Human Dignity and the Dignity of Creatures

In their report for the Swiss government onthe notion of the dignity of creatures, PhilippBalzer, Klaus-Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber analyzethe relationship between human dignity and the dignityof creatures, taking them as two categoricallydifferent concepts. Human dignity is defined as the``moral right not to be humiliated,' whereas thedignity of creatures is taken to be ``the inherentvalue of nonhuman living beings.' To my mind there isno need to draw a categorical distinction between thetwo concepts. Both notions could be brought togetherunder an all-encompassing concept of the inherentvalue of living beings, humans and non-humans alike,a concept one could name ``the dignity of livingbeings.' Indeed, this very notion underlies theposition taken in the report, although this is notmade explicit by the authors themselves.As the aim of the paper is only to clarify theconcepts used, I do not go beyond this ``internal'critique of their position, i.e., I don't assess howthe claims articulated via these concepts – theclaim that humans and/or creatures have an inherentvalue consisting in a supposed intrinsic good – areto be justified, although I myself would be ratherskeptical that this might be successfully done.     

Genetic engineering and the dignity of creatures

The Swiss expert report suggests that the inherent dignity of a living being be identified with its inherent value. But the phrase “inherent value of a living being” seems to connote two concepts of inherent value. One has a morally obligating character but is counterintuitive because of its egalitarianism. The other is one of non-moral value. It is more compatible with considered intuitions but insufficient for substantiating the expert report’s claim that human beings have moral duties towards animals and plants. The paper discusses these concepts. Consideration is then given to the problem of how discursive support can be generated for the expert report’s claim that human beings have the moral duty to abstain from impairing those functions and abilities of a non-human being that members of its species as a rule can practice.     

Two concepts of dignity for humans and non-human organisms in the context of genetic engineering

The 1992 incorporation of an article by referendum in the Swiss Constitution mandating that the federal government issue regulations on the use of genetic material that take into account the dignity of nonhuman organism raises philosophical questions about how we should understand what is meant by “the dignity of nonhuman animals,” and about what sort of moral demands arise from recognizing this dignity with respect to their genetic engineering. The first step in determining what is meant is to clarify the difference between dignity when applied to humans and when applied to nonhumans. Several conceptions of human dignity should be rejected in favor of a fourth conception: the right not to be degraded. This right implies that those who have it have the cognitive capacities that are prerequisite for self-respect. In the case of nonhuman organisms that lack this capacity, respecting their dignity requires the recognition that their inherent value, which is tied to their abilities to pursue their own good, be respected. This value is not absolute, as it is in the case of humans, so it does not prohibit breeding manipulations that make organisms more useful to humans. But it does restrict morally how sentient animals can be used. In regard to genetic engineering, this conception requires that animals be allowed the uninhibited development of species specific functions, a position shared by Holland and Attfield, as opposed to the Original Purpose conception proposed by Fox and the Integrity of the Genetic Make-up position proposed by Rolston. The inherent value conception of dignity, as here defended, is what is meant in the Swiss Constitution article. This paper is a slightly revised version of a paper that had been published in German in 1998 (“Menschenwürde vs. Würde der Kreatur,” Freiburg i.Br.).     

The good life of creatures with dignity some comments on the swiss expert opinion

The notion of Dignity of Creatures has been voted into the Swiss Federal Constitution by a plebiscite. Philipp Balzer, Klaus-Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber have given an expert opinion for the Swiss government to clarify the notion of Dignity of Creatures. According to them, by voting this notion into the Swiss constitution, the Swiss have chosen for a limited biocentric approach towards biotechnology. In such an approach genetic engineering of non-human beings is only allowed insofar that their own good is not impaired. It is, however, not clear when the good of a non-human being is impaired. I defend the position that — even if we confine ourselves to animals — their good goes beyond their well being.     

Norton and Passmore on Valuing Nature

Norton argues on pragmatic “Deweyan” grounds that we should cease to ask scientists for value neutral definitions of “sustainability,” developed independently of moral and social values, to guide our environmental policy making debates. “Sustainability,” like human “health,” is a normative concept from the start—one that cannot be meaningfully developed by scientists or economists without input by all the stake holders affected. While I endorse Norton’s approach, I question his apparent presumption that concern for sustainability for the future is at odds with and ought to trump concern for enhancement in the present of public opportunities to access the goods nature represents. I argue that the two are not separable in practice. I argue for Passmore’s position that unless we take care to enhance equitable access to the good and services nature represents in the present, we cannot succeed in promoting sustainability for future generations.     

The Moral Considerability of Invasive Transgenic Animals

The term moral considerability refers to the question of whether a being or set of beings is worthy of moral consideration. Moral considerability is most readily afforded to those beings that demonstrate the clearest relationship to rational humans, though many have also argued for and against the moral considerability of species, ecosystems, and “lesser” animals. Among these arguments there are at least two positions: “environmentalist” positions that tend to emphasize the systemic relations between species, and “liberationist” positions that tend to emphasize the attributes or welfare of a particular individual organism. Already, this classic conflict provides for some challenging theoretical clashes between environmentalists and animal liberationists. The question of moral considerability is complicated, however, by recent developments in genetic engineering. Some animals, like pigs and fish, have been genetically modified by humans to grow organs that can then be transplanted into humans. If environmental arguments for the moral consideration of species are correct, then we are released from our obligations to morally consider those animals that we have genetically modified, since they are by their nature always an “invader species.” If, instead, the welfare of the animal is of penultimate importance, then there is a case for strengthening the moral considerability of GM animals over “naturally-occurring” animals, since they bear a closer relationship to humans. This would appear to be an intractable problem, a “bad marriage,” as Mark Sagoff once proposed. This paper argues that the case of invasive transgenic animals exposes weaknesses in this classic conflict, and particularly, in the framing of this conflict. To remedy this framing problem, this paper argues for a reconceptualization of the term “moral considerability,” instead urging a strong distinction between moral considerability, moral relevance, and moral significance.     

Conflicting Frames about Ownership and Land Use Drive Wildfire Ignitions in a Protected Conservation Area

The creation of protected conservation areas may result in protracted conflicts between stakeholders. In this study we examine the drivers of anthropogenic wildfire ignitions in the National Park of “los Alerces” (NPA) in Patagonia, Argentina. The NPA was established in 1937 to protect the native “andino-patagónico” forests from wildfires as well as preserving its scenic beauty and native flora and fauna. At the time of its creation state authorities prohibited all extractive human activities in the “intangible”—fully protected—“National Park” section, while other regulated extractive and ecotourism activities were allowed to continue in the “Natural Reserve” section in an effort to accommodate the historical entitlements of the displaced populations of “pobladores” (settlers) that had been living in the NPA for over a century. Here we interviewed the main stakeholder groups—“pobladores”, forest rangers and administrators, ecolodge owners and angler club members—to identify the drivers of wildfire ignitions in the park. Wildfires have been singled out by state authorities as the main threat to the NPA though considerable scientific uncertainty exists regarding their complex ecological effects. This study argues, based on the human and biophysical system data collected, that two conflicting cultural frames exist within the NPA that provide the necessary backdrop for understanding the drivers of wildfire ignitions. In turn, these findings raise puzzling dilemmas for the main theoretical approaches that have been used to inform and design conflict management strategies in protected conservation areas.     

Two Concepts of Dignity for Humans and Non-Human Organisms in the Context of Genetic Engineering

The 1992 incorporation of an article by referendum in the SwissConstitution mandating that the federal government issue regulations onthe use of genetic material that take into account the dignity ofnonhuman organism raises philosophical questions about how we shouldunderstand what is meant by ``the dignity of nonhuman animals,' andabout what sort of moral demands arise from recognizing this dignitywith respect to their genetic engineering. The first step in determiningwhat is meant is to clarify the difference between dignity when appliedto humans and when applied to nonhumans. Several conceptions of humandignity should be rejected in favor of a fourth conception: the rightnot to be degraded. This right implies that those who have it have thecognitive capacities that are prerequisite for self-respect. In the caseof nonhuman organisms that lack this capacity, respecting their dignityrequires the recognition that their inherent value, which is tied totheir abilities to pursue their own good, be respected. This value isnot absolute, as it is in the case of humans, so it does not prohibitbreeding manipulations that make organisms more useful to humans. But itdoes restrict morally how sentient animals can be used. In regard togenetic engineering, this conception requires that animals be allowedthe uninhibited development of species specific functions, a positionshared by Holland and Attfield, as opposed to the Original Purposeconception proposed by Fox and the Integrity of the Genetic Make-upposition proposed by Rolston. The inherent value conception of dignity,as here defended, is what is meant in the Swiss Constitution article.     

Impact of physical factors on the society and environment

In 1988 I published a paper “Electromagnetic fields—a new ecological factor” (Markov 1988). There was no internet and very few cell phones were available. It was not even fear from the hazard of the power lines. However, I want to cite the beginning of this paper: “The contemporary conditions of life put man in dependence of the complex of physical influences on the environment and in the first place—of the electromagnetic fields. The rapid development of science and technology has resulted in the introduction of many new devices and technologies in industry, agriculture, and everyday life. On the other hand, during their phylogenetic and ontogenic development, the living organisms are continuously exposed to the influence of different biotic and abiotic factors. The physical factors are included in the first group, and the entire evolution of life is connected with an adaptation to the action of these factors.” Could I repeat this statement nearly a quarter of century later? Sure, I will. The only difference would be that I will speak not only for electromagnetic fields, but for green-house effects, global warming, volcano eruption, and radiation disasters. I would also discuss the noise and vibration to which people are exposed from early days to the very end of their life traveling with private vehicles or public transport.     

Inspiring Respect for Animals Through the Law? Current Development in the Norwegian Animal Welfare Legislation

Over the last years, Norway has revised its animal welfare legislation. As of January 1, 2010, the Animal Protection Act of 1974 was replaced by a new Animal Welfare Act. This paper describes the developments in the normative structures from the old to the new act, as well as the main traits of the corresponding implementation and governance system. In the Animal Protection Act, the basic animal ethics principles were to avoid suffering, treat animals well, and consider their natural needs and instincts. In addition, a principle for balancing our duties towards animals with the needs and interests of humans was expressed by the formulation “unnecessary suffering.” These principles (only with slightly different formulations) are retained in the new act. The novelty of the new act is shown by its explicit intention to promote respect for animals and its recognition of animals’ intrinsic value. Whereas intrinsic value is only given a symbolic function, the notion of respect is intended to have practical consequences. One interpretation of respect for animals is taking the animal’s integrity—and not only welfare—into account. Another is to see the introduction of respect as a call to animal keepers to provide animals with welfare exceeding the minimum requirements. In several respects, the legal system now seems to leave more responsibility to the individual animal keeper—and to citizens in general. I argue that if the authorities really do want to promote respect for animals, they must at the same time initiate activities to achieve this. In my perspective the challenge is to provide adequate measures to achieve in practice the intended respect for animals expressed in the new act.     

Beyond the Prevention of Harm: Animal Disease Policy as a Moral Question

European animal disease policy seems to find its justification in a “harm to other” principle. Limiting the freedom of animal keepers—e.g., by culling their animals—is justified by the aim to prevent harm, i.e., the spreading of the disease. The picture, however, is more complicated. Both during the control of outbreaks and in the prevention of notifiable, animal diseases the government is confronted with conflicting claims of stakeholders who anticipate running a risk to be harmed by each other, and who ask for government intervention. In this paper, we first argue that in a policy that aims to prevent animal diseases, the focus shifts from limiting “harm” to weighing conflicting claims with respect to “risks of harm.” Therefore, we claim that the harm principle is no longer a sufficient justification for governmental intervention in animal disease prevention. A policy that has to deal with and distribute conflicting risks of harm needs additional value assumptions that guide this process of assessment and distribution. We show that currently, policies are based on assumptions that are mainly economic considerations. In order to show the limitations of these considerations, we use the interests and position of keepers of backyard animals as an example. Based on the problems they faced during and after the recent outbreaks, we defend the thesis that in order to develop a sustainable animal disease policy other than economic assumptions need to be taken into account.     

Across Space <Emphasis Type="Italic">and</Emphasis> Time: Social Responses to Large-Scale Biophysical Systems

The conceptual rubric of ecosystem management has been widely discussed and deliberated in conservation biology, environmental policy, and land/resource management. In this paper, I argue that two critical aspects of the ecosystem management concept require greater attention in policy and practice. First, although emphasis has been placed on the “space” of systems, the “time”—or rates of change—associated with biophysical and social systems has received much less consideration. Second, discussions of ecosystem management have often neglected the temporal disconnects between changes in biophysical systems and the response of social systems to management issues and challenges. The empirical basis of these points is a case study of the “Crown of the Continent Ecosystem,” an international transboundary area of the Rocky Mountains that surrounds Glacier National Park (USA) and Waterton Lakes National Park (Canada). This project assessed the experiences and perspectives of 1) middle- and upper-level government managers responsible for interjurisdictional cooperation, and 2) environmental nongovernment organizations with an international focus. I identify and describe 10 key challenges to increasing the extent and intensity of transboundary cooperation in land/resource management policy and practice. These issues are discussed in terms of their political, institutional, cultural, information-based, and perceptual elements. Analytic techniques include a combination of environmental history, semistructured interviews with 48 actors, and text analysis in a systematic qualitative framework. The central conclusion of this work is that the rates of response of human social systems must be better integrated with the rates of ecological change. This challenge is equal to or greater than the well-recognized need to adapt the spatial scale of human institutions to large-scale ecosystem processes and transboundary wildlife.     

Genetic Engineering and the Dignity of Creatures

The Swiss expert report suggests thatthe inherent dignity of a living being be identifiedwith its inherent value. But the phrase ``inherentvalue of a living being' seems to connote two conceptsof inherent value. One has a morally obligatingcharacter but is counterintuitive because of itsegalitarianism. The other is one of non-moral value.It is more compatible with considered intuitions butinsufficient for substantiating the expert report'sclaim that human beings have moral duties towardsanimals and plants. The paper discusses theseconcepts. Consideration is then given to the problemof how discursive support can be generated for theexpert report's claim that human beings have the moralduty to abstain from impairing those functions andabilities of a nonuman being that members of itsspecies as a rule can practice.     

“Würde der kreatur” and the common morality

If respect for the dignity of non-human creatures is to be an element of public policy it needs, as a first step, to be assimilated into the common morality. It is suggested that such respect may be based on several philosophical premises. Limiting the discussion to sentient animals, the paper reviews three of these: the concept of animal telos; the application of Rawlsian contractarianism to the case of non-human animals as moral patients; and human attitudes to animals in the light of virtue theory. Consideration is then given to the extent to which, by accommodating respect for the dignity of animals within the common morality, these principles might find more substantive expression in public policy.     

Green Space Changes and Planning in the Capital Region of China

Green space plays an important role in complex urban ecosystems and provides significant ecosystem services with environmental, aesthetic, recreational and economic benefits. Beijing is the capital city of China and has a large population of about 15.81 million. Construction of green spaces is an important part of sustainable development in Beijing. To attain the sustainable development of Beijing as a capital city, an international city, a historical cultural city, and a living amenity city, this article attempts to develop a comprehensive plan of green space development both at the municipal and regional levels. At the municipal level of Beijing, based on the study of green space changes, and taking physical geographic conditions and historical context into account, we propose to establish green barriers in the mountainous area, and plan a comprehensive green space pattern composed of one city, two rings, three networks, eight water areas, nine fields, and several patches in the plain area. At the regional level of the Capital Circle Region, integrating the characteristics and causes of main environmental issues, we design a macroscopic pattern—“barriers by mountains in the northwest,” “seaward open spaces in the southeast,” “grassland-forest-field-coast zones,” and “green-blue symphony”—for ecological restoration and green space construction. Finally, we discuss the principles necessary to implement green space planning considering adaptation to local conditions, composite function exploitation, interregional equity and integrated planning.     

The Good Life of Creatures with Dignity Some Comments on the Swiss Expert Opinion

The notion of Dignity of Creatures has been voted into the Swiss Federal Constitution by a plebiscite. Philipp Balzer, Klaus-Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber have given an expert opinion for the Swiss government to clarify the notion of Dignity of Creatures. According to them, by voting this notion into the Swiss constitution, the Swiss have chosen for a limited biocentric approach towards biotechnology. In such an approach genetic engineering of non-human beings is only allowed insofar that their own good is not impaired. It is, however, not clear when the good of a non-human being is impaired. I defend the position that – even if we confine ourselves to animals – their good goes beyond their well being.     

``Würde der Kreatur' and the Common Morality

If respect for the dignity ofnon-human creatures is to be an element of publicpolicy it needs, as a first step, to be assimilatedinto the common morality. It is suggested that suchrespect may be based on several philosophicalpremises. Limiting the discussion to sentient animals,the paper reviews three of these: the concept ofanimal telos; the application of Rawlsiancontractarianism to the case of non-human animals asmoral patients; and human attitudes to animals in thelight of virtue theory. Consideration is then given tothe extent to which, by accommodating respect for thedignity of animals within the common morality, theseprinciples might find more substantive expression inpublic policy.     

The Scaling of Water Governance Tasks: A Comparative Federal Analysis of the European Union and Australia

Conflicts over how to “scale” policy-making tasks have characterized environmental governance since time immemorial. They are particularly evident in the area of water policy and raise important questions over the democratic legitimacy, economic efficiency and effectiveness of allocating (or “scaling”) tasks to some administrative levels as opposed to others. This article adopts a comparative federalism perspective to assess the “optimality” of scaling—either upward or downward—in one issue area, namely coastal recreational water quality. It does so by comparing the scaling of recreational water quality tasks in the European Union (EU) and Australia. It reveals that the two systems have adopted rather different approaches to scaling and that this difference can partly be accounted for in federal theoretical terms. However, a much greater awareness of the inescapably political nature of scaling processes is nonetheless required. Finally, some words of caution are offered with regard to transferring policy lessons between these two jurisdictions.     

Environmental Equity and the Role of Public Policy: Experiences in the Rijnmond Region

This Φ Ψ study of environmental equity uses secondary quantitative data to analyze socioeconomic disparities in environmental conditions in the Rijnmond region of the Netherlands. The disparities of selected environmental indicators—exposure to traffic noise (road, rail, and air), NO₂, external safety risks, and the availability of public green space—are analyzed both separately and in combination. Not only exposures to environmental burdens (“bads”) were investigated, but also access to environmental benefits (“goods”). Additionally, we held interviews and reviewed documents to grasp the mechanisms underlying the environmental equity situation, with an emphasis on the role of public policy. Environmental equity is not a priority in public policy for the greater Rotterdam region known as the Rijnmond region, yet environmental standards have been established to provide a minimum environmental quality to all local residents. In general, environmental quality has improved in this region, and the accumulation of negative environmental outcomes (“bads”) has been limited. However, environmental standards for road traffic noise and NO₂ are being exceeded, probably because of the pressure on space and the traffic intensity. We found an association of environmental “bads” with income for rail traffic noise and availability of public green space. In the absence of regulation, positive environmental outcomes (“goods”) are mainly left up to market forces. Consequently, higher-income groups generally have more access to environmental “goods” than lower-income groups.     

The reintroduction and reinterpretation of the wild

This paper is concerned with changing social representations of the “wild,” in particular wild animals. We argue that within a contemporary Western context the old agricultural perception of wild animals as adversarial and as a threat to domestication, is being replaced by an essentially urban fascination with certain emblematic wild animals, who are seen to embody symbols of naturalness and freedom. On closer examination that carefully mediatized “naturalness” may be but another form of domestication. After an historical overview of the human-animal, domestic-wild construction, an anthropological approach is used to interpret the social representation of wild animals held by different social actors — farmers, hunters, and tourists — within the context of an inhabited National Park, that of the Cévennes in south east France. Within the Park, the domestic and the wild, along with agriculture, hunting, conservation, re-introduced wild animals, and tourists cohabit. It is argued that changes in the representation of “wildness” may well be an important indicator of changes in the social representation of nature.