Loss prevention in turnaround maintenance projects by selecting contractors based on safety criteria using the analytic hierarchy process (AHP)

Turnaround maintenance (TAM) is a usual plant shutdown that is done by process industries to perform asset inspections, repairs, and overhauls. TAM engineering projects are needed on a periodic basis to optimize a plant's performance. Process industrial plants usually don't have enough in-house manpower to carry out needed TAM jobs; it is not uncommon for a process industrial plant to outsource its TAM manpower supply to external contractors. This will create a peculiar management challenge regarding how to assure orientation of safety practices for the newly hired labor. Although accidents during process plant shutdowns may have severe consequences, the safety management systems in place for many companies only cover normal operations and few explicitly address TAM projects. Usually, contractors are evaluated from a safety perspective after handling the project by monitoring safety indicators such as number of injuries, incidents, etc. This paper emphasizes safety attributes to be included in selecting contractors at the bidding stage to assure loss prevention and better safety orientation during TAM implementation. The paper starts with reviewing TAM literature and defining main needed safety attributes to prequalify contractors. It develops an analytic hierarchy process (AHP) model that is applied to rank TAM contractors' selection. A case study is presented for a petrochemical plant in Saudi Arabia to demonstrate the AHP model.     

Managing process chemicals,technology and equipment information for pilot plant based on Process Safety Management standard

Injuries, accidents or even fatalities while working in pilot plant are reported worldwide. The OSHA Laboratory Standard and Hazard Communication Standard have been used as a guideline to manage safety of laboratories and pilot plant. In spite of the implementation of these standards, incidents which result in injuries and property loss are continuously occurring. The implementation of OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) Standard in pilot plant is expected to further reduce the risks of accidents. This paper presents a new system for managing process chemicals, technology and equipment information in pilot plant and the concept is developed based on Process Safety Information (PSI) element of PSM 29 CFR 1910.119(d). It provides organized strategies to manage documentations, communicate information, and written program for maintaining, revising and updating related information. Process and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) is used as a foundation for data management. Implementation of this system at the CO₂ Hydrocarbon Absorption System pilot plant as a case study is examined and discussed.     

Ensuring emergency planning & response meet the minimum Process Safety Management (PSM) standards requirements

When incidents happen and the consequences are not mitigated effectively, one of the indicated failures consists of ineffective emergency planning and response (EPR). EPR is an important aspect of the Process Safety Management (PSM) Standards, and the guidelines are stated in CFR 1910.119 (n) which explains the minimum elements of emergency response and procedures in handling emergency or small releases. Despite its implementation in 1992, CSB finds ineffective EPR system in certain accidents such as the Missouri DPS Enterprise Chlorine Gas Release accident in 2002. DPS EPR failed in planning on location of emergency equipment and accessibility. Many other accidents have occurred throughout the decade and even though organizations have their own EPR system, there are issues in meeting minimum PSM requirements. There also exists the problem of self-regulatory policies practiced by organizations, which might not meet these requirements as well. To help organizations meet these minimum requirements, the purpose of this paper is to present a structured and easy technique to plan and implement EPR as per PSM requirements. A model has been developed based on this technique, and its application has been tested as a case study in a refinery in Malaysia and discussed throughout this report. The results reflected the feasibility of this model as it helped users to track and manage documents efficiently. This technique has the potential to help users to manage EPR better and to reduce adverse impacts to people, environment and assets.     

A rising tide raises all boats: Regional promotion of process safety through joint government/industry management

With the development of increasingly complex processes and technologies in chemical and manufacturing industries, Process Safety Management (PSM) has been globally recognized as the primary tool for operating companies to reduce process accidents on their industrial sites and the risks posed to their employees and surrounding communities. Yet, industrial facilities are often interdependent and collocated with others. Recognizing this, regional authorities are also applying PSM principles to reduce the cumulative incidents associated with high density industrial areas and the multiplicative risks posed to broader communities. This paper compares Strathcona County Emergency Service (SCES) in Alberta, Contra Costa County Health Service Hazard Material Programs (CCCHSHMP) in California, and Technical Standards & Safety Authority (TSSA) in Ontario and their PSM systems to provide practical recommendations to improve SCES's system. Four aspects of PSM are considered: regulation and guidance, auditing and inspection, annual performance indicators, and public participation. Based on the results of this comparison, we recommend that SCES develop comprehensive PSM regulations based on CSA Z767-17 PSM including clear instructions for assessing technologies and methodologies for consequence analysis. Both worst-case scenarios and alternative scenarios need to be considered as well as the domino effect of primary accidents. Furthermore, regular audits and inspections will ensure compliance with PSM regulations while helping the design of planning, performing, and following-up strategies to ensure effectiveness. In addition, we suggest the use of lagging and leading performance indicators to evaluate the performance of the PSM program. Finally, we recommend using advisory councils or commissions to increase public participation and ensure the representation of stakeholders' perspectives with the PSM system.     

The effective control of major industrial accidents by the Major Industrial Accident Prevention Centers (MAPC) through the Process Safety Management (PSM) grading system in Korea

This paper examines effectiveness of a regulatory enforcement organization (Major industrial Accident Prevention Center, MAPC), and a grading system for implementation of the Process Safety Management (PSM) regulation in Korea. A lot of chemical installations have been built in Korea since the 1960s. The frequent occurrence of major industrial accidents had made people's concerns grow. The Korean government enacted PSM regulations in 1996 in order to curb these accidents.However, a key question is how to make sure companies comply with the PSM regulations. In order to improve company’ compliance with PSM regulations the Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOEL) responsible for the regulation introduced a grading management system in 2001 and then established special supervisory centers for enforcement of PSM regulations in 2005. This paper reviews the role and effectiveness of the system in term of PSM enforcement. The author found that the grade-based approach has encouraged employers to implement the requirements of the PSM regulations. MAPCs play an effective role in enhancing enforcement performance. Although the more chemical plants have been established in Korea, the fewer major industrial accidents have occurred since the introduction of the system. The results may be useful for the policy maker to build an effective and efficient enforcement system.     

Process safety challenges for SMEs in China

While process safety regulations and standards have been in place in western countries for more than two decades, China has only recently started to officially embrace these issues with the adoption of its Process Safety Management (PSM) regulation AQ/T 3034-2010 (SAWS, 2010). However, compliance with this regulatory framework requires substantial resources and may therefore appear too complex to be efficiently implemented by small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the chemical sector. This is of particular relevance as about 99% of chemical companies in China are SMEs, accounting for more than 80% of all chemical accidents. To address this issue, additional local regulations and planning activities related to process safety have been implemented in China, including the establishment of hundreds of chemical industry parks. Some of the process safety problems faced by chemical industry parks are identified and discussed in this paper. To help solve these problems, UNEP's “Responsible Production approach for Chemical Hazards Management along the Value-Chain” is introduced in this paper and suggested as a simplified PSM approach targeted specifically at SMEs which, regardless of handling hazardous chemicals in their daily operations, may not have the knowledge or capacity to efficiently implement PSM and may not fall in the scope of the PSM regulation AQ/T 3034-2010. By introducing PSM to SMEs in a more manageable way, relevant steps can be progressively implemented by companies towards full compliance with the current regulatory framework, contributing to increased safety in chemical industry parks in China.     

Lessons learned for process safety management in China

A number of chemical accidents have occurred in China over the past two decades with significant impact on humans and the environment. It is expected that lessons will have been learned from these accidents that will help industries to reduce the risk that catastrophic chemical accidents occur in future. In fact, to some extent there is evidence that lessons have been learned, to the extent that the Chinese government has substantially strengthened legislation and regulatory standards. Nonetheless, there remains a concern that much more still needs to be done to reduce chemical accidents risks in China. Important progress in this area requires not only government support but a commitment across all hazardous industries to learn from past accidents that may in many cases require establishment or considerable improvement of their safety management systems. To assist small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), in this effort, results of an analysis of common causes of the chemical accidents reported in the Major Accident Information (MAI) website of Chinese State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) are presented in this paper In particular, inadequate process hazard analysis (PHA), training and emergency response planning (ERP) were identified as the top three process safety management (PSM) elements that contribute to most of the SMEs accidents in China. Seven recommendations are proposed in order to improve the effectiveness of lesson learning for government agencies and SMEs.     

The effectiveness of U.S. OSHA process safety management inspection – A preliminary quantitative evaluation

This study attempted to evaluate the inspection effectiveness of the U.S. OSHA process safety management (PSM) standard using statistical correlation test. A total of 6578 citations of past 1277 OSHA PSM inspections from 1992 to 2006 were quantitatively compared with the findings of the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) investigations on root and contributing causes of 19 major chemical accidents. Nonparametric Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation tests showed a moderately strong agreement between OSHA PSM inspection citations and CSB findings at p < .01 significant level, and the degree of agreement increased with time. These results suggested that past OSHA PSM inspections had cited the problems that were the accident root causes, and the effectiveness of PSM citations has been improved as more inspections were conducted since the standard promulgation. However, factors such as standard coverage, inspection frequency, inspection resources allocation, and inspection strategy, were critical for effective PSM standard enforcement and implementation. Future studies should include more aspects of PSM citations and CSB accident investigation data for better evaluation of inspection effectiveness. The results may be valuable to the PSM enforcement policy makers.     

Why bad things happen to good people

Accidents in the process industries are extensively investigated to determine root causes, for lessons learned, and many times in search of the “guilty”. Accidents are seldom simple and most accidents have human elements that led to or facilitated the accident. Many times the people involved in these accidents, when considered individually on their merit, would be considered “good” people yet “bad things” (accidents) still occur.Human errors can be classified as individual, group, and organizational. Individual human errors have been addressed in a number of studies and papers. Many of these classify human errors and treat them probabilistically or cognitively. Less has been said regarding the individual psychological/sociological response/interaction mechanisms that might contribute to an industrial accident. These elements also contribute to a lack of situational awareness which often plays a large part in human error. Group and organizational interactions/dynamics can also contribute negatively to situational awareness and to the chain of events of an accident. Organization errors, which are typically latent, can also facilitate an accident and are many times people enabled for personal and business vested interests.This paper will discuss the effect of human error at the practical plant level in contributing to accidents in the process industries from individual, group, and organizational perspective. The discussion will include psychological/sociological response/interaction mechanisms that can contribute to situational awareness and human error. It will also discuss how complexity, veracity, and quantity of available information can affect the human decision-making process leading to mistakes.Accidents are seldom simple and most accidents have a number of elements that led to or facilitated the accident. When looking at individual elements probabilistically, multiplying probabilities together, it is hard to see how an accident could have occurred. A common refrain “That’s double jeopardy and we don’t have to consider that” is essentially a qualitative probabilistic analysis. Yet we have cases of triple, quadruple, n-jeopardy occurring to cause accidents. The paper will discuss the superimposition of causes and a similar concept of functional resonance in causing accidents.     

A comparison of general aviation accidents involving airline pilots and instrument-rated private pilots

Introduction: The extremely low accident rate for U.S air carriers relative to that of general aviation (∼1 and ∼60/million flight hours respectively) partly reflects advanced airman certification, more demanding recurrency training and stringent operational regulations. However, whether such skillset/training/regulations translate into improved safety for airline pilots operating in the general aviation environment is unknown and the aim of this study. Methods: Accidents (1998–2017) involving airline pilots and instrument-rated private pilots (PPL-IFR) operating non-revenue light aircraft were identified from the NTSB accident database. An online survey informed general aviation flight exposure for both pilot cohorts. Statistics used proportion testing and Mann-Whitney U tests. Results: In degraded visibility, 0 and 40% (χ² p = 0.043) of fatal accidents involving airline and PPL-IFR airmen were due to in-flight loss-of-control, respectively. For landing accidents, airline pilots were under-represented for mishaps related to airspeed mismanagement (p = 0.036) relative to PPL-IFR but showed a dis-proportionate count (2X) of ground loss-of-directional control accidents (p = 0.009) the latter likely reflecting a preference for tail-wheel aircraft. The proportion of FAA rule violation-related mishaps by airline pilots was >2X (7 vs. 3%) that for PPL-IFR airmen. Moreover, airline pilots showed a disproportionate (χ² p = 0.021) count of flights below legal minimum altitudes. Not performing an official preflight weather briefing or intentionally operating in instrument conditions without an IFR flight plan represented 43% of airline pilot accidents involving FAA rule infractions. Conclusions: These findings inform safety deficiencies for: (a) airline pilots, landing/ground operations in tail-wheel aircraft and lack of 14CFR 91 familiarization regulations regarding minimum operating altitudes and (b) PPL-IFR airmen in-flight loss-of-control and poor landing speed management. Practical Applications: For PPL-IFR airmen, training/recurrency should focus on unusual attitude recovery and managing approach speeds. Airline pilots should seek additional instructional time regarding landing tail-wheel aircraft and become familiar with 14CFR 91 rules covering minimum altitudes.     

Association analysis of accident factors in petrochemical storage tank farms

In order to identify and clarify the association between the factors leading to accidents in a petrochemical tank area, this study analyzes investigation reports of 212 petrochemical tank farm accidents and combines this with the “association rule” mining and science related to complex networks. The main risk factors are determined and a risk factor data set is constructed; 75 association rules are extracted from the factor data set based on the Apriori algorithm. Then the obtained association rules are used to construct an accident factors network of the petrochemical storage tank area, and the topology characteristics of the network are further analyzed to reveal the importance of factors. Factors with large node degree, betweenness, and clustering coefficients are obtained, such as “violation of operating regulations”, “high concentration of flammable gas in the air”, “lack of experience and professional skills”, etc. These factors play an important role in the formation and development of accidents. The results also show that the accident cause network of the petrochemical storage tank area has a small average shortest path length and a large cluster coefficient, indicating a relatively close connection between the accident factors. The contributions of this study is not only extracting the hidden relationships among contributory factors to tank farm accidents using association analysis, but also revealing which factors are more important for the tank farm safety through the complex network.     

地铁施工事故统计分析与研究*

为了解我国城市地铁施工事故规律特征,降低新建地铁线路施工事故发生频率,统计分析2011—2020年全国31个省市自治区（不包括港澳台）地铁施工事故,归纳事故发生时间、事故类型、施工工法的分布特征,基于灰色关联分析法（GRA）对地铁施工事故致因进行分析。研究结果表明:地铁施工事故季节性特征突出,3,8,11月份呈多发态势;科学技术进步和规章制度完善是保证我国轨道交通运营里程高速增长和施工事故率降低的有效手段;事故类型以坍塌为主,且事故造成影响最大;违章作业、设备设施缺陷、地质环境不良和安全监管未贯彻落实分别为“人、物、环、管”4个维度的关键致因因子。     

基于HFACS的化工企业火灾爆炸事故人因分析*

为研究化工企业火灾爆炸事故的主要人为因素，以63起火灾爆炸事故案例为样本，构建人为因素分析与分类系统（HFACS）模型，进行火灾爆炸事故人为因素分类统计与分析，并利用卡方检验和比值比分析HFACS模型上下层级间的因果关系。结果表明:HFACS模型中上下层级人为因素间存在显著的因果关系，层级1中的“不良的组织氛围”及“组织过程漏洞”和层级2中“监督不充分”在HFACS模型中可以显著增大事故发生的可能性，且“资源管理漏洞”、“不良的组织氛围”、“组织过程漏洞”→“监督不充分”→“人员因素”→“违规”是引发事故的关键路径，并根据HFACS模型中引发事故的关键路径及其人为因素的主要表现形式，提出针对性的化工企业火灾爆炸事故预防措施。     

A summary and synthesis of procedural regulations and standards—Informing a procedures writer's guide

Well-written procedures are an integral part of any industrial organization for safe operation, managing risks, and continuous improvement. Regulatory bodies around the world require industries to have current, accurate, and appropriate procedures for most processes. Although the importance of procedures is recognized by all industries in general, significant incidents still occur due to procedural breakdowns. Some of the procedural breakdowns come from obvious problems such as the procedure not being available or the procedure being wrong. However, some incidents have occurred when correct procedures were available and the operator used those procedures. In these instances, the reason workers do not follow procedures correctly may be attributable the procedure being presented or designed in a manner that does not sufficiently communicate the information in a manner that is easily and quickly understood. This indicates that procedure writers may need more guidance on how to write and design procedures so they accomplish this. To effectively manage risk, procedures need to be technically correct (and regulatory compliant) and usable. As part of this, the current work is focused on developing a systematic approach to a procedure writer's guide that includes a regulatory compliant component. The work presented here consists of an effort to identify procedure-writing practices necessary to ensure regulatory compliance by summarizing a large sample of regulations and standards from several industries. The regulations and standards were organized to reflect common ideas and the implications in terms of human factors needs for procedure design were identified. This information will be used as part of the development of a writer's guide that accounts for human factors (HF) that includes explanations of HF implications and empirical support for each of the guidelines. The novelty of the method and information presented here is in the idea of leveraging the cumulative information available regarding procedures in regulations and standards. Incorporating this information into a procedure's writers guide in this manner may not only facilitate procedure being regulatory compliant for facilities in different geographies of the world, but could also support their being written with considerations for human performance.     

Consideration on safety for emerging technology – Case studies of seven service robots

Despite the fact that several manufacturers of service robots launched their innovations into the market, worldwide guidelines or regulations concerning the safety aspects of service robots are not yet available. However the general principles and methodologies of safety of machinery (e.g., ISO/IEC Guide 51, partly ISO14121, ISO12100) could be implemented to a certain degree. The safety of seven service robots as an emerging technology was verified by safety professionals of “NPO – the Safety Engineering Laboratory” a Non Profit Organization. NPO verified the “Critical Hazards” for each service robot mentioned by the respective manufacturers. For those cases, both the “As Low As Reasonably Practicable” principle and the “Reasonable Alternative Design” standard were applied for judging if the risk associated with the Critical Hazards were tolerable or not and if state of the art measures for reducing the risk were applied adequately. These experiences will help to establish guidelines for the safety of service robots as an emerging technology in the future.     

Improved management practice and process hazard analysis techniques for minimizing likelihood of process safety incidents in Taiwan

In Taiwan, process safety accidents often occur despite the prior implementation of process hazard analysis (PHA). One of the main reasons for this is the poor quality of the PHA process; with the main hazards not being properly identified, or properly controlled. Accordingly, based on the findings of 86 process safety management (PSM) audits, dozens of post-accident site resumption review meetings, and hundreds of PSM review sessions, this study examines the main deficiencies of management practice and PHA implementation in Taiwan, and presents several recommendations for improved PHA assessment techniques and procedures. The study additionally examines the feasibility for using PSM-related information, such as process safety information and process incident information, as a tool for further enhancing the PHA quality. Overall, the study suggests that, in addition to following the basic rules of PHA and requirements of OSHA (1992),management in Taiwan should also provide training in the enhanced assessment techniques proposed herein and take active steps to incorporate PSM information into the PHA framework in order to improve the general quality of PHA and reduce the likelihood of process safety accidents accordingly.     

Main differences on European regulations in the frame of the Seveso Directive

Since the first Seveso Directive was issued 25 years ago, each Member State of the European Union developed own regulations to enforce its application. The lack of a common approach generated differences between Member States, or even between regions within a Member State, which in practical terms caused that establishments falling under the field of application of the Seveso Directive face a different level of requirements. This situation causes significantly different impact on social, technical and financial aspects.Factors like industrial background, accidental history, actual land use, social attitude towards risk, economical and political structures play an important role in how the decisions about hazardous activities are perceived and handled.Answering the question: “Is there a right methodology for the assessment of the risk of major accidents?” may be sterile or impossible. Many tools are appropriate and the main concern is to use them properly. Technically, the causes and consequences of, e.g., a fire in a port in Spain on the Mediterranean Sea or in the port of Basel (Switzerland) in the Rhine River could be assessed using the same methods and criteria, but this is not usually the case.This paper shows, with practical examples, the differences existing while applying different regulations in the field of prevention of major accidents and the potential effects that these differences may generate regarding the definition and management of emergency plans outside establishments.If the existing unequal situation is not faced, the comparative disagreements between Member States will prevail. Therefore, the application of the Seveso Directive will generate a different impact on the society, operators and regulators, and may become a factor which may cause a risk transfer between Member States. Efforts should be addressed to harmonize criteria in this subject.