A critical review of the compassionate conservation debate

Compassionate conservation holds that compassion should transform conservation. It has prompted heated debate and has been criticized strongly. We reviewed the debate to characterize compassionate conservation and to philosophically analyze critiques that are recurring and that warrant further critical attention. The necessary elements of compassionate conservation relate to the moral value of sentient animals and conservation and to science and conservation practice. Although compassionate conservation has several nontraditional necessary conditions, it also importantly allows a degree of pluralism in values and scientific judgment regarding animals and conservation practice. We identified 52 specific criticisms from 11 articles that directly critique compassionate conservation. We closely examined 33 of these because they recurred regularly or included substantial questions that required further response. Critics criticized compassionate conservation's ethical foundations, scientific credentials, clarity of application, understanding of compassion, its alleged threat to conservation and biodiversity. Some criticisms, we found, are question begging, confused, or overlook conceptual complexity. These criticisms raise questions for critics and proponents, regarding, for example, equal versus differential intrinsic moral value of different sentient animals (including humans), problems of natural and human-caused suffering of wild animals and predation, and the acceptability of specific conservation practices within compassionate conservation. By addressing recurring and faulty critiques of compassionate conservation and identifying issues for compassionate conservation to address, this review provides a clearer basis for crucial ongoing interdisciplinary dialogue about ethics, values, and conservation.     

The virtue of compassion in compassionate conservation

The role of ethics is becoming an increasingly important feature of biodiversity conservation dialogue and practice. Compassionate conservationists argue for a prohibition of, or at least a strong presumption against, the adoption of conservation policies that intentionally harm animals. They assert that to be compassionate is to care about animals and that it is antithetical to caring for animals to intentionally harm them. Compassionate conservationists thus criticize many existing conservation practices and policies. Two things together challenge the philosophical foundation of compassionate conservation. First, compassionate conservationists ground their theory in virtue ethics, yet virtue ethics permits exceptions to moral rules, so there cannot be an in-principle prohibition on adopting intentional harm-inducing policies and practices. But not all compassionate conservationists advocate for a prohibition on intentionally harming animals, only a strong presumption against it. This leads to the second point: compassion can motivate a person to adopt a harm-inducing conservation policy or practice when doing so is the best available option in a situation in which animals will be harmed no matter what policy or practice is adopted. Combining these insights with the empirical observation that conservationists regularly find themselves in tragic situations, we arrive at the conclusion that conservationists may regularly advocate for harm-inducing policies and practices from a position of compassion. Article Impact Statement: Compassionate conservationists should accept that the virtuously compassionate person may adopt harm-causing conservation policies.     

Emotion as a source of moral understanding in conservation

Recent debates around the meaning and implications of compassionate conservation suggest that some conservationists consider emotion a false and misleading basis for moral judgment and decision making. We trace these beliefs to a long-standing, gendered sociocultural convention and argue that the disparagement of emotion as a source of moral understanding is both empirically and morally problematic. According to the current scientific and philosophical understanding, reason and emotion are better understood as partners, rather than opposites. Nonetheless, the two have historically been seen as separate, with reason elevated in association with masculinity and emotion (especially nurturing emotion) dismissed or delegitimated in association with femininity. These associations can be situated in a broader, dualistic, and hierarchical logic used to maintain power for a dominant male (White, able-bodied, upper class, heterosexual) human class. We argue that emotion should be affirmed by conservationists for the novel and essential insights it contributes to conservation ethics. We consider the specific example of compassion and characterize it as an emotional experience of interdependence and shared vulnerability. This experience highlights conservationists’ responsibilities to individual beings, enhancing established and widely accepted beliefs that conservationists have a duty to protect populations, species, and ecosystems (or biodiversity). We argue compassion, thus understood, should be embraced as a core virtue of conservation.     

Revisiting two dogmas of conservation science

Conservation science is a morally motivated field, with implicit and explicit values built into its practice. As such, conservationists must engage with conservation ethics to interrogate underlying values. We examine cutting-edge ecological science and contemporary ethics to revisit two conservation norms that have become dogmatic in the field: ecological collectives, but not individual animals, are valuable and anthropomorphism should be staunchly avoided. Emerging studies demonstrate that individuals and their intraspecific variation can be instrumentally valuable for conservation science, and there is an emerging consensus within environmental philosophy around the moral worth of individuals. Thus, we suggest conservation science should explicitly recognize the value of individuals. We also argue that avoiding anthropomorphism is detrimental to conservation because critical anthropomorphism enables a more nuanced scientific approach—allowing conservationists to ask enlightened questions with creativity and compassion. We provide evidence that both dogmatic norms are scientifically and morally outdated and propose new normative values to push conservation towards more robust science and ethical practice.     

Compassionate versus consequentialist conservation

Ethical treatment of wildlife and consideration of animal welfare have become important themes in conservation, but ethical perspectives on how best to protect wild animals and promote their welfare are diverse. There are advantages to the consequentialist harms ethical framework applied in managing wild herbivores for conservation purposes. To minimize harms while achieving conservation goals, we argue that overabundant wild herbivores should in many cases be managed through consumptive in situ killing. Advantages of this policy are that the negative welfare states imposed on animals last only a short time; remaining animals are not deprived of positive welfare states (e.g., linked to rearing offspring); poor welfare states of animals in overabundant populations are avoided (e.g., starvation); negative welfare impacts on heterospecifics through resource depletion (i.e., competition) are prevented; harvesting meat reduces the number of (agricultural) animals raised to supply meat; and minimal costs maximize funding for other wildlife management and conservation priorities. Alternative ethical approaches to our consequentialist framework include deontology (containing animal rights) and virtue ethics, some of which underpin compassionate conservation. These alternative ethical approaches emphasize the importance of avoiding intentional killing of animals but, if no population reduction occurs, are likely to impose considerable unintentional harms on overabundant wildlife and indirectly harm heterospecifics through ineffective population reduction. If nonlethal control is used, it is likely that overabundant animals would be deprived of positive welfare states and economic costs would be prohibitive. We encourage conservation stakeholders to consider animal-welfare consequentialism as an ethical approach to minimize harms to the animals under their care as well as other animals that policies may affect while at the same time pursuing conservation goals.     

Application of decision tools to ethical analysis in biodiversity conservation

Achieving ethically responsible decisions is crucial for the success of biodiversity conservation projects. We adapted the ethical matrix, decision tree, and Bateson's cube to assist in the ethical analysis of complex conservation scenarios by structuring these tools so that they can implement the different value dimensions (environmental, social, and animal welfare) involved in conservation ethics. We then applied them to a case study relative to the decision-making process regarding whether or not to continue collecting biomaterial on the oldest of the two remaining northern white rhinoceroses (Ceratotherium simum cottoni), a functionally extinct subspecies of the white rhinoceros. We used the ethical matrix to gather ethical pros and cons and as a starting point for a participatory approach to ethical decision-making. We used decision trees to compare the different options at stake on the basis of a set of ethical desiderata. We used Bateson's cube to establish a threshold of ethical acceptability and model the results of a simple survey. The application of these tools proved to be pivotal in structuring the decision-making process and in helping reach a shared, reasoned, and transparent decision on the best option from an ethical point of view among those available.     

Deconstructing compassionate conservation

Compassionate conservation focuses on 4 tenets: first, do no harm; individuals matter; inclusivity of individual animals; and peaceful coexistence between humans and animals. Recently, compassionate conservation has been promoted as an alternative to conventional conservation philosophy. We believe examples presented by compassionate conservationists are deliberately or arbitrarily chosen to focus on mammals; inherently not compassionate; and offer ineffective conservation solutions. Compassionate conservation arbitrarily focuses on charismatic species, notably large predators and megaherbivores. The philosophy is not compassionate when it leaves invasive predators in the environment to cause harm to vastly more individuals of native species or uses the fear of harm by apex predators to terrorize mesopredators. Hindering the control of exotic species (megafauna, predators) in situ will not improve the conservation condition of the majority of biodiversity. The positions taken by so-called compassionate conservationists on particular species and on conservation actions could be extended to hinder other forms of conservation, including translocations, conservation fencing, and fertility control. Animal welfare is incredibly important to conservation, but ironically compassionate conservation does not offer the best welfare outcomes to animals and is often ineffective in achieving conservation goals. Consequently, compassionate conservation may threaten public and governmental support for conservation because of the limited understanding of conservation problems by the general public.     

A moral panic over cats

Some conservationists believe that free-ranging cats pose an enormous risk to biodiversity and public health and therefore should be eliminated from the landscape by any means necessary. They further claim that those who question the science or ethics behind their arguments are science deniers (merchants of doubt) seeking to mislead the public. As much as we share a commitment to conservation of biodiversity and wild nature, we believe these ideas are wrong and fuel an unwarranted moral panic over cats. Those who question the ecological or epidemiological status of cats are not science deniers, and it is a false analogy to compare them with corporate and right-wing special interests that perpetrate disinformation campaigns over issues, such as smoking and climate change. There are good conservation and public-health reasons and evidence to be skeptical that free-ranging cats constitute a disaster for biodiversity and human health in all circumstances. Further, there are significant and largely unaddressed ethical and policy issues (e.g., the ethics and efficacy of lethal management) relative to how people ought to value and coexist with cats and native wildlife. Society is better served by a collaborative approach to produce better scientific and ethical knowledge about free-ranging cats.     

The moral residue of conservation

Should conservationists use lethal management to control introduced wildlife populations? Should they kill individual animals to protect endangered species? Are trade-offs that prioritize some values at the expense of others morally appropriate? These sorts of ethical questions are common in conservation. In debating such questions, conservationists often seem to presume 1 of 2 possible answers: the act in question is right or it is wrong. But morality in conservation is considerably more complex than this simple binary suggests. A robust conservation ethic requires a vocabulary that gives voice to the uncertainty and unease that arise when what seems to be the best available course of action also seems to involve a measure of wrongdoing. The philosophical literature on moral residue and moral dilemmas supplies this vocabulary. Moral dilemmas arise when one must neglect certain moral requirements to fulfill others. Under such circumstances, even the best possible decision leaves a moral residue, which is experienced emotionally as some form of grief. Examples of conservation scenarios that leave a moral residue include management of introduced rabbits in Australia, trophy hunting in Africa, and forest management trade-offs in the Pacific Northwest. Moral residue is integral to the moral experience of conservationists today, and grief is an appropriate response to many decisions conservationists must make. Article impact statement: Defensible conservation decisions may neglect moral requirements, leaving a moral residue; conservationists should respond with grief.     

The need for ecocentrism in biodiversity conservation

Over the past 5 decades, scientists have been documenting negative anthropogenic environmental change, expressing increasing alarm, and urging dramatic socioecological transformation in response. A host of international meetings have been held, but the erosion of biological diversity continues to accelerate. Why, then, has no effective political action been taken? We contend that part of the answer may lie in the anthropocentric ethical premises and moral rhetoric typically deployed in the cause of conservation. We further argue that it is essential to advance moral arguments for biodiversity conservation that are not just based on perceived human interests but on ecocentric values, namely, convictions that species and ecosystems have value and interests that should be respected regardless of whether they serve human needs and aspirations. A broader array of moral rationales for biodiversity conservation, we conclude, would be more likely to lead to effective plans, adopted and enforced by governments, designed to conserve biological diversity. A good place to start in this regard would be to explicitly incorporate ecocentric values into the recommendations that will be made at the conclusion of the 15th meeting of the parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, scheduled to be held in October 2020.     

From Adaptive Management to Adjustive Management: A Pragmatic Account of Biodiversity Values

Abstract: The conservation of biodiversity poses an exceptionally difficult problem in that it needs to be effective in a context of double uncertainty: scientific (i.e., how to conserve biodiversity) and normative (i.e., which biodiversity to conserve and why). Although adaptive management offers a promising approach to overcome scientific uncertainty, normative uncertainty is seldom tackled by conservation science. We expanded on the approach proposed by adaptive‐management theorists by devising an integrative and iterative approach to conservation that encompasses both types of uncertainty. Inspired by environmental pragmatism, we suggest that moral values at stake in biodiversity conservation are plastic and that a plurality of individual normative positions can coexist and evolve. Moral values should thus be explored through an experimental process as additional parameters to be incorporated in the traditional adaptive‐management approach. As such, moral values should also be monitored by environmental ethicists working side by side with scientists and managers on conservation projects. Acknowledging the diversity of moral values and integrating them in a process of collective deliberation will help overcome the normative uncertainty. We used Dewey's distinction between adaptation and adjustment to offer a new paradigm built around what we call adjustive management, which reflects both the uncertainty and the likely evolution of the moral values humans attribute to biodiversity. We illustrate how this paradigm relates to practical conservation decisions by exploring the case of the Sacred Ibis (Threskiornis aethiopicus), an alien species in France that is the target of an eradication plan undertaken with little regard for moral issues. We propose that a more satisfying result of efforts to control Sacred Ibis could have been reached by rerouting the traditional feedback loop of adaptive management to include a normative inquiry. This adjustive management approach now needs to be tested in real‐case conservation programs.     

Animal agency in wildlife conservation and management

Wildlife conservation and management (WCM) practices have been historically drawn from a wide variety of academic fields, yet practitioners have been slow to engage with emerging conversations about animals as complex beings, whose individuality and sociality influence their relationships with humans. We propose an explicit acknowledgement of wild, nonhuman animals as active participants in WCM. We examined 190 studies of WCM interventions and outcomes to highlight 3 common assumptions that underpin many present approaches to WCM: animal behaviors are rigid and homogeneous; wildlife exhibit idealized wild behavior and prefer pristine habitats; and human–wildlife relationships are of marginal or secondary importance relative to nonhuman interactions. We found that these management interventions insufficiently considered animal learning, decision-making, individuality, sociality, and relationships with humans and led to unanticipated detrimental outcomes. To address these shortcomings, we synthesized theoretical advances in animal behavioral sciences, animal geographies, and animal legal theory that may help conservation professionals reconceptualize animals and their relationships with humans. Based on advances in these fields, we constructed the concept of animal agency, which we define as the ability of animals to actively influence conservation and management outcomes through their adaptive, context-specific, and complex behaviors that are predicated on their sentience, individuality, lived experiences, cognition, sociality, and cultures in ways that shape and reshape shared human–wildlife cultures, spaces, and histories. Conservation practices, such as compassionate conservation, convivial conservation, and ecological justice, incorporate facets of animal agency. Animal agency can be incorporated in conservation problem-solving by assessing the ways in which agency contributes to species’ survival and by encouraging more adaptive and collaborative decision-making among human and nonhuman stakeholders.     

Cautioning against overemphasis of normative constructs in conservation decision making

Questions around how to conserve nature are increasingly leading to dissonance in conservation planning and action. While science can assist in unraveling the nature of conservation challenges, conservation responses rely heavily on normative positions and constructs to order actions, aid interpretations, and provide motivation. However, problems can arise when norms are mistaken for science or when they stymy scientific rigor. To highlight these potential pitfalls, we used the ethics-based tool of argument analysis to assess a controversial conservation intervention, the Pelorus Island Goat Control Program. The program proponents' argument for restorative justice was unsound because it relied on weak logical construction overly entrenched in normative assumptions. Overreliance on normative constructs, particularly the invocation of tragedy, creates a sense of urgency that can subvert scientific and ethical integrity, obscure values and assumptions, and increase the propensity for flawed logic. This example demonstrates how the same constructs that drive biodiversity conservation can also drive poor decision making, spur public backlash, and justify poor animal welfare outcomes. To provide clarity, a decision-making flowchart we devised demonstrates how values, norms, and ethics influence one another. We recommend practitioners follow 3 key points to improve decision making: be aware of values, as well as normative constructs and ethical theories that those values inform; be mindful of overreliance on either normative constructs or ethics when deciding action is justified; and be logically sound and transparent when building justifications. We also recommend 5 key attributes that practitioners should be attentive to when making conservation decisions: clarity, transparency, scientific integrity, adaptiveness, and compassion. Greater attention to the role of norms in decision making will improve conservation outcomes and garner greater public support for actions.     

Fixism and conservation science

The field of biodiversity conservation has recently been criticized as relying on a fixist view of the living world in which existing species constitute at the same time targets of conservation efforts and static states of reference, which is in apparent disagreement with evolutionary dynamics. We reviewed the prominent role of species as conservation units and the common benchmark approach to conservation that aims to use past biodiversity as a reference to conserve current biodiversity. We found that the species approach is justified by the discrepancy between the time scales of macroevolution and human influence and that biodiversity benchmarks are based on reference processes rather than fixed reference states. Overall, we argue that the ethical and theoretical frameworks underlying conservation research are based on macroevolutionary processes, such as extinction dynamics. Current species, phylogenetic, community, and functional conservation approaches constitute short‐term responses to short‐term human effects on these reference processes, and these approaches are consistent with evolutionary principles.     

When all life counts in conservation

Conservation science involves the collection and analysis of data. These scientific practices emerge from values that shape who and what is counted. Currently, conservation data are filtered through a value system that considers native life the only appropriate subject of conservation concern. We examined how trends in species richness, distribution, and threats change when all wildlife count by adding so-called non-native and feral populations to the International Union for Conservation of Nature Red List and local species richness assessments. We focused on vertebrate populations with founding members taken into and out of Australia by humans (i.e., migrants). We identified 87 immigrant and 47 emigrant vertebrate species. Formal conservation accounts underestimated global ranges by an average of 30% for immigrants and 7% for emigrants; immigrations surpassed extinctions in Australia by 52 species; migrants were disproportionately threatened (33% of immigrants and 29% of emigrants were threatened or decreasing in their native ranges); and incorporating migrant populations into risk assessments reduced global threat statuses for 15 of 18 species. Australian policies defined most immigrants as pests (76%), and conservation was the most commonly stated motivation for targeting these species in killing programs (37% of immigrants). Inclusive biodiversity data open space for dialogue on the ethical and empirical assumptions underlying conservation science.     

The ethics of genetic engineering and gene drives in conservation

The ethical issues associated with using genetic engineering and gene drives in conservation are typically described as consisting of risk assessment and management, public engagement and acceptance, opportunity costs, risk and benefit distributions, and oversight. These are important, but the ethical concerns extend beyond them because the use of genetic engineering has the potential to significantly alter the practices, concepts, and value commitments of conservation. I sought to elucidate the broader set of ethical issues connected with a potential genetic engineering turn in conservation and provide an approach to ethical analysis of novel conservation technologies. The primary rationales offered in support of using genetic engineering and gene drives in conservation are efficiency and necessity for achieving conservation goals. The instrumentalist ethical perspective associated with these rationales involves assessing novel technologies as a means to accomplish desired ends. For powerful emerging technologies the instrumentalist perspective needs to be complemented by a form-of-life perspective frequently applied in the philosophy of technology. The form-of-life perspective involves considering how novel technologies restructure the activities into which they are introduced. When the form-of-life perspective is applied to creative genetic engineering in conservation, it brings into focus a set of ethical issues, such as those associated with power, meaning, relationships, and values, that are not captured by the instrumentalist perspective. It also illuminates why the use of gene drives in conservation is so ethically and philosophically interesting.     

Underaddressed animal-welfare issues in conservation

Much progress has been made toward assessing and improving animal welfare in conservation. However, several glaring knowledge gaps remain where animal-welfare concerns exist but animal-welfare studies have not been performed in politically sensitive contexts. Based on contemporary issues in Australia, we identified 4 topics that require more research: animal-welfare oversight for operations designated as management (as opposed to research); animal-welfare impacts of biological agents used to control invasive animals; welfare of animals hunted recreationally; and animal-welfare impacts associated with indigenous wildlife use. Animal-welfare science may be applied to these sensitive topics through simple quantitative studies (e.g., quantifying the frequency of adverse animal-welfare events). Several such studies have effectively addressed animal-welfare concerns in similarly contentious contexts, including feral camel (Camelus dromedarius) culling in Australia, recreational hunting in Scandinavia, and indigenous whale hunting in the United States. For discussions of animal welfare in conservation to be evidence-based, courageous research is required in the 4 key areas we identified.     

When Agendas Collide: Human Welfare and Biological Conservation

Abstract:  Conservation should benefit ecosystems, nonhuman organisms, and current and future human beings. Nevertheless, tension among these goals engenders potential ethical conflicts: conservationists' true motivations may differ from the justifications they offer for their activities, and conservation projects have the potential to disempower and oppress people. We reviewed the promise and deficiencies of integrating social, economic, and biological concerns into conservation, focusing on research in ecosystem services and efforts in community-based conservation. Despite much progress, neither paradigm provides a silver bullet for conservation's most pressing problems, and both require additional thought and modification to become maximally effective. We conclude that the following strategies are needed to make conservation more effective in our human-dominated world. (1) Conservation research needs to integrate with social scholarship in a more sophisticated manner. (2) Conservation must be informed by a detailed understanding of the spatial, temporal, and social distributions of costs and benefits of conservation efforts. Strategies should reflect this understanding, particularly by equitably distributing conservation's costs. (3) We must better acknowledge the social concerns that accompany biodiversity conservation; accordingly, sometimes we must argue for conservation for biodiversity's sake, not for its direct human benefits.     

Effect of Monitoring Technique on Quality of Conservation Science

Monitoring free‐ranging animals in their natural habitat is a keystone of ecosystem conservation and increasingly important in the context of current rates of loss of biological diversity. Data collected from individuals of endangered species inform conservation policies. Conservation professionals assume that these data are reliable—that the animals from whom data are collected are representative of the species in their physiology, ecology, and behavior and of the populations from which they are drawn. In the last few decades, there has been an enthusiastic adoption of invasive techniques for gathering ecological and conservation data. Although these can provide impressive quantities of data, and apparent insights into animal ranges and distributions, there is increasing evidence that these techniques can result in animal welfare problems, through the wide‐ranging physiological effects of acute and chronic stress and through direct or indirect injuries or compromised movement. Much less commonly, however, do conservation scientists consider the issue of how these effects may alter the behavior of individuals to the extent that the data they collect could be unreliable. The emerging literature on the immediate and longer‐term effects of capture and handling indicate it can no longer be assumed that a wild animal's survival of the process implies the safety of the procedure, that the procedure is ethical, or the scientific validity of the resulting data. I argue that conservation professionals should routinely assess study populations for negative effects of their monitoring techniques and adopt noninvasive approaches for best outcomes not only for the animals, but also for conservation science. Efecto de la Técnica de Monitoreo en la Calidad de la Ciencia de la Conservación