特种设备应急救援预案的研究

本文分析了特种设备的安全状况、应急救援预案的管理要求和现状,提出了应急救援预案的构成要素及其主要内容,以液化石油气储罐为例阐述了危险源辨识、后果预测以及现场应急处置方法,为企业编制特种设备应急预案提供了参考。     

辽宁营口港总体规划环境评价实践

以辽宁营口港总体规划环境评价为例,探讨了目前中国规划环境评价中的若干热点问题,包括多方案比选与“零方案”分析、区域生态环境影响预测与分析、规划的兼容性分析、公众参与、规划环境合理性综合论证等5个方面.研究表明,规划的兼容性分析和环境合理性综合论证是规划环评的重要特征.目前中国规划环评的介入时间仍显较晚,在基础数据库建设、公众参与、环境减缓措施等方面尚显不足.规划环境指标综合分析表明,营口港总体规划的实施,可能对海岸带生态环境产生一定的不利影响,但在采取一定的环境保护措施后,其不利影响可控制在可接受的范围内.     

Restoration of Marine Coastal Ecosystem Health as a New Goal for Integrated Catchment Management in Tolo Harbor, Hong Kong, China

This article demonstrates why it is necessary to have the restoration of marine coastal ecosystem health as a new goal for integrated catchment management in the coastal area of Tolo Harbor. The present goal of integrated catchment management (ICM) in the Tolo Harbor is based on water quality objectives. The performance of the ICM plan, the Tolo Harbor Action Plan (THAP), was evaluated using marine coastal ecosystem health indicators including both stress and response indicators. Since the implementation of THAP in 1988, some significant reductions in pollution loading have been observed: reduction of 83% of biological oxygen demand load and 82% of total nitrogen between 1988 and 1999. There has also been an improvement in the health of Tolo Harbor’s marine coastal ecosystem as evidenced by trends in physical, chemical, and biological indicators, although reverse fluctuations in some periods exist. However, such improvement can only be considered as the first sign of complete ecosystem health restoration, because ecosystem health covers not only physical, chemical, and biological aspects of an ecosystem, but also ecosystem service functions. The findings support the need to take the restoration and protection of marine coastal ecosystem health as a new goal rather than using water quality objectives. Steps necessary to further improve Tolo Harbor’s marine coastal ecosystem health are also discussed.     

Illegal fishing and territorial user rights in Chile

Illegal fishing poses a major threat to conservation of marine resources worldwide. However, there is still limited empirical research that quantifies illegal catch levels. We used the randomized response technique to estimate the proportion of divers and the quantities of loco (Concholepas concholepas) they extracted illegally. Loco have been managed for the past 17 years through a territorial user rights for fisheries system (TURFs) in Chile. Illegal fishing of loco was widespread within the TURFs system. Official reported landings (i.e., legal landings) accounted for 14–30% of the total loco extraction. Our estimates suggest that ignoring the magnitude of illegal fishing and considering only official landing statistics may lead to false conclusions about the status and trends of a TURFs managed fishery. We found evidence of fisher associations authorizing their members to poach inside TURFs, highlighting the need to design TURFs systems so that government agencies and fishers’ incentives and objectives align through continuous adaptation. Government support for enforcement is a key element for the TURFs system to secure the rights that are in place.     

Participatory development of incentives to coexist with jaguars and pumas

Reducing costs and increasing benefits for rural communities coexisting with large carnivores is necessary for conservation of jaguar (Panthera onca) and puma (Puma concolor). To design acceptable incentives, stakeholders must be involved in the process. We conducted an innovative, structured, group communication process based on a Delphi technique as a template for identifying potential incentives. Community workshops with 133 members of 7 communities and surveys with 25 multidisciplinary experts from government, nongovernmental organizations, and academia provided iterative data to design a plan of incentives through 4 rounds of discussion. The final product integrated 862 ideas into 6 types of incentives: organization of communities, mechanisms for improved dialogue, citizen technical assistance, green labeling for community products, payment for the ecosystem service of biodiversity, and an assessment of financial alternatives. We used quantitative and qualitative techniques to indicate support for decisions about the design of incentives, which reduced researcher subjectivity. The diverse incentives developed and the cooperation from multiple stakeholders resulted in an incentive plan that integrated issues of governance, equity, and social norms.     

“水十条”对工业水污染强度的影响及其机制

《水污染防治行动计划》(简称“水十条”)是国家为切实加大水污染防治力度,保障国家水安全而制定的法规。为检验“水十条”的政策影响效应,文章利用2012—2017年全国269个地级市的数据,结合工业化程度、对外开放水平、技术进步、人口规模、水资源禀赋等控制变量,运用双重差分法对“水十条”政策实施是否有助于减轻工业水污染强度进行研究。研究发现:我国中西部地区由于产业结构、技术水平等原因,工业水污染强度显著高于其他地区,“水十条”政策实施显著降低了中西部地区工业水污染强度。通过改变政策实施时间、剔除中心城市、增加控制变量以及剔除严重污染等方式进行重新回归,检验结果依然具有较强稳健性。进一步分析中,文章研究了产业结构以及技术创新的作用机制,发现第一产业比重显著降低,而第三产业显著提升,产业结构得到优化,并且技术创新效应显著加强。结果表明,产业结构升级以及技术创新均为“水十条”政策改善工业水污染强度的有效途径。在空间异质性方面,在环境规制强度较高的地区“水十条”政策对工业水污染强度的影响相对较小;而在环境规制强度较低地区却呈现出较强的抑制作用,主要原因在于环境规制强度高的地区水污染情况原本较好,因此污染强度降低幅度较小。因此,文章认为“水十条”政策能够显著改善工业水污染强度,并且加上环境规制、技术创新以及产业结构优化等手段的辅助能够更好地发挥政策效果。文章的发现为中国水污染防治行动提供了有益的政策启示。     

重点流域水生态环境保护“十四五”规划编制思路与重点

本文主要对《重点流域水生态环境保护"十四五"规划编制技术大纲》进行解读,在梳理当前我国流域水生态环境保护现状、问题以及形势的基础上,分析了重点流域水生态环境保护"十四五"规划的定位,介绍了规划编制的总体思路以及目标制定、问题和症结分析、规划任务设计和项目筛选等重点环节,并对做好规划编制工作提出了相关建议。     

科学谋划“十四五”国家生态环境监测网络建设

党的十八大以来,党中央、国务院高度重视环境监测工作,将生态环境监测纳入生态文明改革的大局统筹推进,取得了前所未有的显著成效。然而与建设美丽中国的新要求及国际先进水平相比, 中国的生态环境监测网络仍存在差距。笔者深入研究了当前和今后一个时期国家生态环境监测网络发展方向 ,并提出相应建议。针对空气、地表水、土壤、生态、声等要素的国家生态环境监测网络,分别提出网络布局及点位优化的原则,强调应通过理顺国家生态环境监测网运行机制、建立部门协作机制、健全生态环境监测法规标准体系、加强监测新技术研究及成果转化、强化监测装备自主研发等方式加强生态环境监测网络相关保障。     

Cost shifting and other perverse incentives in biodiversity offsetting in India

Biodiversity offsetting aims to compensate for development‐induced biodiversity loss through commensurate conservation gains and is gaining traction among governments and businesses. However, cost shifting (i.e., diversion of offset funds to other conservation programs) and other perverse incentives can undermine the effectiveness of biodiversity offsetting. Additionality—the requirement that biodiversity offsets result in conservation outcomes that would not have been achieved otherwise—is fundamental to biodiversity offsetting. Cost shifting and violation of additionality can go hand in hand. India's national offsetting program is a case in point. Recent legislation allows the diversion of offset funds to meet the country's preexisting commitments under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). With such diversions, no additional conservation takes place and development impacts remain uncompensated. Temporary additionality cannot be conceded in light of paucity of funds for preexisting commitments unless there is open acknowledgement that fulfillment of such commitments is contingent on offset funds. Two other examples of perverse incentives related to offsetting in India are the touting of inherently neutral offsetting outcomes as conservation gains, a tactic that breeds false complacency and results in reduced incentive for additional conservation efforts, and the clearing of native vegetation for commercial plantations in the name of compensatory afforestation, a practice that leads to biodiversity decline. The risks accompanying cost shifting and other perverse incentives, if not preempted and addressed, will result in net loss of forest cover in India. We recommend accurate baselines, transparent accounting, and open reporting of offset outcomes to ensure biodiversity offsetting achieves adequate and additional compensation for impacts of development.