Green clubs

This paper treats programs in which firms voluntarily agree to meet environmental standards as “green clubs”: clubs, because they provide non-rival but excludable reputation benefits to participating firms; green, because they also generate environmental public goods. The model illuminates a central tension between the congestion externality familiar from conventional club theory and the free-riding externality familiar from the theory on private provision of public goods. We compare three common program sponsors—governments, industry, and environmental groups. We find that if monitoring of the club standard is perfect, a government constrained from regulating club size may prefer to leave sponsorship to industry if public-good benefits are sufficiently low, or to environmentalists if public-good benefits are sufficiently high. If monitoring is imperfect, an important question is whether consumers can infer that a club is too large for its standard to be credible. If they can then the government may deliberately choose an imperfect monitoring mechanism as a way of regulating club size indirectly. If they cannot then this reinforces the government's preference for delegating sponsorship.     

A new meta-analysis on the WTP/WTA disparity

This study reports a new meta-analysis of papers that elicit willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept compensation (WTA) measures of value for the same good. We investigate the effects of type of good and several survey-design features on the WTP/WTA disparity, measured as the logarithm of the ratio of mean WTA to mean WTP. Confirming Horowitz and McConnell?s (2002) pioneering meta-analysis, we find the disparity is smaller for ordinary private goods than for public and non-market goods, that it is not solely an artifact of using hypothetical transactions or other weak experimental or survey methods, and that it is smaller for studies using student subjects. In addition, we find that the disparity is smaller when subjects have experience valuing the good in real markets or through repeated experimental trials. In contrast to Horowitz and McConnell, we find the disparity is significantly smaller in studies using incentive-compatible elicitation mechanisms. The disparity is smaller in more recent studies, an effect that is attributable only in part to changes in study characteristics.     

宝天高速公路沿线生态环境保护居民支付意愿评价

平均支付意愿是条件估值法（CVM）推导环境物品总经济价值的一种表征尺度。以宝天高速公路修建过程中保护生态环境为例,采用支付卡式CVM研究方法,对沿线居民支付意愿进行了详细分析。结果表明：平均支付意愿在收入、教育程度、年龄、性别和职业稳定变量上均存在不同程度的组群差异。t检验显示收入、教育两个变量平均支付意愿组间差异显著;而协方差分析表明收入水平是影响平均支付意愿在年龄、性别、职业稳定变量组间差异不突出的主要原因,也是导致支付意愿存在组群差异的最主要因素。最后利用回归模型计算得到,宝天高速公路（牛背至天水段）沿线生态环境保护的居民平均支付意愿为42.77元。     

Fiscal spending and the environment: Theory and empirics

During economic crises, governments often increase fiscal spending to stimulate the economy. While the fiscal spending surge may be temporary, spending composition is often altered in favor of expenditures on social programs and other public goods which may persist over time. We model and measure the impact of fiscal spending patterns on the environment. The model predicts that a reallocation of government spending composition towards social and public goods reduces pollution. However, increasing total government spending without altering its composition does not reduce pollution. We empirically test these predictions for air and water pollutants showing that they are fully supported.     

Positive framing does not solve the tragedy of the commons

We investigate whether positive framing increases cooperation in three social dilemmas with slightly different properties: a linear public goods (PG) game, a non-linear PG game, and a common pool resource (CPR) game. Results from our laboratory experiments show that contributions to a linear PG are higher if the externality is framed positively, rather than negatively, corroborating earlier findings by Andreoni (1995). By contrast, we find no such framing effects in the non-linear PG game or the CPR game. In these games, the best response in the material payoffs is to contribute less if others contribute more, counteracting effects of pro-social preferences. Positive framing therefore does not help to solve the tragedy of the commons.     

环境物品的经济价值评估方法:条件价值法

系统地介绍了西方国家常用的１种评价环境物品（公共物品）的方法——条件价值法。在大量文献和作者已有研究的基础上,解释了环境物品的特征和价值含义,综述了条件价值法的概念、特点和总体框架内容,分析了该方法中出现的偏差类型,总结了该方法在国际国内的已有应用,提出其应用潜力和应用前景     

Personality and economic choices

There is substantial variation in individual preferences for public goods, yet much of that variation remains poorly understood. However, simple measures of personality can help to explain economic values and choices in a systematic way. In this paper, we examine the effects of personality on individual economic choices over public environmental goods. Based on three datasets from three separate stated preference studies, we use a hybrid choice econometric framework to examine the effects of personality on preferences for the status quo, changes in environmental quality, and costs of investing in environmental improvements. We find effects that are consistent across all datasets. Personality, a stable feature of an individual's character that is simple to measure, enriches explanations of why the demand for environmental goods varies across people, provides an indication of how different people are likely to react to the introduction of environmental policies, and explains substantial differences in Willingness to Pay.     

Learning abatement costs: On the dynamics of the optimal regulation of experience goods

We study the introduction of new technologies when their costs are subject to idiosyncratic uncertainty and can only be fully learned through individual experience. We set up a dynamic model of clean experience goods that replace old polluting consumption options and show how optimal regulation evolves over time. In our base setting where social and private learning incentives coincide, the optimal tax on the polluting consumption is increasing over time. We show, however, that if social and private learning incentives diverge because the private discount rate exceeds the social discount rate, it may be optimal to temporarily increase the tax rate beyond net marginal external damages to induce more learning before reducing the tax rate to the steady state level. Alternatively, one could complement the tax with subsidies for first-time users which can be phased out over time. Similar results apply if consumers have biased expectations. We therefore give a rationale for introductory subsidies on new, clean technologies and non-monotonic tax paths from a perspective of consumer learning.     

Strategic investment in reputation

Although collective efforts are common in both animal and human societies, many human and probably animal social dilemmas have no obvious cooperative solution, which is a challenge for evolutionary biologists. In public goods games, i.e. the experimental paradigm for studying the sustainability of a public resource with human subjects, initial cooperation usually declines quickly. Recently, it has been shown that the interaction with another social game in which good reputation attracts help, can maintain a high level of cooperation in the public goods game. Here we show experimentally that humans use different strategies in the public goods game conditional on whether the player knows that his decisions will be either known or unknown in another social game. The knowledge of being recognized as the same individual in both scenarios motivates players to invest in their reputation and thus sustain the public resource. However, cooperation declines immediately when individual identities switch from being recognizable to being unrecognizable between the two interacting games.Communicated by M. Borgerhoff-Mulder     

Green clubs

This paper treats programs in which firms voluntarily agree to meet environmental standards as “green clubs”: clubs, because they provide non-rival but excludable reputation benefits to participating firms; green, because they also generate environmental public goods. The model illuminates a central tension between the congestion externality familiar from conventional club theory and the free-riding externality familiar from the theory on private provision of public goods. We compare three common program sponsors—governments, industry, and environmental groups. We find that if monitoring of the club standard is perfect, a government constrained from regulating club size may prefer to leave sponsorship to industry if public-good benefits are sufficiently low, or to environmentalists if public-good benefits are sufficiently high. If monitoring is imperfect, an important question is whether consumers can infer that a club is too large for its standard to be credible. If they can then the government may deliberately choose an imperfect monitoring mechanism as a way of regulating club size indirectly. If they cannot then this reinforces the government's preference for delegating sponsorship.     

Social networks and non-market valuations

This paper considers the role of social networks in the non-market valuation of public goods. In the model individuals derive utility both from their own direct enjoyment of the public good and from the enjoyment of those in their network. We find that network structure almost always matters, both for utility and for valuation. The network increases aggregate valuation when it assigns higher importance, that is, stronger connections, to individuals with higher private values for the public good. The model provides a theoretical foundation for the idea of opinion leaders who have disproportionate influence over their communities. Specifically, opinion leaders are individuals assigned high importance by the network, and projects favored by opinion leaders tend to be favored by the network as a whole. The model can also guide future empirical studies by enabling a more structural approach to non-market valuation in a socially connected group.     

A Review of WTA/WTP Studies

Willingness to accept (WTA) is usually substantially higher than willingness to pay (WTP). These constructs have been studied for roughly 30 years and with a wide variety of goods. This paper reviews those studies. We find that the less the good is like an “ordinary market good,” the higher is the ratio. The ratio is highest for non-market goods, next highest for ordinary private goods, and lowest for experiments involving forms of money. A generalization of this pattern holds even when we account for differences in survey design: ordinary goods have lower ratios than non-ordinary ones. We also find that ratios in real experiments are not significantly different from hypothetical experiments and that incentive-compatible elicitation yields higher ratios.     

Environmental values and willingness to pay for a protected area: a segmentation of Italian university students

The study investigated students’ attitudes and willingness to pay (WTP) for the protection of some environmental values. The empirical study refers to a site located in Southern Italy and inserted into the Natura 2000 European Network. Students were segmented according to their appreciation of environmental values and the WTP for them. We considered two scenarios of the study site – of use and non-use – and four values – recreational, educational, bequest and existence. Five clusters, from the ‘unconcerned’ to the ‘committed’ one, reveal a diversity of profiles across the sample. Segmentation results point out the multifunctionality of the environmental heritage and highlight the heterogeneity of students’ environmental profiles.     

The Relationship between the Income Elasticities of Demand and Willingness to Pay

The relationship between income and willingness to pay for collectively provided public/environmental goods is investigated. We show that while the income elasticity of willingness to pay and the ordinary income elasticity of demand are related, knowledge of one is insufficient to determine the magnitude or even the sign of the other. The income elasticity of willingness to pay is influenced by additional factors which are generally unobservable. Examples are provided to illustrate the degree to which the two income elasticities may diverge. Our results indicate that even when goods are demand luxuries they may or may not have income elasticities of willingness to pay which are greater than one.     

Microcredit and willingness to pay for environmental quality: Evidence from a randomized-controlled trial of finance for sanitation in rural Cambodia

Low willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental quality in developing countries is a key research question in environmental economics. One explanation is that missing credit markets may suppress WTP for environmental improvements that require large up-front investments. We test the impact of microloans on WTP for hygienic latrines via a randomized controlled trial in 30 villages in rural Cambodia. We find that microcredit dramatically raises WTP for improved latrines, with 60% of households in the Financing arm willing to purchase at an unsubsidized price, relative to 25% in the Non-financing arm. Effects on latrine installation are positive but muted by several factors, including a negative peer effect: randomly induced purchases by neighbors reduce a household's probability of installing its own latrine. On methodological grounds, this paper shows that a “decision-focused evaluation” can be integrated into academic analysis to provide insight into questions of general interest.     

Valuing nature in a general equilibrium

We explore the consequences of modeling the demand for environmental quality improvements as a fully integrated part of a general equilibrium demand system in an applied general equilibrium (or CGE) analysis. Demand for non-market goods depends on a full range of relative prices as well as environmental outcomes. We simulate the effects of reducing two air pollutants to improve human health and three ecosystem services provided to households. The ecosystem services make non-separable contributions to household utility. We find that willingness to pay measures of use-based ecosystem services are impacted by changes in demand for complementary market goods. Demand for these goods shifts due to pollution reductions that enhance ecosystem services. Partial equilibrium estimates of these use values can be measured with substantial error if they fail to account for the general equilibrium adjustments caused by pollution. Over 300 calibrations of the model identify the model features important to these errors. We find that effects on ecosystem services associated with non-use values have important implications for the feedback effects on use related measures of economic tradeoffs. This is due to how our model integrates market and non-market effects, reflecting the non-market services importance to general equilibrium market outcomes.     

An integrated model of regional and local residential sorting with application to air quality

We examine the interconnectedness of demand for regionally and locally varying public goods using a residential sorting model. We propose a version of the model that describes household choices at the city (MSA) level and, conditional on city, the neighborhood (census tract) level. We use a two-stage budgeting argument to develop an empirically feasible sorting model that allows us to estimate preferences for regionally varying air quality while accounting for sorting at the local level. Our conceptual and empirical approach nests previous sorting models as special cases, allowing us to assess the importance of accounting for multiple spatial scales in our predictions for the cost of air pollution. Furthermore our preferred specification connects the city and neighborhood sorting margins to the upper and lower elements of a nested logit model, thereby establishing a useful correspondence between two stage budgeting and nested logit estimation. Empirically we find that estimates from a conventional model of sorting across MSAs imply a smaller marginal willingness to pay for air quality than estimates from our proposed model. We discuss how the difference is attributable in part to the omitted variable problems arising when tract level sorting is ignored.     

Improving multi-site benefit functions via Bayesian model averaging: A new approach to benefit transfer

A benefit function transfer obtains estimates of willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the evaluation of a given policy at a site by combining existing information from different study sites. This has the advantage that more efficient estimates are obtained, but it relies on the assumption that the heterogeneity between sites is appropriately captured in the benefit transfer model. A more expensive alternative to estimate WTP is to analyze only data from the policy site in question while ignoring information from other sites. We make use of the fact that these two choices can be viewed as a model selection problem and extend the set of models to allow for the hypothesis that the benefit function is only applicable to a subset of sites. We show how Bayesian model averaging (BMA) techniques can be used to optimally combine information from all models.The Bayesian algorithm searches for the set of sites that can form the basis for estimating a benefit function and reveals whether such information can be transferred to new sites for which only a small data set is available. We illustrate the method with a sample of 42 forests from U.K. and Ireland. We find that BMA benefit function transfer produces reliable estimates and can increase about 8 times the information content of a small sample when the forest is ‘poolable’.     

There will be blood: Crime rates in shale-rich U.S. counties

Over the past decade the production of tight oil and shale gas significantly increased in the United States. This paper examines how this energy boom has affected regional crime rates throughout the country. We find positive effects on rates of various property and violent crimes in shale-rich counties. In 2013, the cost of the additional crimes in the average treatment county was roughly $2 million. These results are not easily explained by shifts in observed demographics like gender and age. There is however evidence that people with criminal records (registered sex offenders) moved disproportionally to shale-boom towns in North Dakota. We also document a rise in income inequality (a postulated determinant of criminal activity) that coincides with the timing of the energy boom. Policy makers in boom towns should anticipate these crime effects and invest in public infrastructure accordingly.     

Testing the Internal Consistency of Contingent Valuation Surveys

For an internal consistency check, one can examine WTP responses to different surveys. Holding an environmental problem constant, concave preferences imply WTPconcavein the success of a remedy. The same preferences imply WTPconvexin the magnitude of an environmental problem, assuming a successful remedy. Having opposite signed curvature of these two WTP patterns is general, not requiring concave preferences. For an adding-up test, an environmental commodity can be divided. Then, WTP for one part plus WTP for the second part, conditional on already having the first part, equals WTP for the whole, adjusted by an income effect.