A critical review of the compassionate conservation debate

Compassionate conservation holds that compassion should transform conservation. It has prompted heated debate and has been criticized strongly. We reviewed the debate to characterize compassionate conservation and to philosophically analyze critiques that are recurring and that warrant further critical attention. The necessary elements of compassionate conservation relate to the moral value of sentient animals and conservation and to science and conservation practice. Although compassionate conservation has several nontraditional necessary conditions, it also importantly allows a degree of pluralism in values and scientific judgment regarding animals and conservation practice. We identified 52 specific criticisms from 11 articles that directly critique compassionate conservation. We closely examined 33 of these because they recurred regularly or included substantial questions that required further response. Critics criticized compassionate conservation's ethical foundations, scientific credentials, clarity of application, understanding of compassion, its alleged threat to conservation and biodiversity. Some criticisms, we found, are question begging, confused, or overlook conceptual complexity. These criticisms raise questions for critics and proponents, regarding, for example, equal versus differential intrinsic moral value of different sentient animals (including humans), problems of natural and human-caused suffering of wild animals and predation, and the acceptability of specific conservation practices within compassionate conservation. By addressing recurring and faulty critiques of compassionate conservation and identifying issues for compassionate conservation to address, this review provides a clearer basis for crucial ongoing interdisciplinary dialogue about ethics, values, and conservation.     

Emotion as a source of moral understanding in conservation

Recent debates around the meaning and implications of compassionate conservation suggest that some conservationists consider emotion a false and misleading basis for moral judgment and decision making. We trace these beliefs to a long-standing, gendered sociocultural convention and argue that the disparagement of emotion as a source of moral understanding is both empirically and morally problematic. According to the current scientific and philosophical understanding, reason and emotion are better understood as partners, rather than opposites. Nonetheless, the two have historically been seen as separate, with reason elevated in association with masculinity and emotion (especially nurturing emotion) dismissed or delegitimated in association with femininity. These associations can be situated in a broader, dualistic, and hierarchical logic used to maintain power for a dominant male (White, able-bodied, upper class, heterosexual) human class. We argue that emotion should be affirmed by conservationists for the novel and essential insights it contributes to conservation ethics. We consider the specific example of compassion and characterize it as an emotional experience of interdependence and shared vulnerability. This experience highlights conservationists’ responsibilities to individual beings, enhancing established and widely accepted beliefs that conservationists have a duty to protect populations, species, and ecosystems (or biodiversity). We argue compassion, thus understood, should be embraced as a core virtue of conservation.     

The virtue of compassion in compassionate conservation

The role of ethics is becoming an increasingly important feature of biodiversity conservation dialogue and practice. Compassionate conservationists argue for a prohibition of, or at least a strong presumption against, the adoption of conservation policies that intentionally harm animals. They assert that to be compassionate is to care about animals and that it is antithetical to caring for animals to intentionally harm them. Compassionate conservationists thus criticize many existing conservation practices and policies. Two things together challenge the philosophical foundation of compassionate conservation. First, compassionate conservationists ground their theory in virtue ethics, yet virtue ethics permits exceptions to moral rules, so there cannot be an in-principle prohibition on adopting intentional harm-inducing policies and practices. But not all compassionate conservationists advocate for a prohibition on intentionally harming animals, only a strong presumption against it. This leads to the second point: compassion can motivate a person to adopt a harm-inducing conservation policy or practice when doing so is the best available option in a situation in which animals will be harmed no matter what policy or practice is adopted. Combining these insights with the empirical observation that conservationists regularly find themselves in tragic situations, we arrive at the conclusion that conservationists may regularly advocate for harm-inducing policies and practices from a position of compassion. Article Impact Statement: Compassionate conservationists should accept that the virtuously compassionate person may adopt harm-causing conservation policies.     

Recognizing animal personhood in compassionate conservation

Compassionate conservation is based on the ethical position that actions taken to protect biodiversity should be guided by compassion for all sentient beings. Critics argue that there are 3 core reasons harming animals is acceptable in conservation programs: the primary purpose of conservation is biodiversity protection; conservation is already compassionate to animals; and conservation should prioritize compassion to humans. We used argument analysis to clarify the values and logics underlying the debate around compassionate conservation. We found that objections to compassionate conservation are expressions of human exceptionalism, the view that humans are of a categorically separate and higher moral status than all other species. In contrast, compassionate conservationists believe that conservation should expand its moral community by recognizing all sentient beings as persons. Personhood, in an ethical sense, implies the individual is owed respect and should not be treated merely as a means to other ends. On scientific and ethical grounds, there are good reasons to extend personhood to sentient animals, particularly in conservation. The moral exclusion or subordination of members of other species legitimates the ongoing manipulation and exploitation of the living worlds, the very reason conservation was needed in the first place. Embracing compassion can help dismantle human exceptionalism, recognize nonhuman personhood, and navigate a more expansive moral space.     

Cautioning against overemphasis of normative constructs in conservation decision making

Questions around how to conserve nature are increasingly leading to dissonance in conservation planning and action. While science can assist in unraveling the nature of conservation challenges, conservation responses rely heavily on normative positions and constructs to order actions, aid interpretations, and provide motivation. However, problems can arise when norms are mistaken for science or when they stymy scientific rigor. To highlight these potential pitfalls, we used the ethics-based tool of argument analysis to assess a controversial conservation intervention, the Pelorus Island Goat Control Program. The program proponents' argument for restorative justice was unsound because it relied on weak logical construction overly entrenched in normative assumptions. Overreliance on normative constructs, particularly the invocation of tragedy, creates a sense of urgency that can subvert scientific and ethical integrity, obscure values and assumptions, and increase the propensity for flawed logic. This example demonstrates how the same constructs that drive biodiversity conservation can also drive poor decision making, spur public backlash, and justify poor animal welfare outcomes. To provide clarity, a decision-making flowchart we devised demonstrates how values, norms, and ethics influence one another. We recommend practitioners follow 3 key points to improve decision making: be aware of values, as well as normative constructs and ethical theories that those values inform; be mindful of overreliance on either normative constructs or ethics when deciding action is justified; and be logically sound and transparent when building justifications. We also recommend 5 key attributes that practitioners should be attentive to when making conservation decisions: clarity, transparency, scientific integrity, adaptiveness, and compassion. Greater attention to the role of norms in decision making will improve conservation outcomes and garner greater public support for actions.     

A moral panic over cats

Some conservationists believe that free-ranging cats pose an enormous risk to biodiversity and public health and therefore should be eliminated from the landscape by any means necessary. They further claim that those who question the science or ethics behind their arguments are science deniers (merchants of doubt) seeking to mislead the public. As much as we share a commitment to conservation of biodiversity and wild nature, we believe these ideas are wrong and fuel an unwarranted moral panic over cats. Those who question the ecological or epidemiological status of cats are not science deniers, and it is a false analogy to compare them with corporate and right-wing special interests that perpetrate disinformation campaigns over issues, such as smoking and climate change. There are good conservation and public-health reasons and evidence to be skeptical that free-ranging cats constitute a disaster for biodiversity and human health in all circumstances. Further, there are significant and largely unaddressed ethical and policy issues (e.g., the ethics and efficacy of lethal management) relative to how people ought to value and coexist with cats and native wildlife. Society is better served by a collaborative approach to produce better scientific and ethical knowledge about free-ranging cats.     

The moral residue of conservation

Should conservationists use lethal management to control introduced wildlife populations? Should they kill individual animals to protect endangered species? Are trade-offs that prioritize some values at the expense of others morally appropriate? These sorts of ethical questions are common in conservation. In debating such questions, conservationists often seem to presume 1 of 2 possible answers: the act in question is right or it is wrong. But morality in conservation is considerably more complex than this simple binary suggests. A robust conservation ethic requires a vocabulary that gives voice to the uncertainty and unease that arise when what seems to be the best available course of action also seems to involve a measure of wrongdoing. The philosophical literature on moral residue and moral dilemmas supplies this vocabulary. Moral dilemmas arise when one must neglect certain moral requirements to fulfill others. Under such circumstances, even the best possible decision leaves a moral residue, which is experienced emotionally as some form of grief. Examples of conservation scenarios that leave a moral residue include management of introduced rabbits in Australia, trophy hunting in Africa, and forest management trade-offs in the Pacific Northwest. Moral residue is integral to the moral experience of conservationists today, and grief is an appropriate response to many decisions conservationists must make. Article impact statement: Defensible conservation decisions may neglect moral requirements, leaving a moral residue; conservationists should respond with grief.     

How the diversity of human concepts of nature affects conservation of biodiversity

Protecting nature has become a global concern. However, the very idea of nature is problematic. We examined the etymological and semantic diversity of the word used to translate nature in a conservation context in 76 of the primary languages of the world to identify the different relationships between humankind and nature. Surprisingly, the number of morphemes (distinct etymological roots) used by 7 billion people was low. Different linguistic superfamilies shared the same etymon across large cultural areas that correlate with the distribution of major religions. However, we found large differences in etymological meanings among these words, echoing the semantic differences and historical ambiguity of the contemporary European concept of nature. The principal current Western meaning of nature in environmental public policy, conservation science, and environmental ethics–that which is not a human artifact–appears to be relatively rare and recent and to contradict the vision of nature in most other cultures, including those of pre-Christian Europe. To avoid implicit cultural bias and hegemony–and thus to be globally intelligible and effective–it behooves nature conservationists to take into account this semantic diversity when proposing conservation policies and implementing conservation practices.     

Ethics and governance for internet-based conservation science research

Internet-based research is increasingly important for conservation science and has wide-ranging applications and contexts, including culturomics, illegal wildlife trade, and citizen science. However, online research methods pose a range of ethical and legal challenges. Online data may be protected by copyright, database rights, or contract law. Privacy rights may also restrict the use and access of data, as well as ethical requirements from institutions. Online data have real-world meaning, and the ethical treatment of individuals and communities must not be marginalized when conducting internet-based research. As ethics frameworks originally developed for biomedical applications are inadequate for these methods, we propose that research activities involving the analysis of preexisting online data be treated analogous to offline social science methods, in particular, nondeceptive covert observation. By treating internet users and their data with respect and due consideration, conservationists can uphold the public trust needed to effectively address real-world issues.     

Sustainability: a Dissent

Abstract:  Broadly conceived and considered in its many usages, sustainability has grave defects as a planning goal, particularly when used by conservationists: it confuses means and ends; it is vague about what is being sustained and who or what is doing the sustaining; it is uninspiring; it is little more than Pinchot-era conservation (and thus ignores the many lessons learned since then); it need not be linked to land, to the land's functioning, or to any ecological science; it need not include a moral component; it is consistent with the view of humans as all-powerful manipulators of the planet; and, in general, it is such a malleable term that its popularity provides only a facade of consensus. When sustainability is defined broadly to include the full range of economic and social aspirations, it poses the particular risk that ecological and biodiversity concerns will be cast aside in favor of more pressing human wants. Given these many defects, the conservation movement should discard the term in favor of a more alluring goal, attentive to nature and its ecological functioning. A sound goal would incorporate and distill the considerable ecological and moral wisdom accumulated since Pinchot's day while giving conservationists the rhetorical tools needed to defend the land against competing pressures. In our view, conservation would be well served by an updated variant of "land health," Aldo Leopold's ecologically grounded goal from the 1940s. Land health as an independent understanding should set the essential terms of how we live and enjoy the earth, providing the framework within which we pursue our many social and economic aims.     

Environmental solutions sparked by environmental history

Environmental solutions require a decision-making process that is ultimately political, in that they involve decisions with uncertain outcomes and stakeholders with conflicting viewpoints. If this process seeks broad alignment between the government and public, then reconciling conflicting viewpoints is a key to the legitimacy of these decisions. We show that ecological baselines can be particularly powerful tools for creating a common understanding for public support (legitimacy) and conformity to new rules or regulations (legality) that enable the solution. They are powerful because they move the discussion of solutions from the abstract to the concrete by providing a conceptual model for a common expectation (e.g., restoring habitat). They provide narratives of the past (ecological histories) that readjust the future expectations of individuals on how to perceive and respond to new policy. While ecological baselines offer scientists benchmarks for reinstating ecological functions, they also normalize public and government discussion of solutions. This social normalization of public issues may assist government policy and influence social views, practices, and behaviors that adopt the policy. For science to more effectively inform conservation, we encourage interdisciplinary thinking (science- and human-centered) because it can provide public support and government legitimacy for investing in environmental solutions.     

From Adaptive Management to Adjustive Management: A Pragmatic Account of Biodiversity Values

Abstract: The conservation of biodiversity poses an exceptionally difficult problem in that it needs to be effective in a context of double uncertainty: scientific (i.e., how to conserve biodiversity) and normative (i.e., which biodiversity to conserve and why). Although adaptive management offers a promising approach to overcome scientific uncertainty, normative uncertainty is seldom tackled by conservation science. We expanded on the approach proposed by adaptive‐management theorists by devising an integrative and iterative approach to conservation that encompasses both types of uncertainty. Inspired by environmental pragmatism, we suggest that moral values at stake in biodiversity conservation are plastic and that a plurality of individual normative positions can coexist and evolve. Moral values should thus be explored through an experimental process as additional parameters to be incorporated in the traditional adaptive‐management approach. As such, moral values should also be monitored by environmental ethicists working side by side with scientists and managers on conservation projects. Acknowledging the diversity of moral values and integrating them in a process of collective deliberation will help overcome the normative uncertainty. We used Dewey's distinction between adaptation and adjustment to offer a new paradigm built around what we call adjustive management, which reflects both the uncertainty and the likely evolution of the moral values humans attribute to biodiversity. We illustrate how this paradigm relates to practical conservation decisions by exploring the case of the Sacred Ibis (Threskiornis aethiopicus), an alien species in France that is the target of an eradication plan undertaken with little regard for moral issues. We propose that a more satisfying result of efforts to control Sacred Ibis could have been reached by rerouting the traditional feedback loop of adaptive management to include a normative inquiry. This adjustive management approach now needs to be tested in real‐case conservation programs.     

Shared ways of thinking in Brazil about the science–practice interface in ecology and conservation

The debate in the literature on the science–practice interface suggests a diversity of opinions on how to link science and practice to improve conservation. Understanding this diversity is key to addressing unequal power relations, avoiding the consideration of only dominant views, and identifying strategies to link science and practice. In turn, linking science and practice should promote conservation decisions that are socially robust and scientifically informed. To identify and describe the viewpoints of scientists and decision makers on how the science–practice interface should work in order to improve conservation decisions, we interviewed Brazilian scientists (ecologists and conservation scientists, n = 11) and decision makers (n = 11). We used Q methodology and asked participants to rank their agreement with 48 statements on how the science–practice interface should work in order to improve conservation decisions. We used principal component analysis to identify shared viewpoints. The predominant viewpoint, shared by scientists and decision makers, was characterized by valuing the integration of scientific and strategic knowledge to address environmental problems. The second viewpoint, held mostly by decision makers, was distinguished by assigning great importance to science in the decision-making process and calling for problem-relevant research. The third viewpoint, shared only by scientists, was characterized by an unwillingness to collaborate and a perception of scientists as producers of knowledge that may help decision makers. Most participants agreed organizations should promote collaboration and that actors and knowledge from both science and practice are relevant. Disagreements concerned specific roles assigned to actors, willingness to collaborate, and organizational and institutional arrangements considered effective to link science and practice. Our results suggest there is ample room for collaborations and that impediments lie mainly in existing organizations and formal institutional arrangements rather than in negative attitudes between scientists and decision makers.     

Effect of Monitoring Technique on Quality of Conservation Science

Monitoring free‐ranging animals in their natural habitat is a keystone of ecosystem conservation and increasingly important in the context of current rates of loss of biological diversity. Data collected from individuals of endangered species inform conservation policies. Conservation professionals assume that these data are reliable—that the animals from whom data are collected are representative of the species in their physiology, ecology, and behavior and of the populations from which they are drawn. In the last few decades, there has been an enthusiastic adoption of invasive techniques for gathering ecological and conservation data. Although these can provide impressive quantities of data, and apparent insights into animal ranges and distributions, there is increasing evidence that these techniques can result in animal welfare problems, through the wide‐ranging physiological effects of acute and chronic stress and through direct or indirect injuries or compromised movement. Much less commonly, however, do conservation scientists consider the issue of how these effects may alter the behavior of individuals to the extent that the data they collect could be unreliable. The emerging literature on the immediate and longer‐term effects of capture and handling indicate it can no longer be assumed that a wild animal's survival of the process implies the safety of the procedure, that the procedure is ethical, or the scientific validity of the resulting data. I argue that conservation professionals should routinely assess study populations for negative effects of their monitoring techniques and adopt noninvasive approaches for best outcomes not only for the animals, but also for conservation science. Efecto de la Técnica de Monitoreo en la Calidad de la Ciencia de la Conservación     

Comparing Spatially Explicit Ecological and Social Values for Natural Areas to Identify Effective Conservation Strategies

Abstract: Consideration of the social values people assign to relatively undisturbed native ecosystems is critical for the success of science‐based conservation plans. We used an interview process to identify and map social values assigned to 31 ecosystem services provided by natural areas in an agricultural landscape in southern Australia. We then modeled the spatial distribution of 12 components of ecological value commonly used in setting spatial conservation priorities. We used the analytical hierarchy process to weight these components and used multiattribute utility theory to combine them into a single spatial layer of ecological value. Social values assigned to natural areas were negatively correlated with ecological values overall, but were positively correlated with some components of ecological value. In terms of the spatial distribution of values, people valued protected areas, whereas those natural areas underrepresented in the reserve system were of higher ecological value. The habitats of threatened animal species were assigned both high ecological value and high social value. Only small areas were assigned both high ecological value and high social value in the study area, whereas large areas of high ecological value were of low social value, and vice versa. We used the assigned ecological and social values to identify different conservation strategies (e.g., information sharing, community engagement, incentive payments) that may be effective for specific areas. We suggest that consideration of both ecological and social values in selection of conservation strategies can enhance the success of science‐based conservation planning.     

Conservation as Virtue: a Scientific and Social Process for Conservation Ethics

Abstract:  Most scientists take ethical arguments for conservation as given and focus on scientific or economic questions. Although nature conservation is often considered a just cause, it is given little further consideration. A lack of attention to ethical theory raises serious concerns for how conservation scientists conceive and practice ethics. I contrast two common ways scientists approach ethics, as demonstrated in the writings of Stephen Jay Gould and E. O. Wilson. Gould casts severe doubt as to whether any ethics are possible from science, whereas Wilson proposes science as the only path to ethics. I argue these two methods ultimately limit popular support for conservation and offer Alasdair MacIntyre's "virtue ethics" as an alternative. Unlike Gould and Wilson, MacIntyre provides an ethical theory that reconciles scientific inquiry and social traditions. Recent studies of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States affirm MacIntyre's claims and provide important insights for conservation today. These accounts argue that social solidarity and political success against segregation were possible only as rooted in the particular language, logic, and practices of a robust cultural tradition. If correct, conservation science should attend to several questions. On what basis can conservation achieve widespread cultural legitimacy? What are the particular social currencies for a conservation ethic? What role does science play in such a scheme? MacIntyre's careful positioning of scientific and social traditions provides a hopeful ethical direction for conservation.     

Evaluating the social and ecological effectiveness of partially protected marine areas

Marine protected areas (MPAs) are a primary tool for the stewardship, conservation, and restoration of marine ecosystems, yet 69% of global MPAs are only partially protected (i.e., are open to some form of fishing). Although fully protected areas have well-documented outcomes, including increased fish diversity and biomass, the effectiveness of partially protected areas is contested. Partially protected areas may provide benefits in some contexts and may be warranted for social reasons, yet social outcomes often depend on MPAs achieving their ecological goals to distinguish them from open areas and justify the cost of protection. We assessed the social perceptions and ecological effectiveness of 18 partially protected areas and 19 fully protected areas compared with 19 open areas along 7000 km of coast of southern Australia. We used mixed methods, gathering data via semistructured interviews, site surveys, and Reef Life (underwater visual census) surveys. We analyzed qualitative data in accordance with grounded theory and quantitative data with multivariate and univariate linear mixed-effects models. We found no social or ecological benefits for partially protected areas relative to open areas in our study. Partially protected areas had no more fish, invertebrates, or algae than open areas; were poorly understood by coastal users; were not more attractive than open areas; and were not perceived to have better marine life than open areas. These findings provide an important counterpoint to some large-scale meta-analyses that conclude partially protected areas can be ecologically effective but that draw this conclusion based on narrower measures. We argue that partially protected areas act as red herrings in marine conservation because they create an illusion of protection and consume scarce conservation resources yet provide little or no social or ecological gain over open areas. Fully protected areas, by contrast, have more fish species and biomass and are well understood, supported, and valued by the public. They are perceived to have better marine life and be improving over time in keeping with actual ecological results. Conservation outcomes can be improved by upgrading partially protected areas to higher levels of protection including conversion to fully protected areas.     

Compassionate versus consequentialist conservation

Ethical treatment of wildlife and consideration of animal welfare have become important themes in conservation, but ethical perspectives on how best to protect wild animals and promote their welfare are diverse. There are advantages to the consequentialist harms ethical framework applied in managing wild herbivores for conservation purposes. To minimize harms while achieving conservation goals, we argue that overabundant wild herbivores should in many cases be managed through consumptive in situ killing. Advantages of this policy are that the negative welfare states imposed on animals last only a short time; remaining animals are not deprived of positive welfare states (e.g., linked to rearing offspring); poor welfare states of animals in overabundant populations are avoided (e.g., starvation); negative welfare impacts on heterospecifics through resource depletion (i.e., competition) are prevented; harvesting meat reduces the number of (agricultural) animals raised to supply meat; and minimal costs maximize funding for other wildlife management and conservation priorities. Alternative ethical approaches to our consequentialist framework include deontology (containing animal rights) and virtue ethics, some of which underpin compassionate conservation. These alternative ethical approaches emphasize the importance of avoiding intentional killing of animals but, if no population reduction occurs, are likely to impose considerable unintentional harms on overabundant wildlife and indirectly harm heterospecifics through ineffective population reduction. If nonlethal control is used, it is likely that overabundant animals would be deprived of positive welfare states and economic costs would be prohibitive. We encourage conservation stakeholders to consider animal-welfare consequentialism as an ethical approach to minimize harms to the animals under their care as well as other animals that policies may affect while at the same time pursuing conservation goals.