Two Concepts of Dignity for Humans and Non-Human Organisms in the Context of Genetic Engineering

The 1992 incorporation of an article by referendum in the SwissConstitution mandating that the federal government issue regulations onthe use of genetic material that take into account the dignity ofnonhuman organism raises philosophical questions about how we shouldunderstand what is meant by ``the dignity of nonhuman animals,' andabout what sort of moral demands arise from recognizing this dignitywith respect to their genetic engineering. The first step in determiningwhat is meant is to clarify the difference between dignity when appliedto humans and when applied to nonhumans. Several conceptions of humandignity should be rejected in favor of a fourth conception: the rightnot to be degraded. This right implies that those who have it have thecognitive capacities that are prerequisite for self-respect. In the caseof nonhuman organisms that lack this capacity, respecting their dignityrequires the recognition that their inherent value, which is tied totheir abilities to pursue their own good, be respected. This value isnot absolute, as it is in the case of humans, so it does not prohibitbreeding manipulations that make organisms more useful to humans. But itdoes restrict morally how sentient animals can be used. In regard togenetic engineering, this conception requires that animals be allowedthe uninhibited development of species specific functions, a positionshared by Holland and Attfield, as opposed to the Original Purposeconception proposed by Fox and the Integrity of the Genetic Make-upposition proposed by Rolston. The inherent value conception of dignity,as here defended, is what is meant in the Swiss Constitution article.     

The good life of creatures with dignity some comments on the swiss expert opinion

The notion of Dignity of Creatures has been voted into the Swiss Federal Constitution by a plebiscite. Philipp Balzer, Klaus-Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber have given an expert opinion for the Swiss government to clarify the notion of Dignity of Creatures. According to them, by voting this notion into the Swiss constitution, the Swiss have chosen for a limited biocentric approach towards biotechnology. In such an approach genetic engineering of non-human beings is only allowed insofar that their own good is not impaired. It is, however, not clear when the good of a non-human being is impaired. I defend the position that — even if we confine ourselves to animals — their good goes beyond their well being.     

Human dignity and the dignity of creatures

In their report for the Swiss government on the notion of the dignity of creatures, Philipp Balzer, Klaus-Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber analyze the relationship between human dignity and the dignity of creatures, taking them as two categorically different concepts. Human dignity is defined as the “moral right not to be humiliated,” whereas the dignity of creatures is taken to be “the inherent value of non-human living beings.” To my mind there is no need to draw a categorical distinction between the two concepts. Both notions could be brought together under an all-encompassing concept of the inherent value of living beings, humans and non-humans alike, a concept one could name “the dignity of living beings.” Indeed, this very notion underlies the position taken in the report, although this is not made explicit by the authors themselves. As the aim of the paper is only to clarify the concepts used, I do not go beyond this “internal” critique of their position, i.e., I don’t assess how the claims articulated via these concepts — the claim that humans and/or creatures have an inherent value consisting in a supposed intrinsic good — are to be justified, although I myself would be rather skeptical that this might be successfully done.     

Genetic engineering and the dignity of creatures

The Swiss expert report suggests that the inherent dignity of a living being be identified with its inherent value. But the phrase “inherent value of a living being” seems to connote two concepts of inherent value. One has a morally obligating character but is counterintuitive because of its egalitarianism. The other is one of non-moral value. It is more compatible with considered intuitions but insufficient for substantiating the expert report’s claim that human beings have moral duties towards animals and plants. The paper discusses these concepts. Consideration is then given to the problem of how discursive support can be generated for the expert report’s claim that human beings have the moral duty to abstain from impairing those functions and abilities of a non-human being that members of its species as a rule can practice.     

The Good Life of Creatures with Dignity Some Comments on the Swiss Expert Opinion

The notion of Dignity of Creatures has been voted into the Swiss Federal Constitution by a plebiscite. Philipp Balzer, Klaus-Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber have given an expert opinion for the Swiss government to clarify the notion of Dignity of Creatures. According to them, by voting this notion into the Swiss constitution, the Swiss have chosen for a limited biocentric approach towards biotechnology. In such an approach genetic engineering of non-human beings is only allowed insofar that their own good is not impaired. It is, however, not clear when the good of a non-human being is impaired. I defend the position that – even if we confine ourselves to animals – their good goes beyond their well being.     

Beyond “Second Animals”: Making Sense of Plant Ethics

Concern for what we do to plants is pivotal for the field of environmental ethics but has scarcely been voiced. This paper examines how plant ethics first emerged from the development of plant science and yet also hit theoretical barriers in that domain. It elaborates on a case study prompted by a legal article on “the dignity of creatures” in the Swiss Constitution. Interestingly, the issue of plant dignity was interpreted as a personification or rather an “animalization of plants.” This sense of irony makes sense when one realizes that on scientific grounds the plant is a “second animal,” i.e., it differs from the animal in degree of life or some ethically-relevant criterion but not in nature. From the point of view of ethics however, plants should be defended for what they are by nature and not by comparison to external references: the ethical standing of plants cannot be indexed to animals. It is thus reckoned that to circumvent this odd fetishism, the plant ethics can only be adequately addressed by changing the theory of plant science. Common sense tells us this: plants and animals belong to radically different fields of perception and experience, a difference that is commonly captured by the notion of kingdom. In this paper we remind the ethical conversation that plants are actually incommensurable with animals because they are unsplit beings (having neither inside nor outside), i.e., they live as “non-topos” in an undivided, unlimited, non-centered state of being. It is concluded that the unique ontology of plants can only be addressed through a major change from object-thinking to process-thinking and a move from ego-centric to “peri-ego” ethics.     

Human Dignity and the Dignity of Creatures

In their report for the Swiss government onthe notion of the dignity of creatures, PhilippBalzer, Klaus-Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber analyzethe relationship between human dignity and the dignityof creatures, taking them as two categoricallydifferent concepts. Human dignity is defined as the``moral right not to be humiliated,' whereas thedignity of creatures is taken to be ``the inherentvalue of nonhuman living beings.' To my mind there isno need to draw a categorical distinction between thetwo concepts. Both notions could be brought togetherunder an all-encompassing concept of the inherentvalue of living beings, humans and non-humans alike,a concept one could name ``the dignity of livingbeings.' Indeed, this very notion underlies theposition taken in the report, although this is notmade explicit by the authors themselves.As the aim of the paper is only to clarify theconcepts used, I do not go beyond this ``internal'critique of their position, i.e., I don't assess howthe claims articulated via these concepts – theclaim that humans and/or creatures have an inherentvalue consisting in a supposed intrinsic good – areto be justified, although I myself would be ratherskeptical that this might be successfully done.     

The Moral Considerability of Invasive Transgenic Animals

The term moral considerability refers to the question of whether a being or set of beings is worthy of moral consideration. Moral considerability is most readily afforded to those beings that demonstrate the clearest relationship to rational humans, though many have also argued for and against the moral considerability of species, ecosystems, and “lesser” animals. Among these arguments there are at least two positions: “environmentalist” positions that tend to emphasize the systemic relations between species, and “liberationist” positions that tend to emphasize the attributes or welfare of a particular individual organism. Already, this classic conflict provides for some challenging theoretical clashes between environmentalists and animal liberationists. The question of moral considerability is complicated, however, by recent developments in genetic engineering. Some animals, like pigs and fish, have been genetically modified by humans to grow organs that can then be transplanted into humans. If environmental arguments for the moral consideration of species are correct, then we are released from our obligations to morally consider those animals that we have genetically modified, since they are by their nature always an “invader species.” If, instead, the welfare of the animal is of penultimate importance, then there is a case for strengthening the moral considerability of GM animals over “naturally-occurring” animals, since they bear a closer relationship to humans. This would appear to be an intractable problem, a “bad marriage,” as Mark Sagoff once proposed. This paper argues that the case of invasive transgenic animals exposes weaknesses in this classic conflict, and particularly, in the framing of this conflict. To remedy this framing problem, this paper argues for a reconceptualization of the term “moral considerability,” instead urging a strong distinction between moral considerability, moral relevance, and moral significance.     

What is Speciesism?

In spite of the considerable literature nowadays existing on the issue of the moral exclusion of nonhuman animals, there is still work to be done concerning the characterization of the conceptual framework with which this question can be appraised. This paper intends to tackle this task. It starts by defining speciesism as the unjustified disadvantageous consideration or treatment of those who are not classified as belonging to a certain species. It then clarifies some common misunderstandings concerning what this means. Next, it rejects the idea that there are different kinds of speciesism. Such an idea may result from confusion because there are (1) different ways in which speciesism can be defended; and (2) different speciesist positions, that is, different positions that assume speciesism among their premises. Depending on whether or not these views assume other criteria for moral consideration apart from speciesism, they can be combined or simple speciesist positions. But speciesism remains in all cases the same idea. Finally, the paper examines the concept of anthropocentrism, the disadvantageous treatment or consideration of those who are not members of the human species. This notion must be conceptually distinguished from speciesism and from misothery (aversion to nonhuman animals). Anthropocentrism is shown to be refuted because it either commits a petitio principia fallacy or it falls prey to two arguments: the argument from species overlap (widely but misleadingly known as “argument from marginal cases”) and the argument from relevance. This rebuttal identifies anthropocentrism as a speciesist view.     

Genetic Engineering and the Dignity of Creatures

The Swiss expert report suggests thatthe inherent dignity of a living being be identifiedwith its inherent value. But the phrase ``inherentvalue of a living being' seems to connote two conceptsof inherent value. One has a morally obligatingcharacter but is counterintuitive because of itsegalitarianism. The other is one of non-moral value.It is more compatible with considered intuitions butinsufficient for substantiating the expert report'sclaim that human beings have moral duties towardsanimals and plants. The paper discusses theseconcepts. Consideration is then given to the problemof how discursive support can be generated for theexpert report's claim that human beings have the moralduty to abstain from impairing those functions andabilities of a nonuman being that members of itsspecies as a rule can practice.     

Animal Rights: Autonomy and Redundancy

Even if animal liberation were to be adopted, would rights for animals be redundant – or even deleterious? Such an objection, most prominently voiced by L. W. Sumner and Paul W. Taylor, is misguided, risks an anthropocentric and anthropomorphic conception of autonomy and freedom, overly agent-centered rights conceptions, and an overlooking of the likely harmful consequences of positing rights for humans but not for nonhuman animals. The objection in question also stems from an overly pessimistic construal of autonomy-infringements thought to result from extending rights to animals, and also, of confusions that supposedly may ensue from ascribing animal rights. Whether or not a case for animal liberation and/or animal rights can cogently be made, the redundancy-or-worse objection to animal rights need pose no barrier.     

Deep Ethology, Animal Rights, and the Great Ape/Animal Project: Resisting Speciesism and Expanding the Community of Equals

In this essay I argue that the evolutionary and comparative study of nonhuman animal (hereafter animal) cognition in a wide range of taxa by cognitive ethologists can readily inform discussions about animal protection and animal rights. However, while it is clear that there is a link between animal cognitive abilities and animal pain and suffering, I agree with Jeremy Bentham who claimed long ago the real question does not deal with whether individuals can think or reason but rather with whether or not individuals can suffer. One of my major goals will be to make the case that the time has come to expand. The Great Ape Project (GAP) to The Great Ape/Animal Project (GA/AP) and to take seriously the moral status and rights of all animals by presupposing that all individuals should be admitted into the Community of Equals. I also argue that individuals count and that it is essential to avoid being speciesist cognitivists; it really doesn't matter whether ‘dogs ape’ or whether ‘apes dog’ when taking into account the worlds of different individual animals. Narrow-minded primatocentrism and speciesism must be resisted in our studies of animal cognition and animal protection and rights. Line-drawing into ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ species is a misleading speciesist practice that should be vigorously resisted because not only is line-drawing bad biology but also because it can have disastrous consequences for how animals are viewed and treated. Speciesist line-drawing also ignores within species individual differences. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Concept of Farm Animal Welfare: Citizen Perceptions and Stakeholder Opinion in Flanders, Belgium

Several attempts to conceptualize farm animal welfare have been criticized for diverging reasons, among them often the failure to incorporate the public concern and opinion. This paper’s objective is to develop a conception of farm animal welfare that starts from the public’s perception and integrates the opinion of different stakeholder representatives, thus following a fork-to-farm approach. Four qualitative citizen focus group discussions were used to develop a quantitative questionnaire, which has been completed by a representative sample of Flemish citizens (n = 459). Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were applied to develop a conception of farm animal welfare starting from an extended list of aspects that relate to animal production and associate with farm animal welfare in the public’s perception. In depth interviews with stakeholder representatives were used to match and adapt the structure of the animal welfare conception model. The resulting conception revealed seven dimensions grouped in two different levels. Three dimensions were animal-based: “Suffering and Stress,” “Ability to Engage in Natural Behavior,” and “Animal Health.” Four dimensions were resource-based: “Housing and Barn climate,” “Transport and Slaughter,” “Feed and Water,” and “Human-Animal Relationship.” This conception is distinct from earlier attempts since it is based on public perceptions; it addresses the opinion of different stakeholders, and it distinguishes empirically between animal-based and resource-based dimensions in the conceptualization of farm animal welfare. The relevancy of a popular definition is supported by the present demand oriented economy, in which animal welfare is a non-trade concern, and mainly left to the market where consumers still mainly act as individuals who calculate and weigh pros and cons.     

On vegetarianism,morality, and science: A counter reply

I recently took issue with Kathryn George's contention that vegetarianism cannot be a moral obligation for most human beings, even assuming that Tom Regan's stringent thesis about the equal inherent value of humans and many sentient nonhumans is correct. I argued that both Regan and George are incorrect in claiming that his view would permit moral agents to kill and eat innocent, non-threatening rights holders. An unequal rights view, by contrast, would permit such actions if a moral agent's health or life is at stake. I then argued that current nutritional research does not support Professor George's claim that some wealthy adult males (and many fewer wealthy women) are the only persons whose health does not require the consumption of nonhuman animals and their products. In her 1992 response to my critique, George did not address my moral argumentation. She concentrated her entire paper on a wholesale rejection of my discussion of nutrition. Although she now takes a somewhat more moderate position on who can safely contemplate strict vegetarianism, she still believes that most people are not in a position to follow such a diet. In my counter-reply, I argue that her rejection is based upon numerous distortions, omissions, and false charges of fallacy. She even devotes a substantial section of her paper to criticizing me for saying the opposite of what I actually wrote. As I did in my earlier paper, I cite current research, including George's own preferred source on the topic of vegetarianism, to support my view. I conclude that Professor George has still not shown that for most human beings it is dangerous to follow a diet that omits nonhuman animals and their products. Moral agents who take the rights of humansand nonhumans seriously will find vegetarianism well worth considering.     

Reflections in a Stock Pond: Are Anthropogenically Derived Freshwater Ecosystems Natural, Artificial, or Something Else?

“A skyscraper is as natural as a bird’s nest” –Alan Watts For millennia, people have altered freshwater ecosystems directly through water development and indirectly by global change and surrounding land-use activities. In these altered ecosystems, human impacts can be subtle and are sometimes overlooked by the people who manage them. This article provides two case studies near Boulder, Colorado that demonstrate how perceptions regarding these ecosystems affect their management. These examples are typical of lakes and streams along the Front Range of Colorado that are simultaneously natural and social in origin. Although natural, many of the region’s freshwater ecosystems are affected by ongoing ecologic, hydrologic, chemical, and geomorphic modifications produced by human activity. People and nature are both active participants in the production of these freshwater ecosystems. The concept of “hybridity,” borrowed from geographers and social scientists, is useful for describing landscapes of natural and social origin. Hybrid freshwater ecosystems are features of the humanized landscape and are derived from deliberate cultural activities, nonhuman physical and biological processes, and incidental anthropogenic disturbance. Our perceptions of “natural” freshwater ecosystems and what definitions we use to describe them influences our view of hybrid systems and, in turn, affects management decisions regarding them. This work stresses the importance of understanding the underlying societal forces and cultural values responsible for the creation of hybrid freshwater ecosystems as a central step in their conservation and management.     

The Benefits of Nest Relocation Extend Far Beyond Recruitment: A Rejoinder to Mrosovsky

Individual sea turtle nests have an extremely low probability of producting adult turtles; thus the practice of moving nests away from the ocean (where they will not be inundated by seawater) is a questionable conservation strategy. Recently in Environmental Management, Mrosovosky used the repeatability of nesting female turtles to place their eggs in certain locations to infer that some females may consistently nest in areas which will be flooded, lowering the chance that any eggs will hatch. This information was used to hypothesize that saving “doomed” sea turtle nests may then alter the genetic composition of the population, ultimately resulting in turtles that nest in poor habitats. Here I question Mrosovosky’s argument by focusing on several weaknesses inherent in the original article, namely that at present there is no evidence to suggest that nest-site selection is a heritable trait with an underlying genetic basis.     

“Würde der kreatur” and the common morality

If respect for the dignity of non-human creatures is to be an element of public policy it needs, as a first step, to be assimilated into the common morality. It is suggested that such respect may be based on several philosophical premises. Limiting the discussion to sentient animals, the paper reviews three of these: the concept of animal telos; the application of Rawlsian contractarianism to the case of non-human animals as moral patients; and human attitudes to animals in the light of virtue theory. Consideration is then given to the extent to which, by accommodating respect for the dignity of animals within the common morality, these principles might find more substantive expression in public policy.     

Inspiring Respect for Animals Through the Law? Current Development in the Norwegian Animal Welfare Legislation

Over the last years, Norway has revised its animal welfare legislation. As of January 1, 2010, the Animal Protection Act of 1974 was replaced by a new Animal Welfare Act. This paper describes the developments in the normative structures from the old to the new act, as well as the main traits of the corresponding implementation and governance system. In the Animal Protection Act, the basic animal ethics principles were to avoid suffering, treat animals well, and consider their natural needs and instincts. In addition, a principle for balancing our duties towards animals with the needs and interests of humans was expressed by the formulation “unnecessary suffering.” These principles (only with slightly different formulations) are retained in the new act. The novelty of the new act is shown by its explicit intention to promote respect for animals and its recognition of animals’ intrinsic value. Whereas intrinsic value is only given a symbolic function, the notion of respect is intended to have practical consequences. One interpretation of respect for animals is taking the animal’s integrity—and not only welfare—into account. Another is to see the introduction of respect as a call to animal keepers to provide animals with welfare exceeding the minimum requirements. In several respects, the legal system now seems to leave more responsibility to the individual animal keeper—and to citizens in general. I argue that if the authorities really do want to promote respect for animals, they must at the same time initiate activities to achieve this. In my perspective the challenge is to provide adequate measures to achieve in practice the intended respect for animals expressed in the new act.     

Rural environmental attitudes

Two frequent beliefs about rural environmental attitudes are examined conceptually and empirically: (1) the common conception that rural environmental concerns are expressed predominantly by wealthy community newcomers; and (2) the related position that long-time rural residents are hostile to the environmental cause. We argue conceptually, through the use of a 2×2 community matrix, that environmental attitudes are equally likely to be expressed by what we term “upper middle income newcomers,” “lower middle income newcomers,” “upper middle income locals,” and “lower middle income locals.” Empirically, we find that although wealthy newcomers express the strongest environmental attitudes in the community, their concerns represent only a small percentage of rural environmental attitudes consisting of respondents who make less than $40,000 a year in household income are over 40 years of age, possess less than a college education, and work in a nonprofessional occupation. This new category expresses environmental concerns at least equal to the rest of the community on three of four measures of environmental attitudes. The findings provide insight into the widespread and cross-sectional nature of rural environmental concern. The implication is that environmental groups will find significant sources of political support in rural communities, provided they craft their environmental message in a language consistent with rural attitudes and values. Things are gettin' bad fast. Easterners and environmentalists comin' down here from the big cities are tryin' to turn our way of life completely upside down. A western US rancher quoted in Krakauer (1991)     

Interaction Between the Environment and Animals in Urban Settings: Integrated and Participatory Planning

In urban ecosystems, the ecological system has become completely unbalanced; this, in turn, has led to an increase in well-known problems such as air pollution, ground pollution, and water pollution. This imbalance has also led to the growth and spread of pathogens harmful to man, animals, and plants. Urban sustainability indicators, both global and local, also “indicate” the percentage of population, but these refer only to the human population, not the animal population. Cities need good waste, water, and air management, effective traffic planning, and good zoning of businesses, crafts, and services; over and above these activities, cities also need for planning to take into account the existence of pets (dogs, cats, and etc.) and nonpet animals (insects, birds, mice, etc.). Cities tend to be designed around humans and “on a human scale,” without taking into account the fact that a huge animal population is living side by side with people. That explains why overcrowding tends to go hand in hand with urbanization; all these populations, including humans, need to adapt to new spaces and often need to drastically change their behavior. This is a fact that must be included when drafting sustainable city plans. The supposed strategy is that of “integrated-participatory” control of the interactions between the environment and animals in the cities. Strategy will focus on the development of integrated approaches and tools for environment and animal management in the context of urban settings. This will require such specific methods as ecological balance sheets and ecoplans for the planning, management, and control of the interrelation among environment, animal, and public health. The objective is to develop a better understanding of urban biodiversity and of urban ecosystem functioning, in order to understand and minimize the negative impacts of human activities on them. The research will focus on assessing and forecasting changes in urban biodiversity, structure, function, and dynamics of urban ecosystems, with relationships among society, economy, biodiversity, and habitats.