Stable taxation schemes in regional environmental management

Economists have frequently proposed the use of taxes to internalize externalities, the unit tax on a particular activity being equal to the marginal social damage it generates. This paper introduces such a taxation scheme, comprising a set of rules which, given a set of polluters, their profits, and costs, and a central authority for environmental control, generates a set of taxes to be levied on the waste emissions. Different attributes of the taxation schemes are then presented, the most important of which (stability) refers to the possibility of overall cooperation between all the polluters. The paper concludes by examining the implications of the existence of stable taxation schemes and of the imposition of constraints either on the emissions or on the percentage of load removed.     

Efficiency of pollution taxation and market structure

This paper looks at the performance of a uniform pollution tax in achieving a given level of pollution abatement at least cost. It is shown that market structure is an important consideration in this performance and that in general least-cost abatement will not result from a pollution tax uniformly applied. The pattern of pollution taxes that will achieve least-cost abatement when differing degrees of market power exist among polluters is developed and discussed.     

The economics of enforcing pollution taxation

The efficient structure of pollution tax policy is examined when it is recognized that enforcing compliance will be costly. There are two components of this cost: (1) the direct cost of enforcement and (2) the cost polluters incur avoiding enforcement. Considering only the first cost, the efficient pollution policy calls for a tax in excess of that conventionally recommended as efficient, T¹ but with little enforcement. Once avoidance cost is recognized the efficient policy can be substantially altered; requiring a tax lower than T¹, but with greater enforcement. Even when direct enforcement cost is zero, it is shown that there is no unique advantage to T¹ in the absence of avoidance cost.     

Pollution control in a simplified general-equilibrium model with production externalities

Pollution externalities of the producer-producer type are considered in a positive two-sector model with stationary capital and labor. By assumption, output from the polluting sector can be diverted to pollution abatement. Environmental authorities attempt to control the level of pollution to some minimum “acceptable” standard by requiring polluters to depollute through the mechanism of a uniform tax on production. Following discussion of short-run considerations, the stability of the tax-adjustment scheme is examined and the dynamic nature of growth paths in the economy is explored.     

The Importance of Site-Specific Information in the Design of Policies to Control Pollution

The presence and concentration of pollutants in groundwater are influenced by geophysical processes and the behavior of economic agents. The purpose of this paper is to assess the importance of spatial variability in physical parameters in the design of efficient pollution regulations. Alternative tax policies are evaluated in terms of effects on farm profit utilizing a spatially distributed, dynamic simulation model which links economic behavior with the geophysical processes that determine groundwater quality. The empirical focus is the control of groundwater nitrates arising from irrigated agriculture in Malheur County, Oregon. Results indicate that a detailed accounting of spatial variance in physical parameters had little effect on selection of a cost-minimizing tax policy to control groundwater nitrate concentration. This result implies that relatively simple tax schemes and models to evaluate these tax schemes may be adequate in some settings.     

环境空气质量评价的普适指数公式及其应用

在适当设定空气污染物的“基准”值和用相对于“基准”值的空气污染物的：“相对”值情况下，采用S型曲线表示空气污染物对环境空气质量的危害程序，并应用遗传算法优化公式中的参数，得出了一个对多种空气污染物通用的环境空气质量评价的普数指数公式，借助于折衷激励功效函数将单项污染物分指数加权为综合指数，该公式形式简单，容易计算，评价结果精度较高，且具有可比性。     

Optimal pollution in the presence of adjustment costs

This paper explores optimal pollution control when pollution is considered a stock and costs of treating pollution are a function both of the level and rate of change of pollution control. It is shown that even if the long run optimum stock of pollution is below the initial level adjustment costs may imply an optimally increasing stock of pollution in the short run. The results obtained are contrasted with those which emerge when adjustment costs are absent and when damages are taken to be a function of the flow of pollution; the appropriate tax rates of polluting discharges are examined.     

Prices vs quantities with multiple pollutants

We examine the choice of policy instruments (price, quantity or a mix of the two) when two pollutants are regulated and firms' abatement costs are private information. Whether abatement efforts are complements or substitutes is key determining the choice of policies. When pollutants are complements, a mixed policy instrument with a tax on one pollutant and a quota on another is sometimes preferable even if the pollutants are identical in terms of benefits and costs of abatement. Yet, if they are substitutes, the mixed policy is dominated by taxes or quotas.     

Commercial fisheries under price uncertainty

The deterministic models applied in economics of fisheries are extended to comprise price uncertainty and risk aversion among the fishing units. It is proved that in the open-access fishery both the total fishing effort and the number of fishing units are reduced as the variance of the price increases; that the total fishing effort may be smaller in the open-access fishery than in the optimal fishery at a high variance; that only a fixed producer price system can create a first-best optimum, and that a tax on revenue is more efficient than both fishing unit quotas or tax on catch.     

The efficiency value of effluent tax revenues

The concept of the efficiency value of effluent tax revenues is developed. It is defined as the reduction in excess burden resulting from the substitution of these revenues for current or future resource distorting tax revenues, such as those raised from federal corporate and personal income taxes. The annual efficiency value of revenues raised by national effluent taxes on two major air pollutants is estimated to range from $0.63 to $3.05 billion, if substituted for federal personal income tax revenue, and from $1 to $4.87 billion, if substituted for corporate income tax revenue, expressed in 1982 dollars. Thus previous estimates of the efficiency gain from substitution of an effluent tax scheme for current pollution regulation policy have been too low, because the efficiency value of the tax revenues has been excluded.     

Markets and environmental management with a storable pollutant

Lee [J. Environ. Econ. Manag., in press] investigates possibilities where pollutants may be stored for a period of time and later released into the environment when adverse effects are minimal. The treatment and storage of pollutants before their release into the environment is a crucial part of many abatement programs. Surprisingly, emission charges will not induce optimal abatement when storage is possible. This occurs because the firms' response to the dynamic tax is indeterminant. We suggest alternative controls, whereby rights to emit pollutants are sold competitively and demonstrate that markets provide incentives for the optimal generation-storage-emission of pollution by firms. In deriving this result an important difference between markets and taxes is revealed. With markets there is still indeterminacy at the firm level, but the aggregate response of all firms is dictated by market forces that insure pollution is reduced by some desired amount.     

Pigou meets Mirrlees: On the irrelevance of tax distortions for the second-best Pigouvian tax

This paper extends the Mirrlees (1971) model of optimal income redistribution with optimal corrective taxes to internalize consumption externalities. Using general utility structures and exploring both linear and non-linear taxes, it is demonstrated that the optimal second-best tax on an externality-generating good should not be corrected for the marginal cost of public funds, since it equals one in the optimal tax system. In the optimum, distortions of income taxes are equal to marginal redistributional gains. If the government does not have access to a non-distortionary marginal source of finance, the marginal cost of public funds can be either larger or smaller than one depending on subjective preferences for income redistribution. The optimal second-best corrective tax is then either higher or lower than the Pigouvian level. The findings in this paper generalize and amend prior results based on representative-agent models, shedding new light on the weak double-dividend hypothesis, and on the welfare gains of recycling revenue from environmental taxes.     

Impacts of inter-sectoral trade on carbon emissions—a case of China in 2007

With the increase in international trade, more attention has been given to quantifying the impacts of international trade on energy use and carbon emissions. Input-output analysis is a suitable tool for assessing resources or pollutants embodied in trade and it has become a critical tool for performing such analysis. This study estimated the national and sectoral carbon emissions embodied in Chinese international trade using the latest available China input-output table of 2007. The results showed that a significant exporting behavior of embodied carbon emissions existed in China??s trade. Over 1/3 of the emissions in Chinese domestic production processes were generated for exports in 2007. The net balance of emissions embodied in exports and imports accounted for nearly 30% of China??s domestic emissions, which means that any policy made to increase the exports would result in a significant growth of China??s domestic emissions. Since over half of China??s export trade is processing trade, the re-exported emissions could not be overlooked; otherwise, it would hard to capture the actual emissions generated abroad to obtain China??s domestic consumption. The enlargement of export scale is a primary driven factor to the rapid growth of China??s exported emissions. It is necessary for China to adjust its economic and industrial structure to reduce the dependence of economic growth on the export trade. However, when adjusting industry structures or making policies on carbon emission reduction, it will be more reasonable to consider the relationship between production and consumption, rather than just focus on the emission values of sectors?? direct production, as a large part of carbon emissions emitted by the principal direct polluters were generated to obtain the products which were required by other sectors.     

Time,affluence and pollution in the theory of consumer's behavior

This paper extends Becker's analysis on the allocation of time to provide a theoretical basis for the phrase “affluence breeds effluence.” Many environmentalists fear that a pollutant tax is merely a license to pollute. Their fears are well-founded if we consider the effect of increased affluence of the society on the pollutant stock. Assuming that relatively pollutant intensive “commodities” are also relatively less time intensive, an assumption applicable to most of the affluent societies, it is shown that the pollutant tax policy will be ineffective if the effect of increased wage rate on pollutant stock is ignored in spite of the efficiency of such a tax as a policy tool.     

The use of effluent fees to regulate public sector sources of pollution An application of the niskanen model

The economics literature on environmental policy makes a compelling case for the use of effluent fees to control polluting activities. This analysis, however, proceeds from the assumption of profit maximizing behavior by polluters. Since (non-profit-maximizing) public agencies are a major source of environmental damage, this paper investigates the likely response of bureaucrats to effluent fees in terms of some extended versions of the Niskanen model of bureaucratic behavior. We find that, at least for a range of plausible cases, such fees can induce significant reduction in polluting activities. The results are sufficiently encouraging to make the extension of fees to public agencies worthy of serious consideration.     

Environmental-economic models for total emission control of regional environmental pollution — input-output approach

This paper deals with a Leontief-type dynamic input-output analysis for total emission control of pollution. A dynamic input-output model can be described as a linear programming problem. In this paper an objective function to be minimized is chosen as the sum of pollutants emitted in a regional area throughout the planning period. It is assumed that consumption grows with a constant growth rate throughout the planning period. With this model, we can tell how to assign the elimination rate of pollutants to each production sector, under the constraint that the total emission standard is satisfied in each term of the planning period.     

炭黑尾气中可燃气态污染物的净化及回收利用

本文研究炭黑工业尾气中可燃气态污染物ＣＯ、Ｈ＿２及ＣＨ＿４等的净化及其余热的回收利用。其中主要研究炭黑尾气的主要来源、组成、发生量及特性，以及炭黑尾气的净化及回收利用。研究表明，直接燃烧法是我国目前炭黑尾气净化和回收利用的最佳方法。应用直接燃烧法，不仅可将炭黑尾气中可燃气态污染物销毁，使之变为无害的物质ＣＯ＿２和Ｈ＿２０，并可回收利用可燃气态污染物燃烧时放出的热量，可供炭黑工业余热利用率提高２０％。     

Ancillary benefits of reduced air pollution in the US from moderate greenhouse gas mitigation policies in the electricity sector

Actions to slow atmospheric accumulation of greenhouse gases also would reduce conventional air pollutants yielding “ancillary” benefits that tend to accrue locally and in the near-term. Using a detailed electricity model linked to an integrated assessment framework to value changes in human health, we find a tax of $25 per metric ton of carbon emissions would yield NO_x-related health benefits of about $8 per metric ton of carbon reduced in the year 2010 (1997 dollars). Additional savings of $4–$7 accrue from reduced investment in NO_x and SO₂ abatement in order to comply with emission caps. Total ancillary benefits of a $25 carbon tax are $12–$14, which appear to justify the costs of a $25 tax, although marginal benefits are less than marginal costs. At a tax of $75, greater total benefits are achieved but the value per ton of carbon reductions remains roughly constant at about $12.     

Tax versus emissions trading scheme in the long run

In this paper we compare the performance of emission taxes and tradable permits under free market entry when firms face idiosyncratic ex ante cost uncertainty. We show that under auctioned permits insufficient entry occurs, while under a linear emission tax scheme, depending on parameters, market entry can be either excessive or insufficient. Our long-run analysis thus contrasts with Spulber׳s (1985) equivalence result and also modifies Weitzman׳s result in favor of an ETS in that the superiority of a tax over an ETS is not guaranteed, even when the Weitzman condition favors a tax. We also show that an ETS is superior to a tax scheme when the entry cost is low and the magnitude of uncertainty/asymmetric information and the size of the output market are large.     

大气污染指示植物的研究

自50年代以来.为寻找一种经济、实用和灵敏的方法来监测环境变化,开展了大量大气污染指示植物的研究.这些工作包括用植物叶片典型症状、树皮、草本植物、附生植物指示气体污染(O_3、PANs、NO_x、SO_2、HF、乙烯等)、粉尘以及重金属污染.进入80年代以后,有关研究集中到利用植物富集的污染物含量结合计算机等先进技术指示和监测大气环境变化及进行大气质量评价.本文对国内外开展的大气污染指示植物研究的历史及其主要方法作了简要介绍,并就利用植物指示和监测大气污染的若干问题进行了探讨.