Does size matter? Comparing the party politics of climate change in Australia and Norway

ABSTRACT

The implications of state size for the party politics of climate change are examined, and in particular its effect in facilitating or impeding cross-party consensus on the issue. This issue is explored through an in-depth, qualitative comparison of Australia and Norway, which are shown to be comparable in important respects yet differ in terms of their size and climate politics. Original primary data is presented from 44 interviews with policymakers and policy-shapers in both countries, which shows that, to the limited extent that state size moderates the parties’ behaviour, it is the countries’ geographical – not economic – size that matters. Institutional factors are found to play a more significant role, however, and the corporatist features of state-business cooperation, strong ENGOs and compensatory welfare arrangements are highlighted as particularly important.     

Climate laws in small European states: symbolic legislation and limits of diffusion in Ireland and Finland

ABSTRACT

The past decade has seen the introduction of framework climate change laws in several countries. The development of climate laws in two small European states, Ireland and Finland, both of which introduced national climate laws in 2015, are examined. Two questions are addressed. First, to what extent do later adopters of climate policy instruments draw on the examples of pioneering legislation? Second, how and why are pioneering climate policy instruments modified by later adopters? In both cases, the 2008 UK Climate Change Act was a source of inspiration in the early stages, particularly for civil society campaigns. Thereafter, domestic interests mobilised to remove from legislative proposals the most pioneering and ambitious parts of the UK model. The result, in both cases, was enactment of climate laws that resembled only very loosely the UK Climate Change Act.     

Drivers of political parties’ climate policy preferences: lessons from Denmark and Ireland

ABSTRACT

Political parties are important actors in domestic climate politics. What drives variation in parties’ climate policy preferences? To contribute to a growing literature on the party politics of climate change, we focus on the roles of public opinion, party competition, and parties’ traditional policy preferences in shaping parties’ climate policy preferences in Denmark and Ireland. In case studies that draw on in-depth interviews with policy practitioners, we show how parties respond to public opinion, accommodate issue-owners, and are powerfully constrained and enabled by their existing preferences. These mechanisms also help to explain different responses on climate policy across the left-right spectrum. Competition between mainstream parties is particularly powerful, but can constrain as much as it enables ‘greener’ climate policy preferences. While climate change may be a distinctive problem, the party politics of climate change features similar incentives and constraints as other domains.     

The politics of climate change policy design in Korea

The climate change policy design of the Lee Myung-bak administration was the outcome of interest group politics around the greenhouse gas and energy target management scheme, carbon taxes, and the emission-trading scheme. Using qualitative methods, this research examines powerful stakeholders and their interests at play in Korea’s climate change policymaking processes. It also links the political economy of climate change policy to the legacy of the ‘developmental state’ and examines environmental developmentalism in the design of the three climate change policies. The Lee administration strongly promoted environmental developmentalism, which created a new growth engine in an environmental field, while bolstering manufacturing businesses and excluding the views of environmental non-governmental organisations from the target-management and the emission-trading schemes. The Lee administration also sought to facilitate pro-business measures such as low taxes, which led it to reject a carbon tax. Therefore, environmental developmentalism was central to the politics of the Lee administration’s climate change policy design.     

Greener governments: partisan ideologies,executive institutions,and environmental policies

Why do some governments have more environmentally friendly policies than others? Part of the answer involves governing parties’ ideological positions on environmentalism and the constraints imposed by executive institutions. Here, this party-based explanation is elaborated and tested with uniquely comparable indicators of national environmental policies for governments in 27 countries in the European Union (EU). The findings show that governments with parties that emphasized environmental protection in their manifestos are more likely to propose pro-environment policies during EU-level negotiations. However, the effect of ideology is mediated by the centralization of the national executive branch. In centralized national executives, the environmental positions of prime ministers’ parties affect policies, while in decentralized national executives, the positions of environment ministers’ parties are relevant. The findings have implications for understanding the impact of parties’ environmental positions on government policies, as well as for policy making in coalitions more generally.     

Addressing concerns about climate policies: the possibilities and perils of responsive accommodation

Responsive accommodation is a political strategy that addresses concerns about a policy proposal by incorporating amendments that address those concerns. This approach can broaden the policy’s appeal, but is strategically risky, as it can alienate the policy’s base of support. We examine this strategy and its application in the politics of climate change. Using a novel survey experiment, relative public support is evaluated for two amendments to a carbon tax proposal – revenue neutrality assurances and a carbon tariff – designed to ease concerns about taxes and global competitiveness. Analysis shows that support for a carbon tax increases when coupled with a carbon tariff, but decreases among some of the policy’s supporters when described as revenue-neutral. These results suggest that policymakers using a responsive accommodation strategy must carefully weigh its possible risks and rewards in their particular context.     

Creative and disruptive elements in Norway´s climate policy mix: the small-state perspective

ABSTRACT

Recent scholarship has argued that effective and credible national climate policy mixes should encompass measures that promote new low-carbon technologies alongside those instruments aimed at constraining and phasing out support for existing polluting industries. The creative and disruptive policy measures in Norway´s climate policy mix are analysed by focusing on both national and international climate mitigation efforts. Norway´s climate policy mix at home has been more ambitious in the transport sector with a growing electric vehicle market than in the energy sector where niche support and disruptive policies have remained weak. Abroad, Norway has been increasingly active in supporting new low-carbon technologies and disrupting the fossil-fuel industry, especially coal. This is explained by the consensus-seeking and oil and gas dominated small-state social-investment political economy in Norway, combined with a forward-looking foreign policy based on norm-setting and multilateralism.     

Highly educated but occupationally differentiated: the members of Finland’s Green League

The socio-demographic profiles and occupations of the members of the Green League and other Finnish political parties are examined using survey data collected from the members of Finland’s six major political parties (n = 12,427). Significant differentiation in occupational structure is revealed among Green party members. The importance of understanding how Green party members differ by background is emphasised while providing new approaches to studying party members’ interests and goals.     

The Czech Republic’s approach to the EU 2030 climate and energy framework

ABSTRACT

The East-West divide within the EU over climate policy has been frequently discussed. There is a tendency in the literature to focus on Poland and ignore the other countries in the central and eastern European region. Here it is argued that the institutionalised cooperation between the four countries in the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) provides a crucial component for an understanding of how the participating countries approach EU climate negotiations. Here it is suggested that the group is important as a bargaining coalition but also as a reference point for the development of shared ‘Visegrad’ norms in the field. This is based on a case study of the Czech Republic’s approach to the 2014 negotiations on the 2030 climate and energy framework and the country’s cooperation with the other Visegrad countries on the issue.     

Measuring and explaining the EU’s effect on national climate performance

ABSTRACT

To what extent has the European Union (EU) had a benign or retarding effect on what its member states would have undertaken in the absence of EU climate policies during 2008–2012? A measurement tool for the EU policy’s effect is developed and shows a benign average EU effect with considerable variation across countries. The EU’s policy effectiveness vis-à-vis its member states is explained by the EU’s non-compliance mechanism, the degree of usage of the Kyoto flexible mechanisms, and national pre-Kyoto emission reduction goals. Time-series cross-sectional analyses show that the EU’s non-compliance mechanism has no effect, while the ex-ante plans for using Kyoto flexible mechanisms and/or the ambitious pre-Kyoto emission reduction targets allow member states to escape constraints imposed by EU climate policy.     

Changing the story? The discourse of ecological modernisation in the European Union

ABSTRACT

Over the last three decades, ecological modernisation (EM) has emerged as a powerful political discourse, in which economic growth, environmental protection and energy security are mutually reinforcing. Here, the trajectory of EM in the European Union is traced, using a discourse analysis of the seven Environmental Action Programmes. The discourse articulated in these documents points towards an encroaching ‘double depoliticisation’. First, political decisions are discursively constructed as a matter of market rationality rather than a democratic process that engages with different political positions. Second, EM is reified as the only feasible solution, and alternative and contesting discourses are marginalised. Thus not only are political differences erased from the discourse, but the discourse is itself removed from political debate.     

Left to interest groups? On the prospects for enforcing environmental law in the European Union

ABSTRACT

There have been important changes in the enforcement of European Union environmental law over the last 25 years. Environmental law has traditionally been reliant on the European Commission, but the Commission has started to withdraw from enforcement. Instead, it is undertaking efforts to ‘outsource’ enforcement to environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) by systematically promoting access for such groups to national courts. While the Commission has indicated that it sees centralised and private enforcement as substitutes, the advantages and drawbacks of each mechanism are evaluated and it is concluded that both mechanisms have an important role to play. In particular, the private enforcement of EU environmental law is dependent on national opportunity structures that are unlikely to ever be fully liberalised and harmonised by EU procedural law. Private enforcement is therefore not a panacea for compliance problems, and the growing absence of a central enforcing authority is a cause for concern.     

The EU effect: does trade with the EU reduce CO2 emissions in the developing world?

The European Union (EU) is an important destination for developing country exports. Has the EU’s commitment to the Kyoto Protocol induced developing countries to reduce their carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions? Our analyses of 136 developing countries from 1981 through 2007 suggests that: developing countries’ export dependence on the EU is associated with CO₂ emission reductions post-Kyoto in relation to the pre-Kyoto time period; this also holds for SO_2, which, while not covered under Kyoto, is linked with CO₂ emission levels; this does not hold for PM₁₀, a pollutant which is not covered under Kyoto and is not directly associated with CO₂ emissions related to industrial activities; developing countries’ export dependence on non-EU developed countries and on the rest of the world is not associated with significant reductions in emissions between pre- and post-Kyoto for these pollutants . In sum, even in the absence of binding regulatory mandates, the EU appears to exert market leverage to project its regulatory preferences abroad.     

Consumption-based emissions accounting: the normative debate

ABSTRACT

The normative debate surrounding consumption-based emissions accounting, conceived of as a method for constructing national emissions inventories, is investigated. The focus is to examine whether such accounting would be more just than the current method of production-based accounting. It is argued that there is no good reason to think that consumption-based accounting would be less just, and some reason to think that it would be more just. The consequences of this for the overall question of whether to adopt consumption-based accounting are also investigated.     

Vetoing the future: political constraints and renewable energy

Despite the increased importance of and attention to renewable energy, its share in the overall energy mix has varied significantly across countries and over time. There are many determinants of clean energy transitions; this study focuses on political constraints. Here it is argued that political systems that have fewer political constraints have fewer access points through which powerful status quo veto players can slow the progress of clean energy reforms. To test the theory, a hierarchical model is applied on a dataset of 125 countries over four decades. The results provide significant support for the theory. Furthermore, the effects for political constraints hold even when we distinguish between hydro and non-hydro renewable sources and control for regime type. This study builds on research that recognizes the importance of politics in understanding the challenges and opportunities of clean energy reform.     

The limits of democracy in tackling climate change

Previous research has shown that democracies exhibit stronger commitments to mitigate climate change and, generally, emit less carbon dioxide than non-democratic regimes. However, there remains much unexplained variation in how democratic regimes perform in this regard. Here it is argued that the benefits of democracy for climate change mitigation are limited in the presence of widespread corruption that reduces the capacity of democratic governments to reach climate targets and reduce CO₂ emissions. Using a sample of 144 countries over 1970–2011, the previously established relationship between the amount of countries’ CO₂ emissions and their level of democracy is revisited. It is empirically tested whether this relationship is instead moderated by the levels of corruption. The results indicate that more democracy is only associated with lower CO₂ emissions in low-corruption contexts. If corruption is high, democracies do not seem to do better than authoritarian regimes.     

Environmental public opinion in U.S. states, 1973–2012

Partisan polarization of public opinion is a major trend in American environmental politics. While the national pattern is widely recognized, scholars know much less about the polarization of public opinion over time at the state level. This lack of knowledge is unfortunate because geographic variation in the polarization of opinion is essential for explaining the origins of partisan polarization and evaluating its consequences for policy. To fill the gap, the multilevel regression and poststratification technique is applied to provide credible estimates of state-level environmental public opinion for both Democrats and Republicans, 1973–2012. It appears that the growing partisan gap reflects increased pro-environmental opinion among Democrats across many states, whereas Republican state-level public opinion is converging toward a much lower baseline. Cross-state variation among both parties has decreased over time, contributing to greater partisan polarization in the aggregate. Changes in the sorting of voters in and out of political parties cannot explain these patterns of polarization.     

De facto governance: how authoritative assessments construct climate engineering as an object of governance

ABSTRACT

Analyses of climate engineering (CE) governance have accelerated in the last decade. A key claim is that CE remains a largely ungoverned space, with shared norms, institutional arrangements, and formal rules to regulate CE not yet present. In contrast, here it is argued that de facto governance of CE is underway, discernible in an ordering of this nascent field of inquiry by unacknowledged sources of steering. One key source of de facto governance is analyzed: high-level ‘authoritative assessments’ of CE. The focus is on how these assessments are constructing CE as an object of governance through demarcating and categorizing this emerging field of inquiry, and how this contributes to normalizing and institutionalizing CE research (and CE research communities). Scrutinizing the distinct nature and political implications of de facto governance, particularly of novel and speculative technological trajectories not yet subject to formal steering, remains a key task for governance scholars.     

Environmental,climate and social leadership of small enterprises: Fairphone’s step-by-step approach

ABSTRACT

Achieving sustainable consumption and production requires a break with current practices in many sectors, including the smartphone sector. Leaders are central actors in catalysing such change by developing, implementing and promoting innovative ideas, products and practices. Not only large but also small enterprises can aspire to assume leadership for sustainability. This contribution explores the environmental, climate and social leadership of the social enterprise Fairphone that seeks to start a movement towards a more sustainable smartphone sector. Endowed with barely any structural power, it relies on other leadership types, especially entrepreneurial leadership, which is based on dialogue, persuasion and coalition-building. Small enterprises can be leaders, but pursuing a goal such as transforming the smartphone sector takes a step-by-step approach targeting different follower groups from suppliers, competitors and consumers to end-of-life processors and policymakers. Those different follower groups are susceptible to different (combinations of) leadership types.     

Who got their way? Advocacy coalitions and the Irish climate change law

Which organisations saw their positions on two contentious issues reflected in the Irish climate law of 2015, and what role did advocacy coalitions play in the policy process? These questions are answered drawing theoretically from the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and by conducting a network analysis of survey data collected from the organisations involved in the national climate policy process. The study finds that several institutionally important or economically powerful organisations, particularly those involved in the agricultural sector, as well as the government parties saw their preferences reflected in the law. This resulted in legislation that excluded binding emission reductions targets, differentiating it from similar laws introduced in other European countries. Organisations in favour of stronger regulation formed a coalition to advocate for their positions, but they largely failed to get their way.