditions). Conservation simulations, like those we used, may allow educators to encourage forest protection by leading groups to experience successful cooperation and the extrinsic incentives needed to motivate forest conservation.     

The effect of dominance hierarchy on the use of alternative foraging tactics: a phenotype-limited producing-scrounging game

Group living is thought to be advantageous for animals, though it also creates opportunities for exploitation. Using food discovered by others can be described as a producer-scrounger, frequency-dependent game. In the game, scroungers (parasitic individuals) do better than producers (food finders) when scroungers are rare in the group, but they do worse when scroungers are common. When the individuals' payoffs do not depend on their phenotype (i.e. a symmetric game), this strong negative frequency dependence leads to a mixed stable solution where both alternatives obtain equal payoffs. Here, we address the question of how differences in social status in a dominance hierarchy influence the individuals' decision to play producer or scrounger in small foraging groups. We model explicitly the food intake rate of each individual in a dominance-structured foraging group, then calculate the Nash equilibrium for them. Our model predicts that only strong differences in competitive ability will influence the use of producing or scrounging tactics in small foraging groups; dominants will mainly play scrounger and subordinates will mostly use producer. Since the differences in competitive ability of different-ranking individuals likely depend on the economic defendability of food, our model provides a step towards the integration of social foraging and resource defence theories. Received: 30 July 1997 / Accepted after revision: 15 November 1997     

Green clubs

This paper treats programs in which firms voluntarily agree to meet environmental standards as “green clubs”: clubs, because they provide non-rival but excludable reputation benefits to participating firms; green, because they also generate environmental public goods. The model illuminates a central tension between the congestion externality familiar from conventional club theory and the free-riding externality familiar from the theory on private provision of public goods. We compare three common program sponsors—governments, industry, and environmental groups. We find that if monitoring of the club standard is perfect, a government constrained from regulating club size may prefer to leave sponsorship to industry if public-good benefits are sufficiently low, or to environmentalists if public-good benefits are sufficiently high. If monitoring is imperfect, an important question is whether consumers can infer that a club is too large for its standard to be credible. If they can then the government may deliberately choose an imperfect monitoring mechanism as a way of regulating club size indirectly. If they cannot then this reinforces the government's preference for delegating sponsorship.     

Integrated ecological models: simulation of socio-cultural constraints on ecological dynamics

We suggest that general systems theory provides a common philosophical basis for dialog between ecological and social scientists interested in studying the reciprocal interactions of humans and their environment. We (1) provide a synopsis of the ‘systems approach' as viewed from the biological and social sciences, respectively; (2) develop a conceptual framework for the explicit linking of ecological and social variables, and (3) draw upon game theoretic results of the Prisoner's Dilemma to represent human decision-making quantitatively in a model that simulates the tragedy of the commons. The model consists of 5 submodels that represent the ‘observers world' and each of 4 ‘participant's worlds.' The observer's-world represents the decision processes, either Optimize or Tit-for-Tat, by which each of 2 users decides to add or remove animals. The 4 perceived worlds represent hypothetical situations in which (1) persons A and B both add an animal; (2) A adds and B does not; (3) B adds and A does not, and (4) neither A nor B add an animal. Simulation results indicate that net worth of the community and of each person individually under Tit-for-Tat is more than double the net worth attained under Optimize. Replacement of the static payoff matrix assumed in game theory with a dynamic quantitative model illustrates how ‘norm-based' approaches to ecosystem management can outperform optimizing approaches based on predicted outcomes. Although ‘soft systems' techniques may better help decision-makers reach norm-based agreements on ecosystem management, quantitative models have more explanatory value, and if developed sufficiently such models could incorporate complex social dimensions that would enhance further their explanatory value.     

How do fighting ability and nest value influence usurpation contests in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Polistes</Emphasis> wasps?

Most research on animal contests has focused on the factors that influence the intensity and outcome of aggressive contests within nonsocial species, while relatively little is known about contests in social taxa. Here, we examine contests among queens of the social paper wasp, Polistes dominulus. Queens use multiple reproductive strategies, including nesting alone, usurping established colonies, and cooperatively joining other queens. We stage contests between a nesting queen and a challenger to test how resource value (RV) and resource holding potential (RHP) influence (a) who occupies the nest at the end of the contest and (b) the extent of conflict between the queen and challenger. We found that RHP, as measured by individuals’ facial patterns and body size, influenced the outcome of the contest. Challengers with high RHP were more likely to successfully usurp the nest than challengers with low RHP. Interestingly, queens with relatively high RHP were more likely to form a cooperative association with the challenger than queens with lower RHP, suggesting that queens may evict individuals that are an aggressive threat. RV influenced the intensity of conflict. There was more aggressive conflict over large nests than over small nests. Overall, social taxa have complex contest dynamics with important parallels to contests in nonsocial taxa. Studying contests in social taxa provides an important perspective on the factors that influence individual decisions about conflict versus cooperation.